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Introduction
Economic growth is one foundation pillar of modern democratic market economies, be-
cause it helps reduce poverty, increases levels of employment, contributes to a rise in
living standards through public services such as education, and health care, and reduces
governmental budget deficits. Over the last five decades, the annual mean growth rate
of the world’s real Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has been 3.5%. In order to achieve
similar rates of economic growth in the future and maintain current welfare levels, global
policy makers have to eliminate several threats. Among the most pressing policy chal-
lenges the world faces today are: in the short term, the task to overcome the aftermath of
the global financial and governmental debt crisis that started with the collapse of Lehman
Brothers in September 2008 and is not yet completely resolved.
In the medium term, a second threat to growth may come from the fact that economic
growth is associated with an increasing consumption of energy and that energy sources
to a great extent are exhaustible resources. The ambitious task here is to redirect the
global economy in a way that shifts the energy supply, currently based on limited fossil
fuels, towards the use of non-exhaustible renewable energy sources. Closely connected to
this is a third threat that could lead to great economic damages in the long term: climate
change. Consumption of fossil fuels, i.e. their combustion, emits greenhouse gases, which
are detrimental to the earth’s climate. Since economic growth is associated with an in-
creasing consumption of fossil fuels, global carbon emissions have significantly increased
since 1900: By 2010 the amount of carbon emissions had increased more than seventeen-
fold on the amount emitted in 1900, and one and a half time on the figure for 1990. If
greenhouse gases continue to increase in the future, the effects of human-induced climate
change such as hurricanes, floods and periods of aridity will occur more frequently with
corresponding negative effects on economic growth. To alleviate these growth-damping
effects, the industrialized nations have to decouple economic growth and further increases
of emissions. Consequently policy makers have to support the development of new abate-
ment and emission-extensive technologies.
In general, the process of developing and inventing new products or technologies of higher
quality is costly, since some capital may be needed to finance R&D expenditures in order
to even develop a new product. Then, some more capital is required to finance the cost
of producing this new commodity. On the one hand, innovative individuals lack the nec-
essary capital to finance their business start up by themselves if they have been already
successful in generating a new commodity. On the other hand, even established firms at
least sometimes need external capital to finance their R&D expenditures. Basically, these
different businesses can raise capital to finance their investments either by asking lenders
for loans or by issuing bonds/stocks on financial markets.
Empirical observations support the idea that business R&D investment is partially fi-
nanced externally through loans. What is more, the data show an increasing share of
external capital in R&D expenditures: First, total business loans divided by total busi-
ness investment in the U.S. fluctuated around 85% between 1960-2011 while the ratio of
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domestic credit to GDP increased from 78% in 1960 to 193% in 2011.1 Second, in the
same time period, the share of research and development expenditures (R&D) on total
investment expenditures in the U.S. increased from 8% to 20%. Third, long-term interest
rates on credit lending declined from 18% in 1980 to 3% in 2008. Since the relationship
between interest rates and investment is negative, the pattern of R&D expenditures and
interest rates indicates that aggregate R&D expenditures respond to interest rates. This
already suggests a relationship between financial intermediation and technical change:
the lower the loan rate on business credit, the greater is the amount of firms’ R&D ex-
penditures and therefore the rate at which new innovations arrive. Hence, the rate of
technological advance presumably responds to conditions on the credit market.
Moreover, empirical observations suggest technical changes to be biased towards cer-
tain factors: in almost all western industrialized nations, the prices of the two production
factors capital and labor have shown diverging characteristics over the past 150 years.
While the rental rate of capital has been approximately constant, the wage rate has con-
tinuously increased. This evolution in factor prices suggests technological changes to be
labor-augmenting. Therefore technical change is not factor-neutral and takes different
“directions”.
In addition, loan interest rates differ across industries: on the one hand, capital markets
allocate capital to sectors or countries where the highest return and thus the largest growth
potential can be expected. On the other hand, interest rates also reflect the risk inherent
in an investment project that investors (i.e. banks) would have to bear. Since different in-
vestment projects compete for loans, projects linked with higher risk have to accept higher
loan rates to compensate for the higher risk involved. Consequently, profit-maximizing
firms who are free to direct their innovation effort to a certain industry ceteris paribus
choose the sector linked with the lowest risk of default, because the associated credit
costs are the lowest. Taken together with the negative relationship between interest rates
on business credit and the size of R&D investment, this could indicate that banks and
credit might also affect the direction of technical change in a systematic way.
To analyze to what extent banks influence the direction of firms’ innovation effort is
worthwhile because, given the link between financial intermediation and directed tech-
nical change, policies that aim at forcing technical changes towards a certain direction
should take into account the effects of financial markets in general and banks in par-
ticular: Suppose, for instance, the aim of an environmental regulation is to support the
development of new technologies based on renewable energy sources, in order to reduce
the dependence on exhaustible fossil fuel energy and simultaneously to abate emissions
from fossil fuel consumption, which is the main source of man-made climate change. In
general, profit-maximizing firms engaging in innovation direct their R&D effort to the
sector promising the highest return. Especially, a negative external long-term effect from
carbon emissions on the climate does not directly affect the firms’ short-term return on
innovation. Hence, whether a sector is emission-intensive (“dirty”) or emission neutral
(“green”), plays no role in the decision of firms to which sector they direct their inno-
1Domestic credit to private sector refers to financial resources provided to the private sector, such as
through loans, purchases of nonequity securities, and trade credits and other accounts receivable, that es-
tablish a claim for repayment.
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vation effort, and firms do not automatically invest in the development and invention of
eco-friendly commodities. To make sure that they nevertheless target the “green” sector,
environmental policy has to create profit incentives for them to develop new eco-friendly
technologies that would otherwise not be invented.
If, however, firms are capital constrained, they need to raise external capital to finance
R&D expenditures and - after successful innovation - some more external capital to fi-
nance the production of the newly-invented commodity. Policies that affect the determi-
nants of expected profits should consequently take into account the influence of credit
markets on these determinants.
Here are two simple examples: Assume there are two sectors, a “dirty” and a “green”
sector. Firms decide to which sector they direct their innovation effort based on expected
profits. Environmental regulation seeks to direct innovations to the “green” sector. Now
suppose first that ceteris paribus the risk of a default on credit obligations in the “green”
sector is greater than in the “dirty” sector. Hence, redit costs would be greater in the
“green” sector, since the interest rate on business credit is higher to compensate for the
higher risk. Consequently, the expected profits are lower in the “green” sector, due to
greater credit costs. An environmental regulation that does not consider the effect of the
credit market on firms’ profits may be ineffective in the sense that intervention is too weak
to create an incentive for firms to direct their effort towards the development of “green”
commodities. This would imply that the consideration of the credit market would make a
stronger environmental policy intervention necessary, compared to the situation without
considering the impact of credit on the profits of capital-constrained firms. If the results of
my thesis turn out this way, then banks inhibit the response to environmental regulation.
Secondly, suppose that ceteris paribus the risk of default on credit obligations in the
“green” sector is lower than in the “dirty” sector, but expected profits are nevertheless
such that without intervention, firms would innovate on technologies for the “dirty” sec-
tor. Then, the credit cost to a firm who plans to invent a new commodity would be greater
in the “dirty” sector, since the interest rate on business credit here is higher to compen-
sate for the higher risk. In this case, an environmental regulation that does not consider
the effect of the credit market on firms’ profits is too strong. A less strong intervention
would still be sufficient to create an incentive for firms to direct their effort towards the
development of “green” commodities. If the results in this study turn out that way, then
banks promote the response to environmental regulation. Either way, given that firms
need credit to finance their ventures, the examples show that credit interest rates affects
the direction of technical change.
Therefore, the purpose of my study is to analyze the role of banks in directing endoge-
nous technical change with regard to climate change and economic growth. My thesis
also analyzes the question to what extent existing climate policy evaluations alter if credit
is considered among the determinants of directed R&D investment. To achieve this pur-
pose theoretical economic models will be constructed that account for environmental con-
straints and financial intermediation.
The first part explores the relationship between private sector lending and the rate and
direction of technical change: Profit-seeking individuals establish new firms and invest
in research and development to absorb temporary monopoly profits from patent protected
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productivity improvements on existing capital goods. These quality improvements are the
driving force behind economic growth. The capital goods are used in two different inter-
mediate sectors as inputs to production. Innovators direct R&D to capital goods in one of
the two intermediate sectors. Therefore, the direction of technical change is endogenous.
Yet they lack the capital resources to finance investments. Banks supply the necessary
capital. In simplified terms, the research question of this first part is: Do banks influence
the direction of technical change? To answer this research question, we construct an en-
dogenous directed technical change growth model and explicitly incorporate a banking
sector.
The second part examines the role of banks in the process of innovation and the invention
of ”green technologies” in an economy with environmental constraints. The two interme-
diate sectors now differ with respect to their levels of pollution: one sector is ”green”, the
other one ”dirty”. A by-product of dirty sector production are carbon emissions that lead
to negative effects on aggregate output through climate change. The second part answers
the exemplary question: What roles do banks play in directing technical change towards
a ”green” economy? To answer this question, we build on the results of the first part and
develop a model of endogenous directed technical change, financial intermediation and
additionally account for an environmental externality.
The third part evaluates different climate policy instruments with respect to their effects on
economic growth, their cost efficiency and their effectiveness in achieving a postulated en-
vironmental target. Any climate policy instrument seeks to direct technical change away
from the ”dirty” sector towards the ”green” sector; probably at the cost of (temporary)
negative effects on economic growth. This part answers the stylized research question:
What policy rules are best suited to help the economy move towards a path of sustained
and green economic growth? Here, we conduct numerical model simulations based on
the more general findings of parts one and two.
The dissertation is organized as follows. The next chapter gives an overview of previ-
ous approaches, methodology, relates my study to the relevant literature and states some
empirical facts. The first main part, consisting of chapters two to four, explores the gen-
eral relationship between financial intermediation, credit and the direction of technical
change. The second part, consisting of chapters five to seven, introduces environmental
constraints into the model developed in part one. In the third part, consisting of chap-
ters eight and nine, the study analyzes different climate policies and conducts quantitative
model simulations. The last chapter draws a number of conclusions and outlines possible
model extensions.
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1. Concepts, Methodology and Literature
Let us start with some fundamentals on technological progress, differences between factor-
augmenting and factor-biased technical change, the influence of financial intermediation
on economic development according to previous approaches, and the relationship between
economic growth and the environment. Throughout the rest of this study the words “en-
vironment” and “climate” will be used as synonyms and the challenge of reducing CO2
should be seen as a special case of the general challenge to reduce environmental degra-
dation and pollution. In this regard “environmental policy” here means in fact “climate
policy”. Note that these preliminary remarks serve only to highlight the motivation for
the present dissertation and provide some concepts that will be used throughout the rest
of this thesis. They are by no means complete with respect to the existing literature in the
different fields of research.
1.1. Technological Change
Suppose aggregate output of an economy Y can be described by a function of labor L,
a production factor Z and a technology index Q that is Y = F (L, Z,Q).2 Independent
of how Q enters this function, we can presume ∂Y/∂Q > 0: An increase in the technol-
ogy index Q parallels improving technology levels, i.e. technological progress. In this
regard, the relevant literature distinguishes the following three special forms of techno-
logical progress.
If the function is given by Y = F (L,QZ), then technological change will be purely Z-
augmenting. If we assume Z to represent physical capital, then this form implies purely
capital augmenting technical change, which is commonly referred to as Solow-neutral
technical change. In this form, technical change leaves the factor share of labor ∂F
∂L
L
Y
un-
changed provided that the wage rate (the marginal product of labor ∂F
∂L
) is constant.
If Y = QF (L, Z) holds, technical change guarantees the ratio of the marginal factor pro-
ductivities of Z and L (∂Y
∂Z
, ∂Y
∂L
) to remain unchanged, if the ratio of Z and L is kept constant.
The literature commonly refers to this form as Hicks-neutral technical change.
If finally the aggregate production function takes the form Y = F (QL, Z), then techni-
cal change is purely labor-augmenting, which is commonly referred to as Harrod-neutral
technical change. If again Z represents physical capital, then technical change leaves the
factor share of capital ∂F
∂Z
Z
Y
unchanged provided that the interest rate (here the marginal
product of capital ∂F
∂Z
) is constant.3
Due to the following two reasons, the latter formulation is probably the most accepted
one in macroeconomics. First, empirical observations show that technological progress
has been labor-augmenting over the past 150 years, i.e. the two key factors, capital and
labor show diverging characteristics: while real wages – the marginal product of labor –
2Formally, the economy is described by an aggregate production function F : R3+ −→ R+, Y =
F (L, Z,Q), where F is assumed to be continuous, non-decreasing in all variables, homogeneous of de-
gree zero and concave.
3For a formal proof of the equivalence of labor-augmenting technical change and Harrod-Neutrality, see
Uzawa (1961).
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continuously increased, the rental rate of capital – the marginal product of capital – re-
mained almost constant, which indicates technical progress to be labor-augmenting (see
Acemoglu (1999), Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004)). Secondly, only labor augmenting
technical change is consistent with the existence of a long-run steady state growth rate in
the one-sector neoclassical growth model developed by Solow (1956) and Swan (1956)).4.
In Solow’s model of economic growth, technological change is – alongside population or
labor force growth – the driving force behind sustained long-run economic growth. A
shortcoming of this formulation is that especially technological change is exogenous and
thus not explained by the model. Moreover the model fails to account for entrepreneur-
ship that might catalyze economic growth, i.e. the model formulation lacks a sound micro-
foundation.
In order to overcome these shortcomings, new models were developed, known today as
endogenous growth models.5 Roughly speaking, the endogenous growth literature imple-
mented the idea of Schumpeter (1912) that profit-maximizing individuals engage in R&D
in order to attain – at least temporary – monopoly profits based on patent-protected in-
novations. This search for profits creates an incentive to innovation activities that induce
technical change, which represents the engine of economic development.
1.2. Factor-Biased Technical Change
However, despite their strength and influence on macroeconomic theory, endogenous
growth literature does not allow technological change to be biased or directed to one fac-
tor. This contradicts the empirical observation that technological progress benefits some
factors and/or sectors of production more than others. So while endogenous growth liter-
ature ascertain innovations to respond to policy rules in general, the literature on directed
technical change sharpened these findings and showed that technical progress is neither
factor neutral nor sector neutral. The idea that technical changes should be directed is not
new. In their New view on technological change, Atkinson and Stiglitz (1969) stated
”[...] the Government should be concerned not merely with the level of investment or out-
put, but must make sure that firms are directed towards the ”right” technique on long-run
considerations.”
However, this idea was not pursued until Acemoglu (1998, 1999, 2002) developed a com-
prehensive framework that can be used to study empirical phenomena such as the question
why technical change over the past 60 years has been skill-biased, to determine the effect
of factor-biased technical change on the income gap between rich and poor countries, and
to what extent oil prices induced energy-saving innovations and so on.6
Using this framework, economists can, for instance, evaluate environmental policies that
aim at directing technical changes towards the development of new “green” technologies,
i.e. technologies based on renewable energy sources or emission-neutral technologies.
In order to delineate the notion of biased technical change and to distinguish this idea
4A complete proof of Uzawa’s theorem can be found in Jones and Scrimgeour (2004)
5See among many others Lucas (1988), Romer (1990), Rebelo (1991) and Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991), Aghion and Howitt (1992), Young (1993) and Grossman and Helpman (1993).
6See Acemoglu (2002), Hassler et al. (2012) and Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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from the concept of factor-augmenting technical change, consider the aggregate produc-
tion function of the form introduced above:7
Y = F (M, Z,Q),
where M and Z are the factors of production and again Q represents a quality index.
Then in contrast to M-augmenting technical change, technical change is M-biased if it
increases the relative marginal product of factor M compared to Z:
∂
∂F (M,Z,Q)/∂M
∂F (M,Z,Q)/∂Z
∂Q
≥ 0,
where ∂F (M, Z,Q)/∂M is themarginal product of labor and ∂F (M, Z,Q)/∂Z is the marginal
product of factor Z. Conversely, technological change is Z-biased if
∂
∂F (M,Z,Q)/∂Z
∂F (M,Z,Q)/∂M
∂Q
≥ 0.
In order to further clarify the concept, consider the aggregate constant elasticity of substi-
tution (CES) production function:
Y =
[
γ(QMM)
ε−1
ε + (1 − γ)(QZZ)
ε−1
ε
] ε
ε−1
,
where M, Z are specified as above, ε ∈]0,∞[ is the elasticity of substitution, γ ∈]0, 1[ is a
distribution parameter that describes the relative importance ofM and Z for the production
of Y , QM andQZ are factor (or sector) specific technology indices. Depending on the value
of ε, the CES-production function can take the following three forms:
• if ε = 0, then the production function is Leontieff, in other words the factors of
production M and Z cannot be substituted for each other,
• if ε = 1, then the production function is Cobb-Douglas,
• if ε = ∞, then M and Z are perfect substitutes.
In the remainder of this thesis, any two goods (or factors) will be considered gross sub-
stitutes if their corresponding elasticity of substitution is strictly greater than one (ε > 1).
They will be referred to as gross complements whenever the elasticity of substitution is
strictly less than one (ε < 1), since to distinguish between ε > 1 and ε < 1 is most impor-
tant for this analysis.
By construction,QM is M-augmenting and QZ is Z-augmenting. Whether technical change
7Since Acemoglu developed the formal framework of factor biased technical change, the following
explanations borrow heavily from Acemoglu (2002).
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is M-biased or Z-biased depends on the elasticity of substitution ε: The relative marginal
product of the factors M and Z is given by
∂Y/∂M
∂Y/∂Z
=
1 − γ
γ
(
QZ
QM
) ε−1
ε
(
Z
M
)− 1
ε
This relative marginal product of Z is decreasing in the relative supply of factors Z
M
. This
is due to the usual substitution effect, leading to a negative relationship between relative
supplies and relative prices. The more abundant factor is substituted for the less abundant
one. This holds independent of whether the relationship between the two factors is gross
substitutability or gross complementarity.
In contrast, the response of the relative marginal product to changes in the productivity
of Z, QZ, depends on the elasticity of substitution ε: If ε > 1, an increase in the relative
productivity QZ/QM increases the relative marginal product of Z. If ε < 1, an increase
in QZ relative to QM decreases the relative marginal product of Z. Consequently, if the
two factors are gross substitutes, Z-augmenting technological change is also Z-biased. In
contrast, if the two factors are gross complements, Z-augmenting technological change
is M-biased. If ε < 1, an increase in the productivity of Z increases the demand for M
by more than the demand for Z and consequently, the marginal product of M increases
relative to the marginal product of Z.
1.3. Financial Intermediation and Economic Development
Concerning the role of financial markets in economic development,“pre-crisis” macro-
economics offered surprisingly deviating positions.8 The first group of economists sug-
gest that financial markets had at the most a minor relevance in the sense that the de-
velopment in the financial sector follows ”real”-sector activity (Robinson (1952)) or that
macro-economic research overestimates the role of financial development when exploring
the determinants of economic growth (Lucas (1988)).9
The second group of economic researchers go one step further and proclaim their view on
financial matters with respect to economic growth by simply ignoring it (Chandavarkar
(1992), Meier and Seers (1984) and Stern (1989)). This was probably the most popular
view in macroeconomics until the great financial and economic crisis engulfed the global
economy from 2008. Ever since, macroeconomic theory has come under fundamental
criticism: because economists failed to consider financial markets in their macroeconomic
models, they were unable to predict the crisis. Anyhow, the response of macroeconomics
towards this kind of criticism is ambiguous. Some prominent mainstream economists
have lent their voices to this growing chorus of criticism, many others continue to adhere
to their earlier views.10
The third and last group of researchers build on the works of Schumpeter (1912), who
8The literature cited in the following is by no means exhaustive and provides only examples of the
different positions regarding finance and economic growth. But in terms of actual opinions, it is nevertheless
complete. For a complete review the reader may turn to the references given in Levine (2004).
9Lucas (1988) p. 6 states that economists ”over-stress” financial matters for economic development.
10Dutt (2010)
8
1 CONCEPTS, METHODOLOGYAND LITERATURE
%
t
ρ = 0.93
Deposit rate on private savings
Loan rate on business credit
1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012
2
4
6
8
0
FIGURE 1: Long term interest rates in Germany, Jan.1996-Dec.2012
stated that financial intermediaries have to be considered in the process of economic
growth, because they evaluate and finance entrepreneurs and help them invent new prod-
ucts. To name the most prominent ones among many others, Schumpeter (1912), John
Hicks (1969), Boyd and Prescott (1986), King and Levine (1993), and Levine (1997)
assign financial intermediation an active role in economic development that cannot be ig-
nored when exploring the mechanics of economic growth. However, the channels of this
active influence are still a matter of scientific debate.11
Independent of these different views on financial intermediation and macroeconomics,
empirical observations on (credit and deposit-) interest rates feature different properties
that are especially interesting for the present thesis.
Figure 1 shows the interest rates on long-term deposits paid to private households and
on firms’ medium to long-term credit demand per month in Germany from Jan. 1996 to
Dec. 2012.12 In the upper right-hand corner of the picture, I also stated the correlation
coefficient of the two time series, ρ = 0.93 which indicates a high positive, almost perfect
linear relationship between the two rates of interest. The data suggests the existence of an
interest rate spread, meaning a differences between interest rates paid to private household
deposits and interest rates charged on business credit. Classical financial intermediaries
make money from taking deposits, paying households an interest rate, pool these deposits
and supply them as credit to firms with greater interest rates. The interest rate spread is
the profit from financial intermediation.
Another interesting empirical observation is that interest rates on business credit differ
across sectors. Table 1 states the development of loan rates on long term credit paid by
11Summarizing the state of research, Ross Levine (2004 p.3) says that ”We are far from definitive answers
to the questions: Does finance cause growth, and if it does, how?
12Source: Deutsche Bundesbank
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firms in different industrial sectors in Germany from 1980 to 2010. The numbers in the
table show two important features for the purposes of this thesis. First, loan rates charged
on credit differ across industries. Second, but less important for the purpose of this study,
loan rates show similar patterns over time: between 1980 and 1990 loan rates declined
and then continuously increased from 1995 until 2010.
Especially in the period 2000-2004, where the bust of the ”dotcom”-stock market bubble
hit the global economy, loan rates were higher compared to those of the period 1990-
1999. Assuming that interest rates on loans reflect the risk inherent in any investment
project, this suggests higher risk premiums were charged on long-term business credit
during 2000-2004.
TABLE 1: Loan rates for selected industries in Germany, 1980-2010 in %
Sector \ Time period 80 - 84 85 - 89 90 - 94 95 - 99 00 - 04 05 - 10
Chemicals & Chemical prod-
ucts
10.66 6.62 8.27 7.54 13.44 14.42
Food, Beverage & Tobacco 7.31 4.67 5.53 4.30 5.06 6.10
Non-metallic mineral products 8.38 5.49 5.99 6.23 7.30 8.05
Machinery & Equipment 5.51 3.29 5.30 5.73 9.20 11.61
Basic metals & fabr. metal
products
18.17 10.45 9.66 6.00 6.45 7.73
Rubber& Plastic 10.64 6.51 8.34 6.64 8.22 9.29
Wood & Paper, Print 7.68 5.19 5.80 4.31 4.54 6.31
Textiles & Clothes etc. 7.14 4.37 5.09 4.59 4.94 5.67
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Deutsche Bundesbank, own calculations
In 2005-2010 the loan rates on business credit rose even higher compared to the period
2000-2004. While in 2008 and 2009 the great financial crisis lead to a global recession,
from 2010 a phase of slow economic recovery and uncertainty has prevailed until today.
This can be interpreted as empirical evidence that banks charge higher risk premium on
business credit whenever there is a higher probability of default.
1.4. Economic Growth, the Environment and Technical Change
Similar to the controversy about the role of financial intermedation in promoting eco-
nomic growth, the positions regarding the relationship between economic growth and the
environment differ widely. In somewhat oversimplifying terms, the opinions can be di-
vided into two different groups: One group of economists focus on the remaining and of-
ten serious environmental problems of today. Adherers to this position see the emergence
of new pollution problems, the failure to successfully reduce global carbon emissions and
the continuing dependence of the global economy on exhaustible resources. The second
group of researchers consider the long history of improvement in living standards and re-
fer to the enormous improvements in air quality in cities, urban sanitation, life expectancy
et cetera, all made possible by technological advance.
Over the last decades, the fact that the natural resource base of the planet is limited was
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viewed as the main source of limits to economic growth.13 However, in the recent past
it has become more and more apparent that limits to economic growth may also arise
from natures’ limited ability to act as a sink for human pollution, especially with respect
to greenhouse gas emissions.14 This pollution may lead to limits in economic growth
because further environmental degradation makes more intensive clean-up or abatement
efforts necessary that lower the return on investment. An even more pessimistic view is
that economic growth may be limited because further damages to the ecosystem lead to a
point of no return where the ecosystem deteriorates beyond repair and the global economy
moves to a less productive long-run steady state.
Whether there are serious limits to growth has long been a matter of scientific debate and
has not yet been completely resolved: Starting with Meadows et al. (1972) see the subse-
quent contributions by Solow (1973) followed by Meadows et al. (1991), then Nordhaus
(1992). Slightly more recently, Stokey (1998) showed that environmental constraints can
create endogenous limits to economic growth, while Aghion and Howitt (1998) showed
that this may not be the case if “eco-friendly” innovations are allowed for.
Closely connected to this, another scientific debate sparked around the question of how
optimal policy should respond to the task of dealing with climate change and limited
natural resources given that economic growth is negatively affected to some extent in a
laissez-faire future, i.e. without any environmental regulation. More precisely, differences
lie in the answers to the questions of how strong intervention should be in order to avoid
a climate catastrophe, should intervention be temporary or permanent, what are the long
run implications, and are there any costs involved in delaying climate policies into the
future?
To name only representative studies for the different opinions, from among approaches
assuming exogenous technology, Stern (2007) calls for decisive and immediate govern-
mental intervention and Stern (2009b) argues that intervention needs to be in place perma-
nently even though the induced economic costs are significant. A slighty more optimistic
view with modest control in the short-term and limited stronger intervention in the long-
term is suggested in Nordhaus (2008). Approaches assuming endogenous technology are
for instance provided by Bovenberg and Smulders (1995, 1996): The authors develop a
growth model featuring endogenous progress in abatement technologies, where the en-
vironment is modeled as a renewable resource. They find an optimal tax on pollution
that rises at the growth rate of pollution-augmenting knowledge. Goulder and Schneider
(1999) also study endogenous innovations in abatement technologies. Popp (2002) doc-
uments an influence of energy prices on energy saving innovations by using patent data
from 1970 to 1994. Buonanno et al. (2003) study the implications of the Kyoto Protocol
within an endogenous technical change model. Popp (2004) introduces directed innova-
tion in the energy sector and suggests in a calibration exercise that ignoring directed tech-
nical change might lead to an overestimation of the true costs of environmental regulation.
Building on these approaches, Acemoglu et al. (2012) construct a systematicmodel frame-
work of endogenous directed technical change to analyze the impact of different types of
13See “Limits to Growth” by Meadows et al. (1972).
14See for instance Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007).
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environmental regulation. Within the empirically relevant parameter space, they find that
in order to avoid damages in the form of climate change, immediate environmental inter-
vention is indeed necessary. They suggest using carbon taxes only gradually and instead
rely more on medium-term-oriented subsidies to R&D in emission-extensive sectors.
However, with regard to the present dissertation, none of the work just quoted consid-
ers the impact of credit markets on technical change in general nor on the direction of
eco-friendly innovations in particular.
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Part I
FINANCIAL INTERMEDIATION AND
DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
The following first part concentrates on the general role of banks in determining the rate
and direction of technical change. The goal is to develop a micro-founded general equi-
librium model framework to examine the impact of financial intermediation on the deter-
minants of directed technology innovation. In this regard, the present chapter serves as
a foundation for the more applied research work of part two and three, where additional
environmental constraints will be introduced.
The developed model combines elements from two different strands of literature and is
therefore related to each of them. First, the present study builds on the literature on
endogenous directed technological change (Acemoglu (1998, 1999, 2002, 2007)): the ap-
proach in its turn builds on the work of Schumpeter (1912), Romer (1990), Aghion and
Howitt (1992), Grossman and Helpman (1993) and features some types of profit max-
imizing individuals who engage in research and development (R&D) in order to attain
profits from inventing new commodities of greater quality. By extension, in the endoge-
nous directed technical change approach, innovative firms target different sector- or factor
specific technologies. The key feature is that expected profits from innovation determine
the choice to which sector or factor the innovative firms direct their R&D effort in the
first place. Consequently, the direction of innovations and thus technical change is now
endogenous.
Second, the thesis draws on the literature on financial intermediation and economic de-
velopment (Schumpeter (1912), Boyd and Prescott (1986), King and Levine (1993) and
Levine (1997)). This strand of literature is more or less entirely based on the work of
Schumpeter (1912), who stated that financial intermediaries have to be considered in the
process of economic growth, because they evaluate and finance entrepreneurs and thereby
help to invent new products. To understand the relation of this thesis to the second strand
of literature, suppose innovative firms have no internal capital resources to finance their
investment projects. Given that innovation is costly, firms need external capital. A bank
supplies these necessary capital resources. Now suppose for the sake of simplicity that
the expected profits from innovation across sectors differ only in the credit costs (for in-
stance due to different interest rates charged on credit liabilities). In this situation, the
sector linked with the lowest credit cost ceteris paribus yields the highest expected re-
turn on innovation. According to the directed technical change literature, expected profits
from innovation determine to which sector firms direct their innovation effort. Thus profit
maximizing firms ceteris paribus always choose the sector linked with the lowest cost of
credit. This already suggests an influence of banks on the direction of technical change.
The literature on endogenous technical change cited above, however, does not consider
this sketched role of financial intermediation in directing technical change. Therefore, the
model presented next builds on the findings of these two different strands of research and
extends existing approaches by introducing credit constraints and financial intermediaries
into the model framework developed by Acemoglu (2002).
Accordingly the rest of this part is organized as follows: the next section presents the
model. Here, we state the different decision problems, derive conditions for optimal be-
havior and market clearing. Afterwards, I define and describe the equilibrium, and present
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the key result, the determinants of technical change taking account of the bank sector (sec-
tion 3). Part one ends with a critical conclusion (section 4).
2. The Model
We start with a brief overview of the different model components and their corresponding
interactions in the different markets. Then we derive conditions of optimal behavior for
banks, producers and consumers. Then we derive aggregate sectoral and macroeconomic
variables and market clearing conditions.
2.1. The Economy
The economy evolves infinitely in discrete time t, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} and in each t, a contin-
uum of overlapping generations populate the economy, where each generation’s life span
being divided into two periods: In their first period of life, people are young and in the
second period, they are old. Assume that (i) at the end of each period, old individuals
are replaced by new born young individuals, so that each member of the old generation
has exactly one descendant in the subsequent period and ii) the population of the initial
(period 0) old generation is identical in number to the young population of period 0. This
formulation implies that the population is constant over time. So at each point in time, two
different generations populate the economy. Also, the two generations of consumers are
heterogeneous: Each generation consists of workers, entrepreneurs and innovators who
differ in terms of their access to investment projects and consumption profiles.
The other entities in the economy are: a sector of financial intermediation and a “real”
side of goods production. The production side exhibits a downstream structure: during
the first stage, firms produce a variety of capital goods, the second stage contains two
heterogeneous intermediate production sectors and during the last stage, firms produce
one unique final good. The final good can be consumed, transferred into future peri-
ods and invested in capital goods production or in R&D. The final or consumption good
serves as the numeraire: all prices, returns, payments and costs are measured in terms of
the consumption good. Overall, the considered economy contains the following types of
“agents”:
• Banks,
• Firms (final goods, intermediate goods, capital goods), and
• Consumers (workers, entrepreneurs and innovators)
who act in three different market types
• Goods markets (Final output, intermediate goods, capital goods),
• Capital markets (Deposit market, credit market), and
• Factor markets.
Figure 2 shows the different model entities and their mutual market interactions schemat-
ically.
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FIGURE 2: The structure of the model
Banks
The banking sector, located in the center of figure 2, interacts with two different agents on
two different markets: First, they interact with the workers on the market for deposits: in
each period, the banks demand the savings of the workers and repay these deposits plus
interest back to the workers in the following period. Second, the banking sector supplies
business credit to innovators on the credit market to finance R&D at a certain rate of credit
interest. Market conduct in capital markets, i.e. the deposit market and the credit market,
are perfectly competitive. Therefore the bank sector takes deposit interest rates and credit
interest rates as exogenously given and chooses sectoral credit supply and deposit demand
to maximize expected profits from financial intermediation.
Goods Production
Moving right from the center and proceeding counter-clockwise to the left, figure 2 shows
the goods production side of the economy. In total, five types of goods are produced in
three production stages: one final good, two intermediate goods and two continua of sec-
tor specific capital goods. The different production stages are connected in an upstream
manner.
In the first stage, a large number of identical firms produce the unique final good, using the
two different goods from the upstream intermediate stage. The inputs are instantaneously
converted to output, so in this production stage, profit maximizing decisions are static.
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The final output producers interact with four different agents in two markets: i) They sup-
ply their output to the consumers in the final goods market, ii) They represent the demand
side in the intermediate goods market. The final goods market and the intermediate goods
market are perfectly competitive. Final output producers choose production levels and
input quantities to maximizes profits for given factor input prices and output prices.
The second downstream stage, the intermediate stage, consists of two different sectors,
denoted by m and z. In either sector, a large number of identical, price taking firms
produce a sector specific good and supply this output on the intermediate goods market.
In this work, the subindex j To avoid confusion, note that the firms in the intermediate
and the final output stage are completely different firms. Similar to final output produc-
tion, intermediate firms convert inputs instantaneously into output. Hence no dynamic or
intertemporal decisions occur in this intermediate stage. Production here needs a sector-
specific production factor and a continuum variety of capital goods (or machines) that
complement this factor. The factors used in sector m and z are denoted by the capital
letters M and Z respectively. Let the index J ∈ {M, Z} identify the two factors used in
intermediate production. By construction, production in sector m is M-intensive and in
sector z, Z-intensive.15 Both factors are constant in supply. Beside the interaction with the
final output producers, the firms in each intermediate sector interact with two other model
agents in two markets: Firms in sector m use labor and a continuum variety of capital
goods complementing labor, so they represent the demand side in i) the labor market and
ii) in the “labor-complementing capital goods market”. Firms in sector z use factor Z and
a continuum variety of capital goods complementing this factor Z. Hence, these firms
represent the demand side in i) the market for factor Z and ii) in the “Z-complementing
capital goods market”. All intermediate firms take the factor input prices as exogenously
given. The model then derives intermediate good supply and capital goods demand en-
dogenously from static profit maximization.
In the third production stage, entrepreneurs and innovators produce sector specific capital
goods and supply these “machines” to the intermediate firms. Young innovators represent
the demand side on the credit market: they are capital-constrained and thus need capi-
tal resources to finance R&D expenditures. The capital goods exhibit different levels of
quality. Naturally, better-quality goods are more productive in manufacturing intermedi-
ate goods. So this rise in the quality represents technical progress in the two intermediate
sectors. In contrast to the intermediate and final output production stages, decisions dur-
ing this stage cover two periods of time and are thus intertemporal: in the first of two
decision periods, innovators decide i) how much to spend on R&D and ii) the direction
of R&D in order to potentially improve the quality of an existing capital good. The in-
novation process takes one period of time. Successful innovators sell the newly invented
capital good monopolistically on the market for capital goods in the subsequent period.
Entrepreneurs sell those capital goods where innovation was unsuccessful or even did not
take place. Together they represent the capital goods supply side. Profits from capital
goods selling are redistributed to the innovators and entrepreneurs.
15Note that factor M represents labor and Z is another factor of production that remains unspecified
throughout the first part. However one can think of Z as representing energy for more concreteness.
17
2 THE MODEL
Consumers
The consumer side in the model is represented by the workers, entrepreneurs, and inno-
vators. Thereby, each consumer lives for two consecutive periods. Workers are endowed
with one unit of labor time. Over their lifetime, workers interact with three other model
entities on three different markets. In their first period of life – when young – they inelas-
tically supply their unit of labor on the labor market to the intermediate firms of sector m
and earn an income from wage payments. They deposit their income in a bank account,
where deposits yield a certain rate of interest in the next period. Workers only consume in
the second period of life and, therefore, wish to transfer their current wealth into the next
period. For this purpose, they supply their labor income to the deposit market and receive
a deposit rate on their savings.
Entrepreneurs receive patents to produce capital goods of current quality for the two in-
termediate sectors. When old, they consume the profits from capital goods selling.
Innovators invest in R&D to improve the quality of existing capital goods. If successful,
they receive a patent to produce the new capital good of higher quality. R&D investment
is financed by credit. Young innovators initially select either one of the two intermediate
sectors to potentially invent a new capital good of greater quality for. The expected prof-
its from innovation determine whether technical progress is directed to one or the other
or both sectors, because innovators choose those sectors that promise the highest return.
This search for sectoral profits is the engine that drives directed innovations. In their sec-
ond period of life, old innovators then receive the profits from monopolistic capital goods
supply. Since individuals have no bequests, they spend the profits entirely on final goods
consumption.
The following table 2 summarizes all supply and demand interactions of the different
model entities:
\Market Goods markets Capital markets Factor markets
Agent Y YJ XJ H D J
Workers Demand - - - Supply Supply
Entrepreneurs Demand - Supply - - -
Innovators Demand - Supply Demand - -
Final output Supply Demand - - - -
Intermediates - Supply Demand - - Demand
Capital goods Demand - Supply - - -
Banks - - - Supply Demand -
Y = Final output market, YJ = Intermediate output market, XJ = Capital goods market,
H = Credit market, D = Deposit market, J = Factor markets.
TABLE 2: Supply-and-demand interactions in the different markets
Next, we state the different decision problems in detail and derive the first order optimality
conditions. We start with the description of the banking sector. The study then presents
the goods production side and finally states the consumers’ decisions.
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2.2. Banks
This study deals with “banks”, because a bank represents the classic example of a “finan-
cial intermediary”. Nevertheless, other institutions like credit unions, financial advisers
or brokers, insurance companies or pension funds are also financial intermediaries who
perform functions similar to banks in the context of the present study: here, a bank or
financial intermediary a) brings together borrowers and lenders and b) performs certain
functions that will be specified below. In order to highlight the role of banks with respect
to the intensity and direction of firms R&D effort, all financial transactions in the econ-
omy are entirely intermediated, no ”private” borrowing or lending is possible (Diamond
(1984), Williamson (1986)).
This section provides answers to the following exemplary questions: What is the relation-
ship between loan rates paid by innovators and deposit rates paid to workers? Do sectoral
interest rates on business credit differ?
2.2.1. Preliminaries
Crucial to the general relevance of financial intermediation in macroeconomic models is
some type of imperfect information. Otherwise, financial intermediation would be irrele-
vant to economic activity.16 Here the relevant model entities have no unrestricted access
to the available information when they make their decisions. More precisely, the econ-
omy features the following ex-ante information imperfection: Neither the banking sector
nor individual innovators themselves know in advance, whether they are successful in the
research lab. It is only public information that innovators are successful with a certain
probability that depends on the intermediate sector, they decided to potentially innovate
for, so the investment projects feature idiosyncratic risk. Since innovators have limited
capital resources, they need credit to finance their projects. Consequently, this lack in
information implies that the banking sector allocates some credit resources to innovators
who will fail in the innovation process and thus default from credit liabilities.
According to this set up, borrowers (innovators) and lenders (the banking sector) have the
same amount of information in advance. This is in contrast to the literature on borrowing
and lending relationships in partial or general equilibrium models.17 This symmetry in
the ex-ante information deficit rules out problems of adverse selection that are typically
associated with ex-ante informational asymmetries. A lender suffers adverse selection
when he is not capable of distinguishing between projects associated with different credit
risks when allocating credit.18.
Furthermore, innovators who have been successful in the research lab cannot hide their
16According to the Miller-Modigliani theorem (Modigliani and Miller (1958)), economic decisions do
not depend on financial structure in a setting of perfect capital markets. This implies that the addition of
“banks” to this setup would have no consequence for real activity (see for instance Bernanke and Gertler
(1985)). For a formal proof of banks’ redundancy in a simple Arrow-Debreu competitive equilibrium with
perfect capital markets the reader is referred to Freixas and Rochet (2008) p. 7-11.
17This literature is far too extensive to be listed here. An overview of the functions of financial interme-
diaries can be found in Bernanke and Gertler (1985), Levine (1997); Levine and Zervos (1998).
18An analysis of adverse selection problems in financial intermediation can be found for instance in Boyd
and Prescott (1986), Leland and Pyle (1977)
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success from the banks, claim unsuccessful R&D and then deviate from the credit liabil-
ity incurred. Hence, the present study does not consider moral hazard problems either,
typically associated with ex-post information asymmetries in the credit market. By moral
hazard, the literature means the borrower’s ability to put the funds to uses different from
those agreed upon with the lender, who is hindered by his lack of information and control
over the borrower.19 Accordingly, in this study, there is no need for the banks to design
credit contracts that satisfy participation constraints (the innovators must have an incen-
tive to demand credit) and incentive constraints (the innovators must be willing to act in
the best interests of the banks). What is more, innovators are not allowed to default on
credit, i.e. take the borrowed capital and run. So there are no problems of commitment in
this model framework.20
On the basis of this information set-up, the banking sector negotiates with innovators
in the credit market and with workers in the deposit market. The banking sector sup-
plies credit to the innovators in one period and receives credit plus loan interest rates in
the subsequent period. Thus, interest rates compensate for credit default risk inherent in
business projects: if innovators fail to develop a new capital good of higher quality, the
capital is lost completely and innovators default on credit liabilities. Since the chance
of successful innovation depends on the sector innovators decided to potentially innovate
for, the likelihood of successful innovations depends on the direction of R&D. So the in-
vestment projects contain idiosyncratic and, even more importantly, sector-specific risks.
From the banks’ perspective this implies risk of default on credit to be sector-specific and
thus banks penalize higher risk projects with a higher loan interest rates. Thus the model
features sector-specific interest rates on business credit.
Members of the working population save their labor income when young to finance con-
sumption when old. They take this income, enter the deposit market to store their savings
in a bank account and then receive a certain deposit interest rate.
In principle, workers could also lend their savings directly to innovators. However, pri-
vate savings are typically small compared to business investment projects and more im-
portantly, different projects of innovators contain idiosyncratic risks. Thus, the return on
any individual investment project and hence the income from savings would contain risks.
Workers are not willing to bear these idiosyncratic risks. So in order to diversify these
risks, they would have to lend their savings to a very large number of different firms.
And before that, workers would have to evaluate each individual investment project by
themselves, which is impossible considering their limited amount of time and capital.
Therefore, banks who specialize in these activities emerge.
The banking sector collects the savings from workers. Then these savings are pooled
and the capital resources are used to finance large scale business investments. Through
19For an analysis of asymmetric information and moral hazard see for instance Leland and Pyle (1977),
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980).
20For an analysis of this topic see Krueger and Uhlig (2006): The authors analyze dynamic equilibrium
risk sharing contracts between profit-maximizing intermediaries and a large pool of ex-ante identical agents
facing idiosyncratic income uncertainty that makes them heterogeneous ex-post. After having obserevd
their income, agents can walk away from the contract, while the intermediary cannot, i.e. there is one-sided
commitment.
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financing a large number of different projects with stochastically independent returns,
banks fully diversify the idiosyncratic risk and the workers receive a deterministic rate
of interest on their “portfolio” or deposits. To sum up, in this study the banking sector
performs four important functions.21 These are:
• pool a large number of small amount private savings,
• provide resources for business investment,
• diversify risk and
• evaluate prospective entrepreneurs (innovators) and finance the most promising
ones.
2.2.2. Decisions
Suppose, a continuum of identical banks operate under perfect competition. Each bank
collects and pools a large number of small-amount savings from young workers in any
period t and refunds savings plus interest to workers in the following period t + 1, where
rt+1 denotes the interest rate paid on workers’ deposits. Banks compete for workers’
savings by simultaneously offering deposit contracts that promise a certain rate of interest.
Since the banks are identical and competitive, they all offer the same deposit interest rate
and so workers’ return on deposits is identical across banks.22 Therefore workers are
indifferent between the different bank offers and they distribute their deposits across the
individual banks.
The banks use these capital resources to finance business investment projects. Innovators
borrow capital to invest in R&D. Due to sector-specific credit risk, each banks charges a
sector-specific loan interest rate on credit liabilities, denoted by R j,t, j ∈ {m, z}. No matter
what individual bank is considered, all borrowers representing an identical risk of credit
default are offered loan contracts with correspondingly identical loan interest rates to
compensate for the inherent risk. Consequently, borrowers are indifferent between offered
contracts and they also distribute equally across the individual banks. In the sequel, we
describe the decisions of the continuum of individual banks in an aggregate, decision
problem of a single, price taking representative bank.
The decision problem
This representative bank faces idiosyncratic uncertainty in credit supply: An innovator
(the borrower) trying to improve the quality of a J-complementary capital good in indus-
try ϑ j, j = {m, z}, is successful in innovation with a sector-specific probability η j(hϑ j),
where hϑ j represents R&D-effort measured in units of the final good.
21See also Boyd and Prescott (1986), King and Levine (1993), and Levine and Zervos (1998).
22Any deposit contract containing a deposit rate r˜t smaller than rt cannot exist in equilibrium, because
any bank that would offer such a contract would loose customers to competing banks that offer the higher
deposit rate rt. A bank that would offer a contract with a deposit rate r˜t higher than rt would make negative
profits. Hence, the banks all offer the same deposit interest rate rt.
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However, the returns of the individual innnovators’ investment projects are stochasti-
cally independent and consequently, for a large number, in fact a continuum of different
projects, these idiosyncratic risks are completely diversified. Therefore, the randomness
in the returns vanishes in aggregate terms and the aggregate banks’ decision problem be-
comes completely deterministic.23
Since ηm , ηz holds true in general, expected return from financial intermediation depends
on the total size of capital resources devoted to either sector m or z. Denote total credit
supply in sector j at time t by D j,t. Credit demand in sector j is given by R&D expendi-
tures in sector j, denoted as H j,t. The aggregate banking sectors’ deposit demand is Dt.
Aggregate deposit cost to the banking sector equal rt+1Dt. Total deposit supply is given
by aggregate savings S t. We assume that total deposit demand in period t determines total
credit supply in t + 1, so
Dt =
∑
j∈{m,z}
D j,t+1. (2.1)
With credit interest rates of R j,t, j = {m, z}, the return of funding equals ηmRm,t+1Dm,t +
ηzRz,t+1Dz,t. In a competitive environment, the bank sector takes the interest rates rt, Rm,t
and Rz,t as given. The banking sector solves the following optimization problem:
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max
(Dm,t ,Dz,t)∈R
2
+

∑
j∈{m,z}
η jR j,t+1D j,t − rt+1
∑
j∈{m,z}
D j,t
 (2.2)
A solution to (2.2) satisfies the following first order optimality conditions:
Rm,t+1 =
rt+1
ηm
and Rz,t+1 =
rt+1
ηz
. (2.3)
These conditions state the relationship between sectoral loan interest rates R j,t, j ∈ {m, z}
and the deposit interest rate rt+1 and shows that loan rates contain the inverse of the
success-probabilities η−1m , η
−1
z as risk premiums: the greater the chance of success in inno-
vation, the lower is the corresponding rate of interest on business credit. Moreover, one
can derive the following relationship between sectoral credit interest rates:
ηmRm,t+1 = ηzRz,t+1. (2.4)
This simply gives the condition that in equilibrium, the expected loan interest rates in the
two intermediate sectors have to be equal.
23In principle, the underlying law of large numbers argument holds only for averages of a countable
sequence of random variables, where as the model here features a continnuum of random varibales. How-
ever, Uhlig (1996) showed how to obtain a law of large number for a continuum of uncorrelated random
variables.
24This optimization problem is linear in the choice variables Dm,t and Dz,t. This implies that the bank
would supply infinite credit if the expected return is greater than the costs, since then each additional unit of
credit would generate a higher profit. If the costs are greater than the expected return, credit supply would
be zero. So in equilibrium the banks are indifferent, if the expected return from financial intermediation
equals the costs of financial intermediation. Thus the bank makes zero profits in equilibrium.
22
2 THE MODEL
Conditions (2.3) and (2.4) explain the relationship between loan rates paid by innovators
and deposit rates paid to households and answers the question whether sectoral equilib-
rium loan rates differ from each other or not. The answers constitute the main results of
this section and thus the following two propositions sum up these findings.
Proposition 2.1. Whenever banks finance innovative activities, an interest rate spread
between deposit rates paid to workers and loan rates paid by innovators exists: rt < R j,t
for j = {m, z}, i.e. interest rates on business credit exceed the interest rate on deposits.
This interest rate spread remains in place even in a financial market characterized by
perfect competition and is therefore not a result of monopoly distortion.
Proof: see appendix A.
Moreover, the condition stated in equation (2.4) shows the relationship between sectoral
interest rates charged on credit:
Proposition 2.2. In all periods t ≥ 0, the interest rates on private sector lending Rm,t and
Rz,t used to finance R&D can vary between intermediate sectors m and z.
Proof: See appendix A.
On the one hand, equation (2.4) is an equilibrium condition for the bank sector. The ag-
gregate bank is indifferent between funding innovators in sectorm or z as long as expected
returns on sectoral funding are equal. In the case of ηm > ηz the probability of successful
innovation and therefore the probability of debt repayment in the next period is greater for
innovators directing R&D to sector m than for those who direct R&D to sector z. Since
the bank bears the risk of ”losing money” a lower probability of success implies a larger
risk of default on credit liabilities. Sectoral interest rates on loans reflect these different
risks and include a risk premium. In the case considered here, the risk premium and thus
the loan rate is higher for innovators who direct their innovation effort to sector z. With-
out different loan rates, banks would always prefer the lowest risk borrowers, in this case
innovators’ investments in sector m. In other words, a higher interest rate enables higher
risk borrowers to compete for capital resources.
On the other hand, innovators are indifferent between capital goods invention in the two
intermediate sectors as long as the expected returns on innovation effort are equal across
m and z. In this case, innovators accept higher equilibrium interest rates paid on funds in
one sector and still direct innovation effort towards that sector.
To compute market clearing deposit- and credit interest rates and optimal sectoral credit,
we also need (deposit and credit) market clearing conditions and results from optimal
producer and consumer behavior. Therefore, optimal sectoral credit quantities and mar-
ket clearing credit- and deposit interest rates will be derived in section 2.6.
2.3. Firms
Consider now the economy’s production side. Goods production occurs in three different
stages that are linked in a ”downstream” manner: in the final stage, firms combine two
inputs from two intermediate sectors to produce the final output of the economy. During
the second production stage, firms produce the sector specific intermediate good by com-
bining two input factors: a sector-specific factor and a continuum variety of capital goods
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which complement this sector-specific factor. In both of these two stages, firms operate
under perfect competition. In contrast to that, the undermost and first stage exhibits im-
perfect competition. Here, entrepreneurs and innovators produce sector-specific capital
goods and engage in Bertrand competition. Innovators devote resources to invent capital
goods of higher quality. If successful, they become the entrepreneur on that capital good
line. I describe this competition in detail below. The innovation activity is the engine of
economic growth. I derive answers to the following exemplary questions: Does private
sector lending affect R&D investment and what determines the probability of successful
innovation? To save on notation, I suppress time subscripts as long as no confusion arises.
2.3.1. Capital Goods
In the undermost stage, innovators engage in research and development in order to in-
crease the quality of existing capital goods. If successful in the research lab, they in-
vent a ”new” capital good used in the intermediate production process. In capital good
lines where innovators were unsuccessful or even were not present, entrepreneurs pro-
duce capital goods with lower quality using existing technologies and supply these goods
to intermediate firms.
Innovations
Industrial R&D-investment and thus the process of innovation requires resource inputs
and responds to profit incentives. On the one hand, firms may engage in research to sig-
nificantly reduce the production costs of already invented commodities. This is defined as
process innovation. On the other hand, firms may invest in R&D to invent an entirely new
commodity, which is defined as product innovation. With respect to product innovation,
one can further distinguish two different forms: if a newly invented commodity performs
similar functions compared to those performed by already existing products, but offers
greater quality, the newly invented good and the existent good are vertically related. If a
newly invented good provides new functions and thus expands the variety in consumption
or the production set, the relation is horizontal.
In this thesis, innovators perform R&D to improve the quality of capital goods, i.e. in-
novations are vertically related to existing capital goods. Hence, the developed model
equates economic growth with the rise of average capital goods quality. I abstract from
any expansion of variety. This can be done, since the general results of this study do not
depend on any assumption as to whether the relation between existing and newly invented
products is vertical or horizontal.
In order to ensure the possibility of permanent economic growth, every capital goods
quality can be improved an unlimited number of times. There is a set of product lines
or industries, each member of this set representing one line of capital good of probably
infinite different qualities. Since the variety of capital goods does not expand, the set of
industries or varieties is constant through time and I impose the following assumption
with regard to the set of capital goods:
Assumption 2.1. Let the index j = {m, z} denote the two intermediate sectors and let
Θ j denote the set of industries or capital good lines in sector j. Then each ϑ j ∈ Θ j
corresponds to a different capital good line (machine type). The set of different industries
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Θ j is fixed through time and hence, Θ j can be normalized to 1, i.e. Θ j := [0, 1] for
j = {m, z}.
Accordingly, in each sector j a continuum of capital goods exists, whose mass is nor-
malized to unity. Thereby, each product line ϑ j complements sector-specific production
factor J ∈ {M, Z}. So machines of type ϑm (type ϑz) cannot be used in sector z (sector m)
production. In every industry ϑ j, the number of vertically differentiated varieties or qual-
ities is given by q(nϑ j), whereby nϑ j := {0, 1, 2, ...} denotes the n
th product generation in
industry ϑ j complementing sector j = {m, z}. Different product lines complementing the
same factor substitute each other imperfectly. Within any product line, goods of different
quality substitute each other perfectly. In order to avoid an overload of notation, I make
the following:
Assumption 2.2. Let q(nϑ j) be defined as above. Then the quality of each new generation
of J-complementary capital goods is exactly λ j times the quality of the preceding product
generation. Hence,
q(nϑ j) = λ jq(nϑ j − 1) for all nϑ j = 0, 1, 2, ... and ϑ j ∈ Θ j, λ j > 1.
To save on notation, we write qϑ j instead of q(nϑ j) and simply mean the current quality
level of capital good line ϑ j.
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The ”size” of the innovation on product lines ϑ j differs with respect to the target sec-
tor j = {m, z}. Therefore λ j is sector-specific and λm , λz might hold. In this study,
λ j is exogenously fixed. Consequently, capital goods producers treat λ j as a parameter
and the amount of additional services provided by the newly invented product generation
compared to the previous generation does not depend on the size of resources devoted to
R&D.26
These different forms of a step-by-step rise in the quality of a commodity are commonly
referred to as innovation on a ”quality ladder”: whenever a firm is successful in the re-
search lab and develops a blue print of a higher quality product, it ”jumps” one step up
the quality ladder. Figure 3 plots schematic quality ladders for exogenously fixed and
endogenous, R&D-dependent increases in product line quality qϑ j . In the pictures, the
horizontal axis plots different product lines ϑ j. The vertical axis plots the corresponding
25For a constant rise in product quality λ j, the number of previous innovations can always be calculated
from the current level of product quality:
q(ϑ j) = λ
nϑ j
j
.
Taking the logarithm leads to
nϑ j =
log(q(ϑ j)
log(λ j)
.
26Alternatively, λ j could decrease with every newly invented product generation. This formulation would
take into account the increasing difficulty of finding new services with each invention of a new, more service
providing commodity.Finally, λ j could also vary endogenously. Then the size of the rise in quality from
q(nϑ j − 1) to q(nϑ j) would depend on R&D spending.
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FIGURE 3: Schematic representation of different quality ladders
quality qϑ j . One vertical ray corresponds to one product line or industry and on each ray,
the dots denote different product generations. The arrows denote successful product in-
novations by some research lab in that industry. In this case, the corresponding product
quality jumps up one step on the quality ladder. In picture a), the dots are equidistantly
distributed along each ray. Hence, a successful innovation increases the quality by the
same amount, independent of the product position on the ladder and the amount of re-
sources devoted to R&D. In picture b), the quality jumps are also exogenous. In contrast
to picture a) the size of a step on the quality ladder is smaller, the higher the ”leading-
edge” product quality is. In this case, the rise in the amount of services decreases with
the number of previous innovations. In picture c), the quality-jump-size is endogenous.
Here, qϑ j responds to R&D: the amount of additional services depends on the amount of
resources devoted to R&D. Consequently, firms face a trade-off between the higher costs
of more ambitious research and the extra profits that could be earned with greater product
quality.
In this study, however, the rise in product quality is exogenously fixed and constant. First,
this formulation keeps the model complexity as low as possible. Second and more impor-
tantly, the direction of innovation efforts is determined by the following two forces, which
do not depend on assumptions as to whether capital goods quality changes exogenously
or endogenously: i) the relative probability of successfully developing new capital goods,
as given by ηz/ηm and ii) the relative size of the jump in capital goods quality in the two
intermediate sectors m and z in the case of successful innovation, as given by λz/λm. In
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contrast, it is not at all important whether the size of jumps in product quality declines
with the number of previous innovations, or if the size of quality jumps responds to R&D
expenditures.
Last but not least, there are different formulations of the necessary inputs in the inno-
vation process. i) The R&D-process could demand labor as the only input, ii) R&D
could be such that labor and some additional goods are required or iii) only one physical
good is transformed into R&D output. Moreover the process could additionally demand
some time units et cetera. Note that each formulation carries specific implications for
the growth rate of the economy. In this study, innovators borrow a certain amount of the
consumption good from banks to perform R&D. No other inputs are required. The R&D
process involves only the final good being used in generating new innovations. According
to Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991), this specification is referred to as the ‘lab equipment‘
specification.
Entrepreneurs and Innovators
Each intermediate sector uses a continuum of different capital goods in the production
process. Each capital good is supplied monopolistically either by an entrepreneur or by
an innovator. Entrepreneurs hold patents to produce capital goods of existing quality.
Innovators try to invent new generations of product with higher quality in some of the
capital good lines. If innovation is successful, the innovators receive a patent on that in-
novation and they supply the newly invented good of higher quality to the intermediate
firms. The entrepreneur on that product line makes zero profit. If innovation is not suc-
cessful, the entrepreneur exclusively sells the capital good with existent quality level to
the intermediate sector. Key feature here is, that innovators decide to which sector they
direct their R&D effort on the basis of expected profits. This is the engine of endogenous
directed technical change.
The competition between entrepreneurs and innovators in detail can be described as fol-
lows. In capital good lines where innovators are present, entrepreneurs and innovators
operate in a market with Bertrand competition: no matter what sector j ∈ {m, z} or capital
good line ϑ j, marginal and average production costs are identical and entrepreneurs and
innovators compete by setting prices simultaneously. Thereby, each entrepreneur initially
holds a patent on the blueprint to produce the current highest quality capital good in capi-
tal good line ϑJ . Innovators can observe the product characteristics of this “leading-edge”
capital good and engage in R&D to invent new capital goods of higher quality. Although
competitors set prices equal to marginal costs and so product prices are identical in princi-
ple. However, if an innovator develops a new capital good of higher quality, this supplied
good offers greater product quality compared to previous generations of this specific prod-
uct. Here, I consider an institutional setup, where inventors of new ”leading-edge” capital
goods receive a one-period patent for the production and sale of that good. Abstract-
ing from any search- or transaction costs, intermediate sectors want to buy capital goods
of the highest quality standard, given identical prices for all generations of that product.
Consequently, the firm offering the highest quality or equivalently the firm demanding
the lowest quality-adjusted price within any one industry ϑJ gains the complete market
demand and the ”leading-edge” capital good in any industry is again monopolistically
27
2 THE MODEL
supplied. Therefore, positive monopolistic profits are realized by successful innovators
and by those entrepreneurs who operate on a capital good line, where innovation was not
successful or did not take place at all. Together this implies that competition between
innovators and entrepreneurs takes place on an individual level.
With respect to the size of the quality jump after innovation λ j, I impose the following
assumption:
Assumption 2.3. Independent of the sectors j = {m, z} innovators direct their innovation
effort to, the size of the innovation is drastic if λ j is sufficiently high to guarantee the
innovator the unrestricted monopoly profit. This holds true if the price set after innovation
is less than or equal to the marginal cost of production:
pϑ j ≤ ψ for all nϑ j = 1, 2, ..., ϑ j ∈ Θ j, j ∈ {m, z}.
The innovations are drastic in the sense that entrepreneurs with the “old” production tech-
nology can not compete with an innovator that has the “new” technology when the inno-
vator chooses a monopoly price. In this regard, the new capital good of higher quality
makes the old capital good obsolete. One could also assume innovations to be non-drastic
in the sense that pnϑ j > ψ. Then the innovator would practice limit pricing in equilibrium
by setting the price equal to the rivals marginal costs.27 The results here do not depend on
whether innovations are drastic or non-drastic. More importantly a successful innovation
leads to (temporary) monopoly power, which ensures positive profits from innovation and
thus encourages research activities in the first place. One can show that this contrasts to
firms’ research activities if they operated in a perfectly competitive market. In fact, the
next proposition shows that
Proposition 2.3. In a capital goods market characterized by perfect competition, produc-
ers have no incentive to devote costly innovation effort to any target sector J = {M, Z}.
Proof see appendix A.
So new born innovators choose an intermediate sector m or z to direct R&D to and -if the
innovation is successful- to sell capital goods to. Note that they are indifferent between
these target sectors as long as expected profits in both sectors are equal. After a target
sector has been chosen, young innovators need credit to finance R&D investment, since
this venture is costly and they lack the necessary capital resources. Thus financial inter-
mediaries lend the capital to them at a certain rate of interest.28
27A detailed analysis of this topic can be found in Grossman and Helpman (1993), Mas-Colell et al.
(1995).
28This lack of resources is in contrast to standard models of endogenous growth (Rivera-Batiz and Romer
(1991), Romer (1990)) and growthmodels of factor biased technical change (Acemoglu (2002)), where each
potential entrepreneur takes ψ from the jar of final goods. The assumption of capital-constrained innovators
has been used in different strands of research. For an analysis regarding endogenous growth and finance
see for instance King and Levine (1993). Moreover, Williamson (1986) assume external project finance to
analyze optimal debt contracts under asymmetric information. As in Williamson (1986, 1987), Bernanke
and Gertler (1989), the formulation presented here implies a fixed project size. In other words the decision,
which sector the individual chooses to produce machines for, does not depend on the project size and the
size of a project remains constant over time. A variable loan size is considered for instance in Gale and
Hellwig (1985).
28
2 THE MODEL
Then, innovators in sector j distribute across the different capital good lines ϑ j. Each
innovator observes the characteristics of her current state of the art product with quality
qϑ j := qnϑ j and spends h units of the final good for R&D to improve the quality of that
commodity to q′
ϑ j
= λ jqϑ j . If successful, the development of a leading edge commodity
allows an innovator to sell the commodity exclusively in the following period. At the end
of that period, the corresponding patent protection ends. Independent of the intermediate
sector j = {m, z} a capital good is produced for, the unit costs are given ψ. Without loss of
generality, I normalize ψ ≡ 1.
Each individual innovator needs credit equal to finance R&D expenditures so she borrows
h units of the final good in period t and returns this loan plus the interest charged on that
credit back to the bank in period t + 1. To indicate the dependence of R&D expenditures
on credit interest rates and also on current quality levels of the corresponding good that
is planned to be improved, we denote period t R&D expenditures as hϑ j,t (R j,t+1). Accord-
ingly, credit contracts between innovators and banks are signed on an individual level.
Innovators and entrepreneurs face a two-stage decision process within two consecutive
periods of time. Innovators’ first decision period is the research and planning period. In
this stage, they decide on R&D expenditures. Young innovators engage in costly R&D
if the net present value of expected future profits is at least as large as the net present
value of total expenditures. If this is the case, then they ask banks to finance this ven-
ture. Young entrepreneurs do not undertake any actions in the first decision period. Old
innovators then set the profit maximizing price of their capital good, given that they were
successful in the first period. Old entrepreneurs set the price in the second period given
that innovation on their product line was not successful or even did not take place at all.
In the following, we refer to innovators and entrepreneurs who supply a capital good as
“capital good producers”.
So in the second stage, capital goods producers determine the optimal price at which they
are going to sell the capital goods to the intermediate sectors. Given intermediate demand
for capital goods, this price determines the profit flow in the second period and thus de-
termines the net present value of profit in the first stage.
Consider an arbitrary period t. This period t is referred to as the ”first” decision period
and the subsequent period t + 1 is the ”second” decision period. The decision problem
is solved recursively. First we establish the optimal price for a capital goods producer
to set in the second decision period, t + 1, given that either the person succeeded in the
research lab in the previous period t if is an innovator or, if he is an entrepreneur, given
that no innovator tried to improve the quality of his capital good or tried but failed. After-
wards, we derive individual and sectoral R&D expenditures and compute the probability
of successful innovation.
Profit maximization
Ignoring time subscripts for the moment, the demand for the capital good ϑ j in the inter-
mediate sector j is given by
x j(pϑ j) =
(µp j
pϑ j
) 1
1−µ
qϑ jJ, j ∈ {m, z}, (2.5)
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where pϑ j denotes the price of the capital good, which is the choice variable of the cap-
ital goods producer and will be determined next. qϑ j is the quality level of capital good
ϑ j, p j denotes the price of the intermediate good in sector j and J = {M, Z} represents
the sector-specific factor in sector j ∈ {m, z}, all are given to the monopolistic producer.
Equation (2.5) above is determined at the intermediate stage and corresponds to equation
(2.21b) in the next section. For the moment it is enough to note that the demand x(pϑ j ) is
decreasing in its price pϑ j .
Capital goods producers take the demand above as given and maximize profits. The sec-
ond period decision problem of an innovator in period t + 1 then reads:
max
(pϑ j ,t+1)∈R+
{(
pϑ j ,t+1 − 1
)
x j,t+1(pϑ j) − R j,t+1hϑ j,t(R j,t+1) | x j,t+1(pϑ j,t+1) = (2.5)
}
(2.6)
and the decision of an entrepreneur is given by:
max
(pϑ j ,t+1)∈R+
{(
pϑ j,t+1 − 1
)
x j,t+1(pϑ j) | x j,t+1(pϑ j,t+1) = (2.5)
}
(2.7)
These optimization problems are identical in the second decision stage and differ only by
the term R j,t+1hϑ j,t representing the cost of R&D. As the time index indicates, this term is
determined in the first decision stage and thus plays no role in the determination of the
profit maximizing price. The first order optimality condition with respect to pϑ j,t+1 gives
the profit maximizing monopoly price of a capital good ϑ j:
pϑ j ,t+1 =
1
µ
, (2.8)
which is a constant markup over marginal cost and equal across industries ϑ j.
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The resulting flow of monopoly profit for an innovator then can be computed as
π
(i)
ϑ j ,t+1
= π¯ j,t+1qϑ j,t+1 − R j,t+1hϑ j,t(R j,t+1) (2.9)
and the monopoly profit for an entrepreneur e reads
π
(e)
ϑ j ,t+1
= π¯ j,t+1qϑ j,t+1, (2.10)
where π¯ j,t+1 := (1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µ p
1
1−µ
j,t+1Jt+1. Since the supply of factor M (no population growth)
and Z is constant, the influence of factors J = {M, Z} on profits is constant.
29Nevertheless, I keep ϑ j as ”arguments” in the expression in order to distinguish the price of a capital
good from the price of the intermediate good p j,t+1 and also to indicate that the price corresponds to a
product line.
30The monopoly price would depend on the loan rate R j if capital goods producers would also lack the
resources to finance production inputs. In this case, marginal production costs would equal to the loan rate.
In this regard, capital goods producers would face a dynamic decision problem: banks provide the capital
resources to finance production inputs in the ”first” period. Firms can pay back credit only after selling the
capital good in the ”second” period and thus have to pay the interest rate on credit. Hence, the monopoly
price for a capital good would contain the interest rate R j, since each additional unit of production must be
financed by credit.
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R&D and the probability of successful innovation
In the first decision stage, innovators determine the amount of their R&D expenditure
and so the amount of capital they demand as credit from the banks. Innovators who are
successful in the research lab, receive a patent to produce the newly invented good. How-
ever, an innovator’s patent protects the invented good for one period only. Therefore, the
net present value of future profits from innovation in industry ϑ j on a J-complementary
capital good is
Vϑ j,t =
Et[π
(i)
ϑ j,t+1
]
rt
(2.11)
where Et denotes the expectation of future outcomes in period t, π
(i)
ϑ j ,t+1
is given in equa-
tion (2.9) and rt is the interest rate which is potentially time varying.
In contrast to the second decision stage described previously, individual innovators and
individual entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic risks during the first decision stage: From the
innovators’ perspective the return is random, since R&D effort is successful only with a
certain probability. From the entrepreneurs view, there are two possible sources of uncer-
tainty in the return: first, since the unit mass of entrepreneurs/capital goods in each sector
face a unit mass of innovators in total, there exist capital good lines which remain without
an innovator. On those capital good lines, entrepreneurs produces the capital good with
current quality using the existing technology. Second, if an innovator is present in a cap-
ital good line, the innovator probably fails to innovate. Then entrepreneurs also produce
the existent capital good. This setup is such that competition between entrepreneurs and
innovators takes place on an individual level and thus each person faces an idiosyncratic
risk of return.
However, to get deterministic income profiles for all individuals nevertheless, I assume
that individuals form “alliances” to protect themselves against these idiosyncratic risks:
Innovators within each intermediate sector j form ”R&D syndicates”, entrepreneurs in
both sectors together form an “entrepreneur association”.
Since realizations of individual innovation attempts are independent and thus uncorre-
lated, a fraction of the projects will be successful while the rest of the projects will be
unsuccessful. Then one could in principle conclude, applying a law of large numbers
type of reasoning that the fraction of successful projects in sector j ∈ {m, z} is equal to the
ex-ante probability of successful innovation η j, leading to aggregate average innovator
profits of η jΠ j, while the fraction of unsuccessful projects is equal to the ex-ante proba-
bility of innovation failure 1 − η j.
Moreover, using the same type of reasoning, the ex-ante probability of an innovator try-
ing to improve the quality of capital good in sector j is equal to the frequency or mass
of innovators in sector m, denoted by ιm := ι and sector z, denoted by ιz := 1 − ι. So
entrepreneurs expected return is equal to (1 − ιηm)Π
e
m + (1 − (1 − ι)ηz)Π
e
z . One has to be
careful here, however, because the typical laws of large numbers apply to the average of a
countable sequence of random variables, whereas the model here features a continuum of
capital goods/entrepreneurs and innovators (each normalized to unity) and so the η j’s de-
scribe the “average” of a continuum of random variables. Based on the findings of Uhlig
(1996), who shows how to obtain a law of large numbers for a continuum of uncorrelated
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random variables we can conclude that the η j’s and the ι j’s are well defined in the present
context (see also Acemoglu (2009)). In this way, an alliance allows individuals to trade
the high return with idiosyncratic risk for a deterministic but lower return, i.e. an average
return (per sector).
Now, remember that quality steps are fixed and equidistantly distributed along the quality
ladder for any capital goods line ϑ j. Consequently, increasing R&D expenditures do not
increase the size of the jump in capital goods quality. Instead, the size of this expendi-
ture determines the probability of successfully developing a capital good of larger quality.
Naturally, larger R&D outlays make successful innovation more likely. More precisely,
increasing R&D expenditures could increase the probability of success, but with a dimin-
ishing marginal effect. One could also assume the marginal effect on this probability to
increase with larger R&D outlays. This relationship also could be proportional. Dimin-
ishing returns to R&D seem plausible and most of semi-endogenous growth as well as,
to some extent, Schumpeterian models are based on this assumption as well. In contrast
to this frequent assumption, Madsen (2007), for instance, analyzed the returns to R&D in
OECD countries and concluded that the null hypothesis of constant returns to R&D can-
not be rejected. In this study, the effect of increasing R&D expenditures to the probability
of success diminishes by assumption.31
Additionally, the number of previous inventions n could influence the probability of suc-
cessful innovation for a given amount of R&D spending. On the one hand, a higher n
could make R&D more difficult. For a given level of research expenditures, this implies a
declining probability of success with an increasing number of previous innovations n. On
the other hand, fixed steps of quality improvement could become easier due to learning
effects making R&D effort less expensive.
The next assumption specifies the relationship between R&D expenditures, product gen-
eration nϑ j and the probability of successful innovation:
Assumption 2.4. The individual probability of successful innovation ηϑ j , j = {m, z} is a
strictly concave function of R&D expenditures and is defined as
ηϑ j := h
α
ϑ j
φϑ j , j = {m, z}, (2.12)
where α ∈]0, 1[ and
φϑ j :=
1
ζ
q−αϑ j (2.13)
captures the effects of the capital good’s current quality ladder position.32
31The equilibrium analysis becomes much more complicated in case of a diminishing marginal effect
of rising R&D and success probabilities, because the relationships between the model variables become
nonlinear. Although the general relationship between banks and the direction of technical change does not
depend on the specific modeling assumptions of how the innovation process relates to R&D expenditures, I
chose the simplest model framework consistent with economic intuition.
32Since the mapping from R&D to success-probability is unbounded in general, the defined η’s are not
probabilities in a strict sense, i.e. they do not necessarily take values between zero and one. We account for
this and set the parameters appropriately, so that the values of success-probabilities lie between zero and
one.
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With this formulation, innovators treat ηϑ j as a choice variable.
33 In the first decision
period, an innovator takes the interest rates rt, R j,t+1, the price of the intermediate good
p j,t, the profit maximizing price determined in the second decision stage pϑ j,t+1 , quality
level qϑ j ,t+1 factors Jt+1 and the function zϑ j as given. An innovator in capital goods line
ϑ j chooses R&D expenditures hϑ j,t to solve the following optimization problem
max
hϑ j ,t∈R+
{ηϑ j
rt
(
π¯ j,t+1qϑ j ,t+1 − R j,t+1hϑ j,t
)
| η j = h
α
j zϑ j
}
(2.14)
A solution to (2.14) satisfies the following first order conditions
α
(
π¯ j,t+1qϑ j,t+1 − R j,t+1hϑ j ,t
)
= R j,t+1hϑ j . (2.15)
Solve for hϑ j ,t gives
hϑ j ,t =
α
1 + α
π¯ j,t+1
R j,t+1
qϑ j,t+1. (2.16)
This expression implies that innovators direct a constant fraction of (expected) profits to
R&D such that the marginal benefit from one additional unit of R&D expenditure is equal
to the marginal additional individual expected profit from capital goods selling. Thereby
individual research depends positively on the quality level qϑ j , on the return from capital
goods selling π¯ j,t+1 and on the coefficient α. An increase in α leads to a higher marginal
return of research, since the higher α, the larger is the effect of one additional unit of R&D
on the probability of innovation success. An increase in any of the other two variables
qϑ j and π¯ j results in higher (expected) profits from capital goods production. Hence, the
flow of resources into innovation effort increases. For the purpose of this thesis, the most
important result implied by equation (2.16) is a negative influence of the loan interest rate
R j,t on R&D outlays. This suggests an influence of banks on R&D investment.
Using optimal R&D expenditures given in (2.16), expected profits for an innovator on
capital good line ϑ j then read
π
(i)
j,t+1
=
1
1 + α
η jπ¯ j,t+1qϑ j ,t+1. (2.17)
To derive the sectoral probabilities of innovation success use definition 2.4, insert indi-
vidual R&D-expenditures and the expression for φϑ j gives
ηϑ j = η j = ζ
−1
(
α
1 + α
π¯ j,t+1
R j,t+1
)α
(2.18)
Thereby, the function φϑ j :=
1
ζ
q−α
ϑ j,t+1
captures the effects of the current position on the qual-
ity ladder. The present study assumes that successful innovation becomes more difficult
the more product generations have been previously invented. The function φ now states
that this difficulty increases in proportion to the additional output that would be produced
33For a different formulation, where aggregate R&D expenditures determine the probability of success
and individuals take the probability as given, see for instance Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004).
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in case of successfully increasing the product quality from qϑ j,t to λ jqϑ j,t between t and
t + 1. The parameter ζ represents a cost of research measured in units of the final con-
sumption good.
Equation (2.18) shows the determinants of the probability of successful innovation and
constitutes the answer to the second question formulated at the beginning of section 4.3:
First, note that the probability of success is specific with respect to target sector j. More-
over, in this formulation, it is independent of the quality level and hence equal for all
innovators across industries ϑ j within the same intermediate sector j. On the one hand,
this probability increases with greater returns π¯ j. Higher expected returns imply larger
aggregate R&D outlays. Since R&D expenditure relates proportionally to η j by defini-
tion, the probability of successful innovation increases.
On the other hand, the influence of research costs ζ on the probability of success is nega-
tive: Ceteris paribus, the larger the cost of doing research, the lower is the probability of
success and thus the expected profits from innovation per unit of R&D spending.
The probability of research success also decreases with the loan rate R j. However, the
expression for η j in eq. (2.18) so far is incomplete, because R j itself depends on η j, and
the term π¯ j,t+1 contains the endogenous price p j for the intermediate good Y j. I postpone
this derivation of the explicit formula for η j until section five and instead highlight the
result implied by (2.18):
Remark 2.1. Banks influence the sectoral probabilities of successful innovation through
the loan rate R j.
2.3.2. Intermediates
The intermediate stage consists of the two different sectors, denoted by j ∈ {m, z} and
the sector-specific factors are identified by the index J = {M, Z}. In both sectors, a large
number of identical firms produce the sector specific intermediate good under perfect
competition. The firms in this intermediate stage make no inter-temporal decisions. De-
note the intermediate output of sector j by Y j. Production in sector j combines two input
factors: sector specific factors J = {M, Z}, constant in supply and a continuum variety of
different capital goods (machines) xϑ j of different quality qϑ j , where qϑ j := q(nϑ j) denotes
the quality of the nth generation of machine ϑ j in sector j (at time t) and xϑ j denotes the
quantity input of capital good ϑ j in sector j (at time t). Capital goods depreciate fully
after use.34
The good Ym is M-intensive, where M represents labor and the good Yz is Z-intensive.
35 In
the following, I will be unspecific about what Z represents, but for more concreteness one
can think of Z to represent some form of energy input. Since within either intermediate
sector, firms are identical, aggregate sectoral production equals the sum of the functions
of individual firms and individual profit-maximizing decisions can be represented by two
single representative aggregate decision problems (one per sector). The production func-
tion is defined as:
34According to Acemoglu (2002), slow depreciation of capital goods has no effects on the balanced
growth path equilibrium. It affects only the speed of the transitional dynamics.
35I refer to a good Y j to be J-intensive, whenever its production uses factor J and capital goods comple-
ment this factor J where here J = {M, Z}.
34
2 THE MODEL
Assumption 2.5. In any period t, intermediate sector j = {m, z} produces an intermediate
good Y j using the technology
Y j = G(xϑ j , J) =
(∫ 1
0
q
1−µ
ϑ j
x
µ
ϑ j
dϑ j
)
J1−µ. (2.19)
Production function G is linear homogeneous, quasi-concave and twice continuously dif-
ferentiable. In each intermediate sector, all capital goods are imperfect substitutes. That
is, each line of capital good ϑ j is a necessary input in the intermediate production process.
The production function implicitly assumes that at any point in time t, only one quality
of any capital good is used. This assumption does not cause any loss of generality, be-
cause within any one industry ϑ j, goods of different qualities are perfect substitutes for
each other. Naturally, higher quality capital goods are more productive in manufacturing
intermediate goods. However, perfect competition among firms in intermediate sectors
implies that the price equals minimum marginal production costs. Therefore, only those
capital goods ϑ j which go for the lowest quality-adjusted price are used in equilibrium
intermediate production. This implies the exclusive use of the ”leading-edge” (highest
quality) capital good of each industry ϑ j.
Decisions of intermediate stage firms are static, so we suppress time subscripts in the fol-
lowing derivations. The firms in the two sectors m and zmaximize profits taking the price
of their product, pm, pz, the rental prices of the machines, denoted by p j(mϑ j), j = {m, z},
as well as the quality of machines, qϑ j and the input prices wM ,wZ of the factors M and Z
as given. The decision problem of a representative firm in sector j = {m, z} reads
max
(xϑ j ,J)∈R
2
+
{
p jY j − wJJ −
∫ 1
0
pϑ j xϑ jdϑ j | G(xϑ j , J) = (2.19)
}
(2.20)
A solution to (2.20) satisfies the following first order optimality conditions which equate
prices and marginal products of each production factor for all t ≥ 0
(1 − µ)p j,tJ
−µ
t
(∫ 1
0
q
1−µ
ϑ j,t
x
µ
ϑ j ,t
dϑ j
)
= wJ,t, (2.21a)
µp j,tJ
1−µ
(
q
1−µ
ϑ j,t
x
µ−1
ϑ j ,t
)
= pϑ j,t. (2.21b)
Demand for capital goods of type ϑ j of quality qϑ j in sector j = {m, z} can be derived from
(2.21b) as
xϑm,t =
(
µpm,t
pϑm,t
) 1
1−µ
qϑm,tMt. (2.22a)
xϑz,t =
(
µpz,t
pϑz,t
) 1
1−µ
qϑz,tZt. (2.22b)
These equations imply that the quantity of used capital goods is increasing in the cor-
responding price of the intermediate good, pm, pz and in the firms’ employment of the
sector-specific factor J = {M, Z} The capital goods use in sector j is decreasing in the
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price of the capital good pϑ j . Intuitively, a greater price for the product increases the
value of the marginal product of all factors, including that of capital goods. This en-
courages intermediate firms to purchase more capital goods. A greater level of factor
employment J implies more use of the capital goods, hence capital goods demand raises.
Moreover, because the demand curve for the capital goods is downward sloping, a higher
cost implies lower demand. Finally, note that the conditional demand functions for the
machines are linear in the two sector-specific factors M and Z and in the level of capital
goods quality quality. This feature simplifies the equilibrium analysis in section five.
2.3.3. Final Output
In the final output stage, a large number of profit-maximizing firms compete to produce
a consumption good. Similar to the intermediate sector, all the firms in the final output
sector are identical. Then, the aggregate or total production function is just the sum of the
functions of the individual firms and the individual profit maximizing decisions can be
converted into one aggregate decision problem of a single representative firm. Production
technology is given in the next assumption:
Assumption 2.6. The final good is produced using the production technology F : R2+ →
R+
Y = F (Ym, Yz) =
(
γY
ε−1
ε
m + (1 − γ)Y
ε−1
ε
z
) ε
ε−1
, (2.23)
where ε ∈ [0,∞[ represents the constant elasticity of substitution between the inputs
used in the production process, γ ∈]0, 1[ is a distribution parameter and Ym, Yz represent
intermediate input quantities.
Final output is produced using a standard CES-function and F maps nonnegative in-
puts to nonnegative levels of output. The property of linear homogeneity states that
F (λYm, λYz) = λF (Ym, Yz) and thus F features constant returns to scale in Ym, Yz. Further-
more, linear homogeneity in conjunction with quasi-concavity implies F to be concave.36
If ε = ∞, Ym and Yz are perfect substitutes. If ε = 1, the production function will be
Cobb-Douglas and if ε = 0, aggregate production will be Leontieff. If ε > 1, then the
two factors are referred to as gross substitutes. If ε < 1, I refer to Ym and Yz as gross
complements. The single representative firm in final output production takes the distribu-
tion parameter γ > 0, prices of the final good p, and of intermediate inputs pm, pz, and
the production technology stated in (2.23) as given and solves the following optimization
problem:
max
(Ym,Yz)∈R
2
+
{
pF (Ym, Yz) − pmYm − pzYz | F (YM , YZ) = (2.23)
}
(2.24)
36In general, aggregate production functions in models with technological progress contain a term that
measures technological advances, i.e. Y ≈ F (Ym, Yz, A), with an argument A representing technology levels.
In order to keep the model as simple as possible, I abstract from any form of technical progress in this stage
of production. Hence, the technological relationship between necessary inputs and output does not change
through time. However, this is not equivalent to an overall constant relationship between input factor shares.
If the inputs are substitutes the shares of these factors might change in reaction to a change in relative prices,
but this is solely due to substitutions, not technological advances.
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A solution to (2.24) satisfies the following first order conditions which equate prices and
marginal products of each production factor for all t ≥ 0:
pm,t = γ
(
γY
ε−1
ε
m,t + (1 − γ)Y
ε−1
ε
z,t
) 1
ε−1
Y
− 1
ε
m,t (2.25a)
pz,t = (1 − γ)
(
γY
ε−1
ε
m,t + (1 − γ)Y
ε−1
ε
z,t
) 1
ε−1
Y
− 1
ε
z,t . (2.25b)
The consumption good serves as the numeraire. Hence, the price of this consumption
good is normalized to p ≡ 1 in all periods t ≥ 0. The normalization of the final output
price implies a normalization of intermediate goods prices. The following proposition
describes this equivalence in price normalization of final output and intermediate goods
prices for the case of N different intermediate goods. The case of two intermediate goods,
as used in the present study, is then a special case of this proposition of N = 2.
Proposition 2.4. Suppose, the production of final output uses N ∈ N different intermedi-
ate inputs Yi, i = 1, 2, ...,N. Then the normalization of final output prices p is equivalent
to setting the weighted sum of intermediate goods prices
∑N
i=1(γ
ε
i
p1−ε
i
)
1
1−ε equal to 1 in all
periods. This weighted sum is referred to as the ”ideal” price index or Fisher price index.
Proof: See appendix A.
In this study, the final goods sector combines N = 2 different intermediate goods. The
ideal price index in this case is given by
p =
(
γεmp
1−ε
m + γ
ε
z p
1−ε
z
) 1
1−ε
=
(
γεp1−εm + (1 − γ)
εp1−εz
) 1
1−ε
≡ 1. (2.26)
2.4. Heterogeneous consumers
In each period a continuum of young consumers is born. Each consumer lives for two
periods. In the first period of life, people are young and in the second period, they are
old. Assume that (i) at the end of each period, old consumers are replaced by new born
young consumers, so that each member of the old generation has exactly one descendant
in the subsequent period and ii) the population of the initial (period 0) old generation is
numerically identical to the young population of period 0. This formulation implies that
the population is constant over time.37
The young generation is indexed by the superscript “y”, members of the old generation
are indexed with an “o”. In this setting, the attribute of being a worker, an entrepreneur
or an innovator is preassigned. So at each point in time, two different generations pop-
ulate the economy and each generation consists of workers (w), entrepreneurs (e), and
37The two-period setting corresponds to a period length of 30 − 40 years and implies a lifetime of 60 to
80 years. Alternatively one could assume a larger number of life periods. This would imply a larger number
of generations at each point in time and the complexity of the consumer sector would increase: within a
multi-period overlapping generations setting of n ∈ N consecutive periods of life one would have to control
2n different decision problems faced by the individuals. This would add a large amount of realism but
would also make the analysis much more difficult, contributing very little to dealing with the task in hand,
i.e. to analyze the influence of bank’s credit lending on the rate and direction of technical change.
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innovators (i), who differ in terms of their access to investment projects and consumption
profiles. The subindex ℓ ∈ {w, e, i} identifies the different consumer types. Preferences
over consumption are identical for all consumers and equal to:
Assumption 2.7. Consumption preferences can be represented by an utility function U :
R2+ → R, which is defined as
U(c
y
ℓ,t
, coℓ,t+1) := βu(c
o
ℓ,t+1), (2.27)
β is the individual discount factor and the “instantaneous” utility function u : R+ → R,
is logarithmic: u(c) := log(c),
So utility is defined as a function of only second period consumption.
Workers
At each point in time a continuum of mass M of young workers is born. Each one is
endowed with one unit of labor time. Workers supply their labor inelastically to the labor
market when young and receive a “real” wage rate of wM,t. At the beginning of their
second period of life, when old, they retire. Workers only consume in the second period
of life and, therefore, wish to transfer their current wealth into the next period. For this
purpose, they supply their labor income to the deposit market and receive a deposit rate
of rt+1 on these savings. Given labor income of wM,t and since the entire income is saved,
we have st = wM,t, and old workers have income of rt+1st. So the budget constraint of a
worker equals
c
(o)
w,t+1 = rt+1st. (2.28)
Denote aggregate consumption of old workers as C(o)w,t and aggregate savings as S t, then
the aggregate budget constraint of the old working population is given by
C
(o)
w,t+1 = rt+1S t = rt+1wM,tMt =: I
(o)
w,t+1. (2.29)
Old workers do not care about the wealth of their descendants and leave no bequests.
Since utility is strictly increasing in consumption quantities, old workers spend their in-
come entirely for consumption of the final good.
Entrepreneurs
A continuum of mass 2 of young entrepreneurs enters the economy at the beginning of
each period t. Each entrepreneur receives a patent to produce capital goods of current
quality for one of the two intermediate sectors. Then the mass of entrepreneurs holding
patents for capital goods in each intermediate sectors j ∈ {m, z} equals unity. Recall that
the continuum of capital goods used in each intermediate sector has unit mass, so this en-
sures identical masses of capital good lines and entrepreneurs. Hence each entrepreneur
holds a patent for one capital good line and consequently on each capital good line one
entrepreneur is present.
Entrepreneurs form an “entrepreneur association” to protect themselves from idiosyn-
cratic risks in profits. Since realizations of individual innovation attempts are independent
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and thus uncorrelated, a fraction of the projects will be successful while the rest of the
projects will be unsuccessful. Then using a law of large numbers type of reasoning for
a continuum of random variables (see Uhlig (1996)), the fraction of successful projects
in sector j ∈ {m, z} is equal to the ex-ante probability of successful innovation η j and the
fraction of unsuccessful projects is equal to the ex-ante probability of innovation failure
1 − η j. Moreover, using the same type of reasoning, the ex-ante probability that an in-
novator tries to improve the quality of a certain capital good in sector j is equal to the
frequency or mass of innovators in sector m, denoted by ιm := ι and sector z, denoted by
ιz := 1− ι. Entrepreneurs make profits in capital good lines without an innovator or where
innovators’ R&D is unsuccessful. Together this implies an income for the entrepreneur
association of
Π¯et = (1 − ηmι)Π
e
m,t + (1 − (1 − ι)ηz)Π
e
z,t (2.30)
The aggregate budget constraint of the entrepreneurs is then given by
C
(o)
e,t = Π¯
e
t =: I
(o)
e,t (2.31)
Old entrepreneurs also consume their income completely, since utility strictly increasing
in consumption.
Innovators
Each period, a continuum of innovators is born whose mass is normalized to one. Young
innovators engage in R&D to improve the quality of existing capital goods. Young inno-
vators need credit to finance R&D expenditures and banks supply the necessary capital
resources. If successful, they receive a one period patent on that innovation and produce
that capital good with greater quality instead of the entrepreneur on that capital good
line. Innovators direct their investment to capital goods innovation for either intermediate
sector on the basis of expected profits. Denote the share of innovators directing R&D in-
vestment to sector m by ι, then the share of innovators investing in R&D in sector z equals
1 − ι, where ι ∈ [0, 1] can vary in equilibrium.
Similar to the entrepreneurs, innovators group in an “alliance” to protect themselves from
idiosyncratic risks in profits. Within one intermediate sector j = {m, z} innovators form
an “R&D syndicate”. Again, since investment projects contain idiosyncratic risk, we can
apply a law of large number argument for a contiuum of random variables, and conclude
that the fraction of successful projects is equal to the ex-ante probability of successful
innovation η j. Aggregate average profits for the R&D syndicate in sector j are given by
η jΠ
(i)
j
, so the income for innovators in sector j ∈ {m, z} reads
Π¯ j,t = ι jη jΠ j,t (2.32)
Old innovators also spend their income from monopolistic capital goods selling com-
pletely for consumption and leave no bequests for their descendants. Note that the aggre-
gate income of the innovators is sector-specific since innovators within one intermediate
sector form a “R&D-Syndicate”. Therefore, the aggregate income of the syndicate de-
pends also on the number of innovators ι j in sector j, since the more innovators try to
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improve the quality of capital goods in one sector, the greater is the income of the R&D-
syndicate. This implies a budget constraint for innovators in sector j equal to
C
(o)
i, j,t
= Π¯ij,t =: I
(o)
i, j,t
. (2.33)
Total consumption of all innovators is then given by
C
(o)
i,t
= C
(o)
i,m,t
+ C
(o)
i,z,t
. (2.34)
2.5. Aggregation
So far, the study presented the microeconomic decisions of all individuals in the economy.
Next , we compute the aggregate sectoral and macroeconomic variables of the economy.
At the sectoral level, we need a quality index, describing the average development of
capital goods quality. Then, one can derive R&D spending, capital goods investment and
the sector specific outputs as functions of the average sectoral quality index, denoted by
Qm,t in sector m and Qz,t in sector z respectively. The aggregate sectoral quality index for
t ≥ 0 is defined as:38
Q j,t :=
∫ 1
0
qϑ j,tdϑ j for j = {m, z}. (2.35)
Index Q j is a combination of the various qϑ j’s and increases in the qϑ j’s affect aggregate
sectoral output to the extent that they raise Q j,t. The index of aggregate quality in this
economy is the average of qualities, since each intermediate sector uses a continuum of
capital goods whose mass is normalized to unity (other aggregation types that reflect for
instance a CES-aggregator type can be found in Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004) P.324 eq.
(7.15) or Acemoglu (2009)). The aggregator is linear homogeneous, which captures the
plausible feature that if we increase all single productivities by a number a > 0 then the
average sectoral productivity will increase by a.
Although the qϑ j’s of each product line ϑ j are stochastic, we will argue now that the ran-
domness in microeconomic quality improvements vanishes in the sectoral and macroe-
conomic variables and the average sectoral quality Q j,t is completely deterministic: This
holds, because realizations of the quality increases of different capital goods are inde-
pendent and thus uncorrelated. Then one could in principle conclude, applying a law of
large numbers type of reasoning that Q j,t’s are deterministic. One has to be careful here,
however, because the typical laws of large numbers apply to the average of a countable
sequence of random variables, whereas the model here features a continuum of capital
goods (normalized to unity) and so Q j,t describes the “average” of a continuum of random
variables. However, based on the findings of Uhlig (1996), who shows how to obtain a
law of large numbers for a continuum of uncorrelated random variables, we can conclude
that the Q j,t’s are well defined in the present context (see also Acemoglu (2009)).
The dynamics of the average sector-specific quality improvements can now be derived as
follows: for any industry ϑ j in sector j = {m, z}, the probability of success is the same
38See for instance Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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and is given by (2.18). One can show that the expected change in the average quality of
capital goods in sector j between time t and t + 1 is given by
Et[Q j,t+1 − Q j,t] = ι j,tη j,t
(
λ j − 1
)
Q j,t.
39 (2.36)
Thereby, ιm := ι and ιz := 1 − ι, ι ∈ [0, 1] enter this expression, since quality probably in-
creases only in those capital good lines where innovators are present. If for instance ι = 1,
all innovators direct their R&D effort to sector m and the quality of all capital goods used
in sector z remain constant.
Using the law of large numbers argument given above we can conclude that the average
sectoral capital goods quality develops deterministically over time - even though indi-
vidual R&D projects exhibit stochastic returns, so that the expectations operator in the
equation above can be dropped and the dynamic development of average sectoral capital
goods quality Qm,t and Qz,t is given by
Qm,t+1 − Qm,t
Qm,t
= ιtηm,t (λm − 1) for all t ≥ 0, (2.37a)
Qz,t+1 − Qz,t
Qz,t
= (1 − ιt)ηz,t (λz − 1) for all t ≥ 0, (2.37b)
where by assumption (2.2), λ j > 1 so ι j,tη j,t
(
λ j − 1
)
> 0 and Q j,0 is some given initial
quality level. According to equations (2.37a) and (2.37b), the dynamic development of
the average quality of the capital goods in each intermediate sector can be represented by
a deterministic, linear first order difference equation. Denote the economy-wide average
capital goods quality as Qt. Then, Qt is defined as the weighted average of the two sectoral
quality indices Qm,t and Qz,t, where the weights are given by the distribution parameter of
the intermediate inputs Ym,t, Yz,t in final goods production, γ and 1 − γ:
Qt = γQm,t + (1 − γ)Qz,t. (2.38)
It is important to bear in mind that the average quality of sector-specific capital goods
used in the production of the two intermediate goods Ym and Yz are different, allowing
technical change to be biased or directed to one intermediate sector. The average quality
of capital goods Qm and Qz, determine aggregate productivity, while the quotient Qz/Qm
39This relation can be derived as follows:
Et[Q j,t+1 − Q j,t] = ι j,tη j,t
[∫ 1
0
q′ϑ j ,t+1dϑ j −
∫ 1
0
qϑ j ,tdϑ j
]
= ι j,tη j,t
[∫ 1
0
λ jqϑ j ,tdϑ j −
∫ 1
0
qϑ j ,tdϑ j
]
= ι j,tη j,t
(∫ 1
0
qϑ j ,tdϑ j
(
λ j − 1
))
= ι j,tη j,t
(
λ j − 1
)
Q j,t.
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determines the relative productivity of the factor Z.
Aggregate sectoral R&D expenditures can be computed from individual R&D expendi-
tures of an innovator in industry ϑ j, given in (2.16), as
H j,t =
α
1 + α
π¯ j,t+1
R j,t+1
ι j,tQ j,t+1, j ∈ {m, z}, (2.39)
where still ιm,t := ιt and ιz,t := 1 − ιt. The expression shows that aggregate sectoral R&D
is increasing in the average sectoral capital goods quality Q j,t+1, decreasing in the credit
interest rate R j,t+1 and increasing in the mass of innovators per sector ι j ∈ [0, 1]. In this
regard ιt controls the direction (and also rate) of technical change: for instance, if ιt = 1,
all innovation effort would be directed to sector m and consequently, R&D expenditures
in sector z would be zero. From (2.37a) and (2.37b) then follows that only the quality of
capital goods in sector m changes over time, while the quality of capital goods in sector z
remains constant, i.e. technical change would occur only in sector m.
Total R&D in period t is simply given by the sum of aggregate sectoral R&D:
Ht = Hm,t + Hz,t. (2.40)
Spending on capital goods in sector j can be derived from (2.22a) and (2.22b):
X j,t =
∫ 1
0
xϑ j ,tdϑ j = µπ¯ j,tQ j,t (2.41)
and aggregate capital goods spending is the sum over sectoral capital goods spending
equal to
Xt = Xm,t + Xz,t. (2.42)
Finally, aggregate savings are given by total labor income (income of factor Mt) of the
workers
S t = wM,tMt (2.43)
and aggregate consumption in period t is given by consumption of old workers, old en-
trepreneurs and old innovators:
Ct =
∑
ℓ
C
(o)
ℓ,t
, ℓ ∈ {w, e, i}. (2.44)
2.6. Market clearing
The previous sections derived conditions of optimal behavior of banks, firms and con-
sumers. The remaining requirement to describe an equilibrium of the economy is that all
markets clear.
Capital markets
Total deposit supply is given by aggregate savings of young workers S t. Market clearing
on the deposit market requires that workers’ aggregate savings are equal to the deposit
demand of the representative aggregate bank:
S t
!
= Dt ∀t ≥ 0. (2.45)
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Credit demand in each sector j = {m, z} is given by aggregate sectoral R&D expenditures
(eq. (2.39)). Market clearing requires that in each sector, credit supply is equal to credit
demand:
D j,t
!
= H j,t j = {m, z},∀t ≥ 0. (2.46)
Moreover, the bank cannot supply more capital to the innovators than received from the
workers, so we impose the condition that total deposit demand today determines total
credit supply tomorrow:
Dt =
∑
j = {m, z}D j,t+1. (2.47)
Factor markets
The supply of the factors M and Z is constant. The firms in the two intermediate sectors
represent aggregate factor demand. Market clearing on the market for factor J = {M, Z}
then requires
JSt
!
= JDt J ∈ {M, Z},∀t ≥ 0. (2.48)
Goods markets
The entrepreneurs and innovators represent the supply side of capital goods, the demand
side is given by the intermediate firms in the two sectors. For each capital good ϑ j, market
clearing requires:
xSϑ j ,t
!
= xDϑ j ,t ϑ j ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {m, z},∀t ≥ 0. (2.49)
Market clearing on the markets for the intermediate goods requires
Y Sj,t
!
= YDj,t j ∈ {m, z}. (2.50)
Market clearing on the final goods market requires that final goods demand (consump-
tion, investment in R&D and machine production) equals supply and gives the economy’s
resource constraint:
Yt = Xt + Ht +Ct ∀t ≥ 0, (2.51)
where Ct is given in (2.44), Xt is given in (2.42) and Ht is given in (2.40).
Finally, we need a “market clearing” condition for the mass of innovators. For all t ≥ 0:
ιm,t + ιz,t = 1. (2.52)
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3. Equilibrium
The individual demand and supply decisions of firms, banks and consumers together with
market clearing constitute the basis of the following equilibrium analysis. In this section,
I emphasize the influence of banks on the direction of technology development in order
to answer the central research question formulated at the beginning of the first part: Do
banks influence the direction of technical change?
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: section 3.1 defines and charac-
terizes the equilibrium. Next the study analyzes the determinants of directed technical
change (3.2) and derives equilibrium properties (3.3). This section ends with a short com-
parative static analysis of parameter changes on equilibrium variables (3.4).
3.1. Definition and characterization
For a given quantity of available resources in the economy, its distribution for a) different
purposes such as consumption, production and investment purposes and its distribution
b) across time is called allocation. Then, roughly speaking, an allocation constitutes
an equilibrium, if -for a given set of market prices- each individual consumer, firm and
bank responds optimally to the (optimal) decisions of all other entities in the economy.
Accordingly, an equilibrium with financial intermediation is defined as:
Definition 3.1. An equilibrium of the economy considered here is an allocation
A = (Yt,Ct,Mt, Zt, (Y j,t, X j,t,H j,t, ι j,t, (qϑ j,t, xϑ j,t)ϑ j∈[0,1]) j∈{m,z},Dt+1)t≥0
and a price system
P = (rt,w j,t,R j,t, p j,t, pϑ j,t)t≥0
such that:
(i) The allocation is consistent with the production technologies (2.19), (2.23), and the
market clearing conditions/resource constraints (2.45), (2.46), (2.48), (2.49), (2.50), (2.51),
and (2.52).
(ii) Banks behave optimally, i.e. equations (2.3) and (2.4) hold for all t ≥ 0.
(iii) Producers behave optimally, i.e. equations (2.8), (2.16) , (2.21) hold for all t ≥ 0.
(iv) Consumers behave optimally with (profit) incomes determined by (2.29), (2.30) and
(2.32) for all t ≥ 0.
(v) Average capital goods qualities in sector j ∈ {m, z} evolve according to (2.37).
Recall that the process of R&D effort for the individual innovator is stochastic. Therefore,
the quality of capital good ϑ j in sector j = m, z, is random and so are the corresponding
prices, quantities and values. However, since the outcomes from random individual ”ex-
periments” are stochastically independent, the uncertainty vanishes in aggregate terms
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and the corresponding sectoral and macroeconomic variables are non-stochastic. This
implies deterministic time paths of the aggregate sectoral and macroeconomic variables
and the equilibrium analysis becomes completely deterministic.
It is useful to derive properties of some equilibrium variables that will be used in the
following analysis. So in a first step, we compute aggregate production of the two inter-
mediate goods Ym,t and Yz,t as functions of the factors Mt, Zt, output prices pm,t, pz,t and
aggregate sectoral quality indices Qm,t,Qz,t, insert the intermediate firms equilibrium de-
mand schedules for capital goods xm,t, xz,t stated in equations (2.22a) and (2.22b) into the
production functions of good Ym and good Yz given in assumption 2.5. This yields for
sector m
Ym,t =
µ0
µ
p
µ
1−µ
m,t MtQm,t (3.1)
and for sector z
Yz,t =
µ0
µ
p
µ
1−µ
z,t ZtQz,t, (3.2)
where µ0 := (1 − µ)µ
2µ
1−µ . Note that the integral parts in the production functions vanish
due to the definition of the aggregate or average sectoral quality index.40 Taking the ratio
of equations (3.1) and (3.2) gives
Yz,t
Ym,t
=
(
pz,t
pm,t
) µ
1−µ Qz,t
Qm,t
Zt
Mt
. (3.3)
In a second step, we combine the optimality conditions of the final good sector stated in
(2.25). This yields the relative factor price of the two inputs as functions of the relative
factor demand. Let p˜ denote the relative price of the two input factors, the equilibrium
relative pricing scheme reads
p˜t =
pz,t
pm,t
=
1 − γ
γ
(
Yz,t
Ym,t
)− 1
ε
= γ˜Y˜
− 1
ε
j,t
, (3.4)
where γ˜ := 1−γ
γ
, Y˜ j,t :=
Yz,t
Ym,t
. The lower the price of each factor, the higher is the corre-
sponding demand. The greater the supply of factor Yz relative to Ym (so the greater Y˜ j,t),
the lower is the relative price p˜. Moreover, changes in the relative price level in response
to changes in the relative factor supply depend on the elasticity of substitution ε.
Now we use this equilibrium relative price to eliminate the term Y˜ j,t = Ym,t/Yz,t from equa-
tion (3.3). Solve the resulting expression for p˜t gives the expression for the relative price
of the two goods Ym,t and Yz,t as a function of the relative factor supply and the relative
average quality or physical productivity of the sector-specific capital goods:
p˜t =
(
γ˜−εZ˜tQ˜t
)− (1−µ)
σ
(3.5)
40The average sectoral quality of capital goods is defined in equation (2.35) as
Q j,t :=
∫
ϑ j∈Θ j
qϑ jdϑ j for j = {m, z}.
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where Z˜t := Zt/Mt, Q˜t := Qz,t/Qm,t and σ := 1 + (1 − µ)(ε − 1). The relative price
given is decreasing in the relative supply and relative productivity. This implies a constant
relative price if relative factors and relative productivities are constant. The latter holds for
instance if the growth rates of average sectoral capital goods are identical. The expression
also coincides with the result in equation (16) p. 790 in Acemoglu (2002), except that in
this thesis, a) the relative technology is given by the productivity or quality of a constant
quantity of sector specific capital goods and not by an increasing variety of capital goods.
As in the standard directed technical change model of Acemoglu (2002), σ is the elasticity
of substitution between the two factors M and Z, since one can show that
σ = −
(dlog( wZ
wM
)
dlog( Z
M
)
)−1
. (3.6)
It will turn out in brief that the elasticity of substitution has a crucial role on the direction
of technical change. If the two intermediate goods Ym and Yz are gross substitutes (ε >
1 ⇔ σ > 1), then the two factors M and Z are gross substitutes. If Ym and Yz are gross
complements (ε < 1 ⇔ σ > 1) then M and Z are gross complements.
In a third step we derive the equilibrium credit and deposit interest rates and sectoral
credit quantities. Note that the stated equations all contain various endogenous variables
on their right hand side that will be determined next, so the treatment is incomplete at
this stage. To get the equilibrium deposit interest rate rt use (2.45) together with (2.47),
(2.46), (2.39), and (2.3), we get
rt+1 =
α
S t
(
ιtEt[Πm,t+1] + (1 − ιt)Et[Πz,t+1]
)
(3.7)
where Et[Π j,t] denotes sectoral average expected profits for innovators containing en-
dogenous intermediate output prices, capital good qualities and success-probabilities. I
determine the expressions in detail below.
The equilibrium interest rate on deposits is decreasing in aggregate savings which is
equivalent to deposit supply, and increasing in sectoral expected profits from innovation.
Insert (3.7) into (2.3) to get the credit interest rates for sector j :
R j,t+1 =
α
η jS t
(
Et[Πm,t+1] + Et[Πz,t+1]
)
, j ∈ {m, z}. (3.8)
To see the influence of prices and factors on equilibrium credit interest rates, insert η j,t
given in (3.11) into (2.3):
R j,t =
(
1 + α
α
) α
1−α r
1
1−α
t ζ(
p j,tJt
) 1
1−α
, α ∈]0, 1[, j ∈ {m, z}, J ∈ {M, Z}. (3.9)
This shows that credit interest rates are increasing in the deposit interest rate rt, decreasing
in the corresponding intermediate output price p j,t, and also decreasing in the sector-
specific factor Jt = {M, Z}.
Take the ratio of (3.8) to compute the relative credit interest rate R˜t:
R˜t =
Rz,t
Rm,t
=
ηm,t
ηz,t
= η˜−1t , (3.10)
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so the relative credit interest rate is inversely related to the ratio of success-probabilities
in innovation effort.
Now use (2.18) and (2.3), the success-probability in sector j reads
η j,t = ζ
−1
(
α
1 + α
π¯ j,t+1
rt+1
) α
1−α
, j ∈ {m, z}, (3.11)
where π¯ j,t := (1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µ p
1
1−µ
j,t
Jt.
To get equilibrium credit in sector j, use the market clearing conditions in the capital mar-
kets (2.45) and (2.46) together with the condition that total deposit demand in t determines
total credit supply in t + 1 (2.47). Then, credit in sector m reads
Dm,t−1 =
S t−2
1 + R˜tπ˜tQ˜t ι˜t
, (3.12)
which can be solved for
Dm,t−1 =
ιt−1Rz,tπ¯m,tQm,tS t−2
ιt−1Rz,tπ¯m,tQm,t + (1 − ιt)Rm,tπ¯z,tQz,t
. (3.13)
Similar, credit demand in sector z is given by
Dz,t−1 =
S t−2R˜tπ˜tQ˜t ι˜t
1 + R˜tπ˜tQ˜t ι˜t
, (3.14)
which is equivalent to
Dz,t−1 =
(1 − ιt−1)Rm,tπ¯z,tQz,t
ιt−1Rz,tπ¯m,tQm,t + (1 − ιt−1)Rm,tπ¯z,tQz,t
S t−2. (3.15)
The epxressions in (3.13) and (3.15) reveal that credit in sector j ∈ {m, z} is increasing in
aggregate savings and shares of innovators ι j. Credit in sector m is lower for greater Rm,t,
greater (lower) for greater Rz,t, increasing in Qm,t and decreasing in Qz,t.
The ratio of sectoral creditor relative credit in sector z is then equal to:
D˜t = ι˜t p˜
1
1−µ
t+1
Z˜t+1Q˜t+1R˜t+1. (3.16)
It will turn out next that the right hand side equals relative expected profits from innova-
tion. This is intuitively clear since sectoral credit is equal to sectoral R&D expenditures
and the latter are constant share of expected profits.
3.2. Determinants of Directed Technical Change
Let us now analyze the determinants of directed technology development on a balanced
growth path equilibrium (BGP). More precisely, I derive the determinants of directed in-
novations and then analyze how these determinants response to changes in relative factor
supply. After presenting the economics of the direction of technical change, I show the
existence and uniqueness of the BGP-equilibrium. Here, a balanced growth equilibrium
is characterized as an equilibrium, where all variables grow at constant rates.
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The demand for innovations
In the following we analyze how the production side of the economy determines the re-
turn to different types of innovation – the demand for innovation. The next section then
discusses the other side of this equation, the cost of different innovations or the supply
side of innovations.
Average profits from capital goods selling for old innovators in sector m read
Πm,t = (1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µ p
1
1−µ
m,t MtQm,t (3.17)
and in sector z
Πm,t = (1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µ p
1
1−µ
z,t ZtQz,t. (3.18)
The net present discounted value of expected profits for young innovators in sector j,
denoted by V j,t, j ∈ {m, z}, are then given by
V j,t =
Et[Π j,t+1]
rt
. (3.19)
one can show that the V ′s are equal to
Vm,t = µ0p
1
1−µ
m,t+1
Mt+1Qm,t+1R
−1
m,t+1 Vz,t = µ0p
1
1−µ
z,t+1
Zt+1Qz,t+1R
−1
z,t+1. (3.20)
where µ0 := (1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µ . So the larger Vz,t in relation to Vm,t, the greater is the reward to
develop Z-augmenting capital goods (see Acemoglu (2002) p.789). The two profit equa-
tions given in (3.20) suggest that capital goods producers’ profits increase with greater
output prices, with greater factor use and with greater productivity in the intermediate
sectors and decrease with larger interest rates on business credit. The latter effect simply
follows from the relationship between credit interest rates and success-probabilities given
in (2.3).
To show and discuss these determinants in more detail, take the ratio of Vz,t and Vm,t. This
gives
Vz,t
Vm,t
=
(
pz,t+1
pm,t+1
) 1
1−µ
︸      ︷︷      ︸
price
effect
×
Zt+1
Mt+1︸︷︷︸
market size
effect
×
(
Rz,t+1
Rm,t+1
)−1
︸     ︷︷     ︸
risk
effect
×
(
Qz,t+1
Qm,t+1
)
︸   ︷︷   ︸
productivity
effect
. (3.21)
The conclusions drawn from equation (3.21) represent the central results of part one. The
next two theorems comprehend these main findings.
Theorem 3.1. The direction of technical change –whether technical change will favour
relatively scarce or abundant factors– is determined by four different market forces: the
price effect, the market size effect, the productivity effect and the risk effect.
• The price effect: Since µ ∈]0, 1[, the relative profitability of inventing new Z-
augmenting capital goods is increasing in the relative price pz,t+1/pm,t+1. There-
fore, the higher this relative price is, the greater is the return on developing new
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Z-complementary technologies (Acemoglu (2002) p.789).
Naturally, relatively scarce factors are relatively more expensive. Thus, the price
effect directs technical changes to technologies or sectors that complement scarce
input factors and thus command higher commodity prices.
• The market size effect: The relative profitability of inventing Z-complementary
technologies inreases in the relative supply of the factors Zt+1/Mt+1. Therefore,
the larger this relative factor supply, the greater is the return on the development of
new Z-complementary technologies (Acemoglu (2002) p.789).
In this study, the market for a technology is determined by the factors that use this
technology. An increase in the supply of a factor leads to a larger market for capital
goods that complement this factor. The market size effect encourages innovations
in sectors that use the more abundant factor. Hence, this effect works in the opposite
direction compared to the price effect.
• The risk effect: The risk effect results from the fact that Vz,t/Vm,t decreases in
Rz,t+1/Rm,t+1. The lower the relative probability of successful innovation in sec-
tor z, ηz/ηm, the higher is the corresponding relative loan rate Rz/Rm and the risk
of default on external credit reflected in the interest rate on loans.41 Thus, the risk
effect directs innovations to sectors with a higher probability of research success.
This illustrates the significance of the assumption, how the current ηJ’s relate to the
number of previous innovations nϑ j in any industry ϑ j and sector m, z with respect
to the direction of technical change.
• The productivity effect: The ratio Vz,t/Vm,t increases in Qz,t+1/Qm,t+1 and thus the
productivity effect encourages innovations in sectors with a higher productivity.
The result established in theorem 3.1 resembles the effects stated amongst others in Ace-
moglu (2002) plus the risk effect. Altogether the net effect of these partly counteract-
ing forces determines the direction of technical change. Thereby, the risk effect stated
in equation (3.21) results from the explicit consideration of financial intermediation and
represents the innovation of this thesis. The following theorem establishes the second
fundamental result:
Theorem 3.2. If innovators are capital constrained and R&D is financed by credit, then
banks influence the direction of technical change through the risk effect.
First, credit interest rates contain a risk premium given by the inverse of the probability
of successful innovation. The risk premia and the loan rates relate inversely to another:
the lower the probability of successful innovation in any one sector, the higher is the
41Recall that the relationship between the ratio of loan rates and success-probabilities equals
R˜ :=
Rz
Rm
=
r
ηz
/
r
ηm
=
ηm
ηz
=
(
ηz
ηm
)−1
=: η˜−1.
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risk of default on credit obligations by innovators who try to invent new capital goods
in that sector. Consequently, banks compensate for the higher risk and demand increas-
ing risk premia and thus charge innovators higher interest rates on credit. A relatively
higher interest rate – in, say, sector z – ceteris paribus implies relatively increasing credit
costs for innovators whose plan is to invent new Z-complementary capital goods. To keep
profits constant, innovators would have to cut R&D investment. This would result in a
lower probability of success in sector z. The expected profitability of developing new
Z-complementary capital goods would decline and innovators would direct R&D effort to
the relatively less expensive sector: The presence of banks adds an additional component
to the determinants of directed technical change through the relative interest rate charged
on loans Rz,t/Rm,t, which is equivalent to the inverse of the probabilities of successful in-
novation (ηz,t/ηm,t)
−1.
Second, R&D expenditures are proportional to (expected) profits. Credit costs determine
equilibrium profits and thus the amount of resources devoted to R&D in equilibrium. This
in turn influences indirectly the probability of successful innovation and thus the rate of
technical change in both sectors.
Theorem 3.2 provides an answer to the first stylized research question: Do banks influ-
ence the direction of technical change and if so how?. The second part of this question
can also be answered with the explanations carried out previously: Banks influence the di-
rection of technical change through the evaluation of innovators and by funding the most
promising ones.
As a side note, the literature on induced innovation (e.g. Hicks (1932), Habakkuk (1962),
Kennedy (1964), Dranakis and Phelps (1965), Samuelson (1965)) states that relative fac-
tor prices influence the type of technological progress. In particular, the literature argues
that innovations are directed at ”more expensive” factors. In the discussion here, I confine
myself to the role of (output)-prices, market size effects et cetera. However, we can show
the similarity between the present approach and a formulation that considers factor costs
as determinants to develop new technologies rather than output prices: Combine the capi-
tal goods demand stated in equations (2.22a) and (2.22b) with the first order conditions of
the intermediate firms with respect to the factors M and Z given in (2.21a). Using these
expressions we can rewrite (3.17), (3.18) as
Πm = µwMM and Πz = µwZZ. (3.22)
Then one can express the relative profitability of developing Z-complementary capital
goods in terms of factor costs wM,wZ and market sizes M and Z and the relative profitabil-
ity of developing new Z-complementary capital goods then reads
Πz
Πm
=
wZ
wM
Z
M
. (3.23)
Equation (3.23) indicates a higher incentive to innovate for factors that are more expen-
sive. This result shows the equivalence of the approach presented here (and for instance
by Acemoglu (2002)) that considers output prices, and the approach in the induced inno-
vation literature cited above, which concentrates on factor input prices.
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For purposes of a compact notation, I employ the following notation to all relative equi-
librium variables from now on: Let am and az denote arbitrary sector-specific variables
for sector m and sector Z respectively. Then we define the relative variable with respect
to sector Z as a˜ :=
az
am
.
Under this convention, relative expected profits of innovation in sector z, given in equation
(3.21), equal
V˜t = p˜
1
1−µ
t+1
Z˜t+1Q˜t+1R˜
−1
t+1. (3.24)
To get explicit formulations of relative profits and relative productivity, we have to elimi-
nate endogenous prices pm,t, pz,t and also loan rates Rm,t and Rz,t.
Recall that relative credit interest rates for sector z are given by
R˜t+1 =
Rz,t+1
Rm,t+1
=
ηm,t
ηz,t
= η˜−1t (3.25)
which is the inverse of the relative probability of successful innovation in sector z. Using
(3.11), insert π¯ j := (1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µ p
1
1−µ
j
J for j ∈ {m, z}, and take the ratio gives
η˜t =
(
π¯z,t+1
π¯m,t+1
) α
1−α
=
(
p˜
1
1−µ
t+1
Z˜t+1
) α
1−α
. (3.26)
Note that the factors Mt and Zt are constant in supply, so as long as the relative price
p˜t is constant, η˜t is also constant and we can ignore time subscripts. Moreover, η˜t is
independent of the levels of Qm and Qz and equals the ratio of sectoral profits. The latter
results simply from the fact that R&D expenditures are a constant fraction of profits and
R&D determines the probability of success.
To highlight the role of the risk effect in determining the direction of technical change,
we eliminate the relative price p˜t, as given in (3.5), from (3.26) in a first step. The risk
effect then reads
R˜t+1 = η˜
−1
t =
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1t+1 Q˜
−1
t+1
)− α(1−α)σ
, (3.27)
where σ := 1+ (1−µ)(ε−1) is the elasticity of substitution between the two factors Mand
Z.42 Inspection of (3.27) reveals that the response of the risk effect to an increase in the
relative supply of factors Z˜ := Z/M depends on the size of σ (since 1 − α > 0). In fact
(3.27) implies the following proposition:
Proposition 3.1. If factors M and Z are gross complements, ε < 1 ⇔ σ < 1, the risk
effect increases with an increase in the relative supply of factor Z˜.
If factors M and Z are gross substitutes, ε > 1⇔ σ > 1, the risk effect decreases with an
increase in the relative supply of factor Z˜.
42For the purpose of this study it is important to distinguish the cases where ε ≶ 1 and thus σ ≶ 1. For
the relevant parameter values of ε and σ, the exponent is always positive, i.e. 1/(1−α)σ > 0, since α ∈]0, 1[
and σ > 0 by assumption.
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After elimination of p˜t, as given in (3.5), relative expected profits from innovation in
sector z, given in equation (3.21), read
V˜t =
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1Q˜σ−1R˜−σ
) 1
σ
. (3.28)
Ignore the risk effect in equation (3.28) for the moment (and suppose that R˜ = 1). The
parameter σ has a crucial impact on the direction of technical changes.If σ > 1, M and Z
are gross substitutes and an increase in the relative factor supply Z˜ := Z/M (either because
the supply of Z increases or equivalently, the supply of M decreases) will increase the
relative profitability of inventing Z-complementary capital goods V˜t. On the one hand,
if Z˜ increases, factor Z becomes relatively more abundant. This translates into a larger
market for the capital goods that complement Z, which increases V˜ (this is referred to as
the “market-size effect”). On the other hand, if Z˜ increases, factor M becomes relatively
scarce and thus relatively more expensive. This translates into higher prices of goods
that use M-complementary capital goods in the production process and thereby increase
the profit from inventing those M-complementary capital goods. Thus V˜ decreases (this
represents the “price-effect”).
Consequently, the price effect and the market-size effect work in opposite directions. If
σ > 1, V˜, as given in (3.28), increases with an increase in Z˜ and we can conclude that
the market size effect dominates the price effect. If σ < 1, V˜ decreases with an increase
in Z˜ and the price effect dominates the market-size effect. Together this implies that the
parameter σ regulates whether the price effect dominates the market size effect.
Next consider the response of relative expected profits to a change in the relative factor
supply Z˜, given that the risk effect is an additional determinant in the direction of technical
changes (and compare this case to the hypothetical situation above, where we treated the
risk effect R˜ as equal to 1). For that, insert R˜ from equation (3.27) into (3.28):
V˜t =
(
γεZ˜σ−1t+1 Q˜
−ϕ
t+1
) 1
σ(1−α)
, ϕ := 1 − σ(1 − α). (3.29)
Inspection of (3.29) shows first that relative expected profits basically respond to an in-
crease in the relative factor supply Z˜ in the manner described above: If σ > 1, V˜t, as
given in (3.29), increases with an increase in Z˜ and the market size effect dominates the
price effect. If σ < 1, V˜t decreases with an increase in Z˜ and the price effect dominates
the market-size effect. So the result derived by Acemoglu (2002) that the elasticity of
substitution plays a crucial role in determining the direction of technical change does not
change if we consider capital constrained firms and financial intermediation.
Additionally, comparing (3.28) (and still assume R˜ = 1 there) with (3.29) reveals that the
response of relative profits to an increase in Z˜ changes, if we additionally account for the
risk effect in the determinants of technical change:
Proposition 3.2. Relative expected profits V˜t including the risk effect respond stronger to
an increase in relative factor supply Z˜. This result holds independent of the size of the
elasticity of substitution.
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Proof: See Appendix 1.
Taken together, propositions 3.1 and 3.2 imply that the elasticity of substitution between
factors regulates the way in which innovators’ incentive to invent Z-complementary capi-
tal goods responds if the relative factor supply changes in the first place and additionally,
this response changes if the risk effect of private sector lending enters the determinants
of directed technical change. Especially the latter result has some implications for the
assessment of policy rules that aim at directing technological advances towards a certain
factor or sector.43
To see another important aspect of the elasticity of substitution, consider the relative price
w˜ of the (relative) factors Z and M, Z˜. The relative factor reward can be computed as44
w˜ = γ˜
ε
σ Z˜−
1
σ Q˜
σ−1
σ . (3.30)
This relative factor price is decreasing in the relative supply Z˜, since σ > 0. This con-
situtes the usual substitution effect: the more abundant factor is substituted for the less
abundant one, and has a lower marginal product.45
The supply of innovations
So far, the equilibrium analysis has studied how the production side of the economy de-
termines the return on different types of innovations. In the next step, we consider the
other side of this equation and analyze the costs of different innovations. As stated in the
model section, only the final good is being used to generate innovations. This formula-
tion corresponds to the “lab equipment” formulation in Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991).46
This approach implies that future relative costs of innovations are unaffected by the com-
position of current R&D and therefore remain constant.
Recall that innovators choose a sector to innovate for on the grounds of expected profits.
To have innovators who are willing to invest in R&D in both sectors, expected profits
from improving the productivity of the capital goods in both sectors have to be equal:
Vm,t = Vz,t. (3.31)
43For instance, suppose that Ym uses -instead of labor- a “clean“ production factor in the sense that pro-
duction in sector m has no negative external effect on the environment. Suppose also that the production of
Yz uses a ”dirty“ input Z, so the use of Z is associated with some form of pollution. Then the aim of environ-
mental policy would be to direct technical changes away form improving the capital goods complementary
to Z and instead direct innovations towards improving the productivity of capital goods complementary to
M. For instance, the German Renewable Energy Sources Act (“Erneuerbare Energien Gesetz” (EEG 2009))
is an environmental policy that aims at directing technological changes towards “green” technologies, i.e.
technologies that complement renewable energy resources such as wind, solar energy, geothermal energy
etc. In light of the result derived above that the risk effect has a catalyzing effect on profit incentives,
questions such as how long renewable energy technologies should be subsidized before releasing them into
competition, should perhaps be answered differently. Parts two and three of this thesis present a detailed
analysis of this topic.
44For a derivation of the expression given in (3.30), see appendix A1.
45See Acemoglu (2002) p. 790.
46The Lab Equipment assumes that investment in equipment or in laboratories is all that is required for
research. So new capital goods and ideas are created using the final good.
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The condition states that in terms of expectation, it is equally profitable to invest in gener-
ating innovations on M-and Z- complementary capital goods. Hence the average produc-
tivity of the sectoral capital goods Qm,t and Qz,t can both grow along the balanced growth
path. Now resolve the condition above as V˜t, insert equations (3.27), (3.28) and resolve
for Q˜ gives
Q˜ =
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1
) 1
ϕ
, (3.32)
where ϕ := 1−σ(1−α). The notable feature is that with the direction of technical change
endogenized, the relative productivity of technology Q˜ is determined by the relative factor
supply Z˜ and the elasticity of substitution σ. Moreover, the expression for Q˜ implies the
following proposition:
Proposition 3.3. If the two factors are gross substitutes and 1
1−α
> σ > 1, an increase
in Z˜ will raise Q˜. Hence, equation (3.32) implies that if these two conditions hold, the
physical productivity of the relatively more abundant factor tends to be higher.
If the two factors are gross complements, σ < 1, an increase in Z˜ will lower Q˜. Thus,
equation (3.32) implies that the physical productivity of the relatively more scarce factor
tends to be higher if σ < 1.
Recall from section 2.2 that technological change is biased towards a factor if it increases
the marginal product of that factor in comparison to the marginal product of the other
factor. Since σ > 1 ⇔ ε > 1, a higher level of the relative physical productivity Q˜
corresponds to Z-biased technical change, because if ε > 1, the relative marginal product
of Z, w˜ as given in equation (3.30), is increasing in Q˜. Thus Z-augmenting technical
change is also Z-biased and technological advances will be endogenously biased in favor
of the more abundant factor: with gross substitutability an increase in Q˜ is relatively
biased toward Z.
In case of gross complementarity (σ < 1), the condition σ < 1 < 1
1−α
is automatically
fulfilled and the result stated in the proposition above holds generally. However, since
σ < 1 ⇔ ε < 1, the decrease in the relative physical productivity translates into higher
value of the relative marginal product w˜, as given in (3.30). Therefore, even if σ < 1,
technological advances will again be endogenously biased in favor of the more abundant
factor: with gross complementarity, a decrease in Q˜ is relatively biased toward Z. Taken
together this gives us the
Proposition 3.4. Relative equilibrium bias: Consider the directed technical thange model
with capital constraints and financial intermediation. Then, if σ < 1
1−α
an increase in the
relative abundance of the factor Z, denoted by Z˜ := Z/M, always induces technological
change relatively biased toward factor Z.
According to this proposition, the induced technological change increases the relative
marginal product of the factor becoming more abundant. This holds, as long as σ ,
1. If instead σ = 1, the elasticity of substitution between factors is equal to one, and
technological change is not biased towards any one of the factors. Since marginal factor
productivities are equal to factor prices, the relative equilibrium bias therefore describes
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the impact of technology on relative factor prices at given factor proportions. Note that
this equilibrium bias is not a result of the banks’ financial intermediation. So in other
words, the implementation of capital constrained firms and a bank sector does not alter
the findings of the standard directed technical change model introduced by Acemoglu
(2002), p. 792, but adds a component to the determinants of technology bias (see also
Acemoglu (2007)).
Finally, the result is confined to the case considered here, where technologies are factor
augmenting. So the equilibrium bias crucially depends on the assumptions about the set
of possible technologies. If we include non-factor-augmenting technologies into the set
of possibilities, examples can be constructed, where an increase in the abundance of a
factor induces technology to be biased against this factor and the stated equilibrium bias
no longer remains valid.47
3.3. Properties of the balanced growth path equilibrium
Next, we derive final expressions for the sectoral probabilities of successful innovation,
interest rates etc., derive the rate of output growth and show the properties of the balanced
growth path equilibrium.
First, we take the relative price of the intermediate goods given in (3.5) and insert (3.32):
p˜ =
pz
pm
=
(
γ˜ε(1−α)Z˜α
)− 1−µ
ϕ
, (3.33)
where ϕ := 1 − σ(1 − α). Solve this equation for pz (pm) and plug the result into the
normalized price term of the final good (equation (2.26)),
P = [γεp1−εm + (1 − γ)
εp1−εz ]
1
1−ε ≡ 1. (3.34)
This gives the final expressions for the prices of the good Ym:
pm,t = W¯
1
ε−1
t
(
γε(1−α)Mαt
)−1−µ
ϕ
(3.35)
and of the good Yz:
pz,t = W¯
1
ε−1
t
(
(1 − γ)ε(1−α)Zαt
)−1−µ
ϕ
. (3.36)
where W¯t :=
(
γεMσ−1t
)α
ϕ +
(
(1 − γ)εZσ−1t
)α
ϕ and ϕ := 1 −σ(1 − α). The equations indicate
that intermediate output prices are constant as long as the factors M and Z are constant.
After elimination of these price terms the probability of successful innovation, as given in
(3.11), read
ηm,t =
α
α
1−α
0
ζ
(
γεMσ−1t+1
)− α
ϕ
(
W¯
1
σ−1
t+1
rt+1
) α
1−α
. (3.37)
47For a detailed analysis of the necessary and sufficient conditions of (relative and absolute) equilibrium
bias of technology development, see Acemoglu (2007).
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in sector m and
ηz,t =
α
α
1−α
0
ζ
(
(1 − γ)εZσ−1t+1
)− α
ϕ
(
W¯
1
σ−1
t+1
rt+1
) α
1−α
. (3.38)
in sector z, where α0 := α/(1 + α). Still, these expressions contain the economy’s interest
rate which will be determined below.
To solve for the balanced growth path equilibrium, we need equations a) relating the
growth rate of sectoral output to sectoral R&D expenditures and b) relating the rate of
aggregate growth to sectoral output growth rates. The growth rates of sectoral or average
capital goods quality were given in equations (2.37a) and (2.37b):
Qm,t+1 − Qm,t
Qm,t
= ιtηm,t (λm − 1) for all t ≥ 0 (3.39)
for sector m and
Qz,t+1 − Qz,t
Qz,t
= (1 − ιt)ηz,t (λz − 1) for all t ≥ 0 (3.40)
for sector z. The sectoral output as a function of average sectoral capital goods quality
were derived in (3.1) and (3.2):
Ym,t = µ
2µ
1−µ p
µ
1−µ
m,t MtQm,t, (3.41)
Yz,t = µ
2µ
1−µ p
µ
1−µ
z,t ZtQz,t. (3.42)
Since equations (3.35) and (3.36) reveal that intermediate output prices are constant over
time, as long as the factors M and Z are constant over time, equations (3.41) and (3.42)
state the relationship between sectoral output and R&D expenditures over time:
Ym,t+1 − Ym,t
Ym,t
=
Qm,t+1 − Qm,t
Qm,t
(3.43)
and
Yz,t+1 − Yz,t
Yz,t
=
Qz,t+1 − Qz,t
Qz,t
. (3.44)
This implies that the growth rates of sectoral output equal the rate of change of average
sectoral capital goods quality.
Before we get final expressions for the equilibrium deposit interest rate and also rates
of aggregate output growth, we establish a result in the following Lemma that helps to
simplify the rest of the analysis.
Lemma 3.1. Innovators are indifferent between intermediate sectors m and z, i.e.
Vm,t = Vz,t t ≥ 0, (3.45)
if the growth rates of average sectoral capital goods qualities are identical:
gm,t :=
Qm,t+1
Qm,t
− 1 =
Qz,t+1
Qz,t
− 1 =: gz,t t ≥ 0. (3.46)
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Proof: See Appendix A.
The condition (3.45) states that in expected terms, it is equally profitable to invest in
generating innovations onM-and Z-complementary capital goods. In this case, innovators
are indifferent and R&D is directed to both sectors. Hence, the average productivity of
the sectoral capital goods Qm,t and Qz,t can both grow. In fact, the lemma proves that in
this case, the growth rates of Qm,t, denoted by gm,t, and Qz,t, denoted by gz,t are identical
and we can define
gt := gm,t = gz,t. (3.47)
Now take the deposit interest rate, as given in equation (3.7):
rt+1 =
α
S t−1
(
ιtEt[Πm,t+1] + (1 − ιt)Et[Πz,t+1]
)
, (3.48)
where Et[Π j,t+1] =
α
1+α
(1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µηt p˜
1
1−µ
t+1 Z˜t+1Q˜t+1. After elimination of endogenous prices
etc., the equilibrium deposit interest rate reads:
rt+1 = α0W¯
α
σ−1
t+1
(
µ(1 + gt)
2
ζ
(
γεMσ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
)1−α
, (3.49)
where still α0 := α/(1 + α), W¯t :=
(
γεMσ−1t
)α
ϕ +
(
(1 − γ)εZσ−1t
)α
ϕ , ϕ := 1 − σ(1 − α).
We use this deposit interest rate to get final expressions for the success-probabilities and
equilibrium credit interest rates. First, insert (3.7) into (3.37) and (3.38). The probability
of successful innovation in sector m then equals
ηm,t =
(
W¯
1
σ−1
t+1
ζ
1−α
α µ(1 + gt)2
(
γεMσ−1
t+1
) 1−α
ϕ
)α
(3.50)
and in sector z
ηz,t =
( (
γεMσ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
W¯
1
σ−1
t+1
ζ
1−α
α µ(1 + gt)2
(
(1 − γ)εZσ−1
t+1
) 1
ϕ
)α
. (3.51)
Now we are in a position to derive equilibrium credit interest rates. Recall that credit
interest in sector m was given by
Rm,t+1 = α
π¯m,t+1Qm,t+1
S t−1
(
1
1 + α
+ Et[Π˜t+1]
)
(3.52)
and in sector z credit interest equals
Rz,t+1 = α
π¯z,t+1Qz,t+1
S t−1
(
1
1 + α
+
1
Et[Π˜t+1]
)
(3.53)
where Et[Π˜t+1] = η˜t p˜
1
1−µ
t+1
Z˜t+1Q˜t+1. Insert prices, success-probabilities and aggregate sav-
ings from (2.43), this leads directly to the following credit interest rates. In sector m, the
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single representative bank demands a credit interest rate equal to
Rm,t+1 =
α(µ(1 + gt)
2
(1 + α)
(3.54)
and in sector z, innovators pay an interest rate on credit equal to
Rz,t+1 =
αµ(1 + gt)
2
(1 + α)
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1
) α
ϕ
. (3.55)
To see that the growth rate of sectoral output gt := gm,t = gz,t is also the rate of final output,
consider the production function for final output given in (2.23) for period t + 1:
Yt+1 =
(
γY
ε−1
ε
m,t+1 + (1 − γ)Y
ε−1
ε
z,t+1
) ε
ε−1
. (3.56)
Using the relationship between the dynamic development of average capital goods quality
and intermediate output in sector j = {m, z} as given in (3.43) and (3.44) final output in
period t + 1 reads
Yt+1 =
(
γ
(
(1 + gm,t)Ym,t
) ε−1
ε
+
(
(1 − γ)(1 + gz,t)Yz,t
) ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
. (3.57)
Since gm,t = gz,t = gt we get
Yt+1 = (1 + gt)
(
γY
ε−1
ε
m,t + (1 − γ)Y
ε−1
ε
z,t
) ε
ε−1
= (1 + gt)Yt. (3.58)
This shows that final output also grows with a rate equal to gt. Furthermore, on the
balanced growth path, output and consumption growth must be equal.48 This argument
can be proved by showing that consumption growth of old workers, entrepreneurs and
innovators is identical and equal to the rate of output growth.49
48In equilibrium, the condition Yt = Ct + Xt + Ht holds for all t ≥ 0. Then, in a BGP, Y,C, X,H must all
grow at the same rate: Suppose, consumption grows at a maximum rate (compared to X,H) on the right-
hand side of this equation. Then, this must also be the rate at which output grows, because otherwise, one
side of the equation would become negligible asymptotically and the equation cannot hold. Now, substract
consumptionCt from both sides. We then get Yt −Ct = Xt + Ht, where the left-hand side is strictly positive
and grows at a rate greater than all terms on the right-hand side. This is clearly impossible. It follows that
all variables on the right-hand side have to grow at the rate of consumption growth. Therefore, all variables
grow at the same rate.
49Just take the consumers’ income profiles for two consecutive periods, use the dynamic development of
capital goods quality together with the fact that consumers spend their income entirely, it follows that:
C
(o)
W,t+1
C
(o)
W,t
=
C
(o)
e,t+1
C
(o)
e,t
=
C
(o)
i,t+1
C
(o)
i,t
= 1 + gt.
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The equilibrium mass of innovators in sector j = {m, z} is given by:50
ιm,t =
ηz,tλ¯z
ηm,tλ¯m + ηz,tλ¯z
, (3.59)
ιz,t =
ηm,tλ¯m
ηm,tλ¯m + ηz,tλ¯z
, (3.60)
where λ¯ j := λ j − 1 and λ j represents the exogenous and constant sector-specific rise of
quality in case of innovation. After elimination of the η j,t’s the mass of innovators in
sector m reads:
ιm,t := ιt =
λ¯z
λ¯z +
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1
) α
ϕ
λ¯m
, (3.61)
and in sector z the mass of innovators equals
ιz,t := 1 − ιt =
λ¯m
λ¯m +
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1
) −α
ϕ
λ¯z
. (3.62)
Finally, the equilibrium growth rate of the economy is given by an implicit expression:
gt(1 + gt)
2α =
λ¯zλ¯m
λ¯z +
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
λ¯m
((
γεMσ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
W¯
1
σ−1
t+1
ζ
1−α
α µ
)α
. (3.63)
Note that the term on the right hand side is constant over time, as long as the factors M
and Z are constant. Define this term as
Λ¯ :=
λ¯zλ¯m
λ¯z +
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
λ¯m
((
γεMσ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
W¯
1
σ−1
t+1
ζ
1−α
α µ
)α
. (3.64)
So in equilibrium, the growth rate has to be such that the equality condition in (3.63)
holds. This is equivalent to the problem of finding the root(s) of the function
F(gt) := gt(1 + gt)
2α − Λ¯. (3.65)
The economy’s growth rate is unique if the function F(·) has only one root. The following
Lemma proves the conditions under which F has one zero point. We use the results to
characterize the balanced growth path equilibrium afterwards.
50This expressions can be computed as follows. We use the result of Lemma 3.1 that given innovation
in both sectors, the growth rates have to be equal: gm,t = gz,t. Insert the corresponding terms for the
endogenous sectoral growth rates given in (3.39) and (3.40)
ιtηm,t(λm − 1) = (1 − ιt)ηz,t(λz − 1)
and simply solve this expression for ιt to get the expression in the text.
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Lemma 3.2. Let the function F given in (3.65) be defined on the interval [gu, g
o], with
0 < gu < g
o. Then for appropriate values of gu, g
o there exist one g∗t such that F(g
∗
t ) = 0.
Proof: See appendix A.
Together, these derivations prove the following
Proposition 3.5. Consider the directed technological change model described above.
Then, there exists a unique balanced growth path equilibrium in which the relative tech-
nologies are given by
Q˜∗ =
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1
) 1
ϕ
, with ϕ := 1 − σ(1 − α). (3.66)
The interest rate of the economy is given by (3.49), and consumption, sectoral and aggre-
gate output grow at the rate stated in (3.63).51
3.4. Comparative statics
It is also useful, to analyze the comparative static influence of (some of) the exogenous
parameters on the rate of aggregate economic growth g∗.
The implicit growth rate g∗t depends positively on the parameter Λ¯: the greater Λ¯ the
higher has g∗t to be in order to fulfill equation (3.63). So we have to analyze the response
of Λ¯ to parameter changes to get the response of gt.
First, the parameter λ j measures the size of a quality increase in sector j ∈ {m, z} in case
of successful innovation. Since λ¯ j := λ j − 1, the following influence of λ¯ j on g
∗
t holds:
Proposition 3.6. The parameter Λ¯ increases with the ”size“ of innovation in sector j ∈
{m, z}, given by λ¯ j. Hence, the greater λ¯ j, the higher is the equilibrium growth rate g
∗
t .
Proof: See appendix A.
An increase in λ j leads to a larger quality gaps between newly invented and existing
capital goods. Since the growth rate is given by the average rise in capital goods quality,
this directly implies a greater rate of economic growth.
Second, consider the influence of the cost of research on Λ¯ respectively g∗t , given by ζ:
Proposition 3.7. Λ¯ is decreasing in the cost of research ζ. Therefore, the greater ζ, the
lower is the equilibrium growth rate g∗t .
Proof: See appendix A.
A greater cost of research certeris paribus leads to lower probabilities of innovation suc-
cess. For given masses of innovators per sector, the mass of those who are successful in
the research lab declines. So on average, the change in sectoral capital goods quality de-
clines. Since in this study, the engine of economic growth is the rise capital goods quality,
this already implies the stated influence of ζ on g∗t .
Third, µ affects Λ¯ respectively g∗t , where µ is a technology parameter in the intermediate
production function and can be interpreted as the factor cost share of capital goods in total
intermediate production costs and we have:
51See also Acemoglu (2009) p. 509
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Proposition 3.8. Λ¯ and so the equilibrium growth rate g∗t is increasing in µ.
Proof: See appendix A.
A greater µ ceteris paribus leads to larger capital goods demand. This implies increasing
profits from capital goods supply and so returns on R&D increase. Since R&D effort
is a constant fraction of profits, this leads to greater R&D spending. The probability of
innovation-success increase and so on average, changes in sectoral capital goods quality
rises. This already implies a greater rate of economic growth gt.
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4. Concluding Remarks I
The formal framework presented in this part combines the results of existing models of
a) endogenous directed technical change and b) endogenous growth models featuring fi-
nancial intermediation to analyze the impact of credit and banks on the rate and more
importantly on the direction of technical change.
In general, endogenous directed technical change models allow innovations to be directed
towards different factors or sectors: firms can invest resources to develop new technolo-
gies complementing a particular factor or sector. Thereby, the relative profitability of gen-
erating innovations for these specific technologies constitute the incentive to invent higher
quality commodities, i.e. relative profits determine the direction of technical change.
I confirm and extend the findings of current research and show that four market forces
determine the relative profitability of the different types of technologies:
• the price effect, which encourages innovations on technologies that use the more
expensive (scarce) factors;
• the market size effect, which directs innovations towards technologies that use the
more abundant factor;
• the productivity effect, which increases the incentive to develop technologies for
sectors with a higher productivity;
• and the risk effect, which creates incentives to develop technologies complementing
factors where the risk of failure during the innovation process is lower.
The price effect and the market size effect are not a result of capital constraints and fi-
nancial intermediation. These two forces work in opposite directions. The former directs
innovations towards technologies using relatively more scarce (and therefore more expen-
sive) factors and the latter creates a bias towards technologies complementing relatively
more abundant (and therefore less expensive) factors.
This risk effect however results from capital constraints and financial intermediation and
represents the first major result of this thesis: if innovators are capital constrained and
therefore need credit to finance their business expenditures, cost minimizing behavior
then directs innovation effort to those sectors or factors, where the cost of credit is lower.
Since banks demand higher loan interest rates on projects with greater risk of default, this
implies ceteris paribus that the risk effect directs innovations to sectors with lower risk of
failure during the innovation process.
Furthermore, the elasticity of substitution between the factors has a crucial role in deter-
mining the relative power of the price and the market size effect. If the two intermediate
goods and, therefore, the two factors are gross substitutes, the market size effect is rel-
atively more powerful than the price effect. Therefore technical changes are directed
towards the factor with the larger market. In contrast, if the two intermediate goods and
therefore also the two factors are gross complements, the price effect is relatively more
powerful and technical changes are directed towards the relatively more scarce factor.
This role of the elasticity of substitution remains unaltered if the risk effect is an additional
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component in the determinants of directed technical change. The presence of capital con-
straints and banks, however, influences the response of relative profits of technology in-
vention to an increase in relative factor supply: If the factors are gross substitutes, relative
profits including the risk effect respond more strongly to an increase in the relative factor
supply compared to relative profits without the risk effect and if the factors are gross com-
plements, relative profits including the risk effect responds less strongly. This response is
quantitatively even stronger if we consider the risk effect in the determinants of directed
technical change. So the presence of capital constraints and banks lead to a stronger re-
sponse of relative profits to factor supply changes.
Finally, the analysis also yields the “relative equilibrium bias hypothesis”: irrespective of
the elasticity of substitution, an increase in the relative supply of a factor always induces
technological change that is biased in favor of that factor. This implies that the market
size effect is always relatively more powerful than the price effect.
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A. Appendix: Mathematical proofs part I
Proposition 2.1
Proof. This follows simply from the two equations in (2.3) for sector m and Z: In both
expressions, the denominator on the right hand side is a product of variables with values
in [0, 1] for ηJ and values in ]0, 1[ for Λ respectively and therefore the denominator itself
is a number between 0 and 1. Thus, the stated wedge between interest rates RJ,t+1 > rt+1
holds for all t, with J = {M, Z}.
Proposition 2.2
Proof. The proof is straightforward: In general ηM , ηZ is possible. Without loss of
generality, suppose ηM > ηZ. In order to ensure the relationship stated in equation (2.3),
RM,t < RZ,t has to hold.
Proposition 2.3
Proof. To simplify notation I suppress the index J in the following proof. Let X =
x(p(m, ϑ)) denote the demand of the capital good line by some intermediate sector, where
p(m, ϑ) denotes the price of the commodity and X the demand at this price. In section
4.3.2 I show that x(·) is strictly decreasing, differentiable and satisfies x(1) > 0, where the
marginal cost of production ψ ≡ 1. Finally, let the elasticity of demand be defined as
σ(p(m, ϑ)) ≡ −
p(m, ϑ)∂x(p(m,ϑ))
∂p(m,ϑ)
x(p(m, ϑ))
with σ ∈]1,∞[. Suppose a large number of firms N ∈ N have access to the same produc-
tion technology and they produce ϑwith the same quality q(m). Suppose now, an arbitrary
firm, say firm 1, gets access to a research technology such that this firm can improve the
quality of ϑ from q(m) to q(m + 1) without any uncertainty, by expanding ϕ > 0 units of
effort. Finally let the innovation be nonrival and nonexcludable due to a lack of a working
patent law.
Then, the profits for the different firms are as follows: Before firm 1 invents the new com-
modity, all firms use the same production technology. Therefore, the equilibrium price
equals marginal costs of production p(m, ϑ) = 1. The profit of firm i = 1, ...,N is then
Π
(i)
A
= (p(m, ϑ) − 1)x(p(m, ϑ))(i) = 0, where A simply denotes the equilibrium before in-
novation. If firm 1 pays ϕ and innovates, then due to non-excludability all other firms
will also produce the new commodity with quality m + 1. Therefore, the equilibrium
quality adjusted price equals marginal costs p(m + 1, ϑ) = 1. Hence, the profit of firm
i = 2, ...,N is Π(i)
B
= (p(m + 1, ϑ) − 1)x(p(m + 1, ϑ))(i) = 0. The net profit of firm 1 is
Π
(1)
B
= (p(m+1, ϑ)−1)x(p(m+1, ϑ))(1)−ϕ = −ϕ < 0. ThusΠ(1)
A
> Π
(1)
B
. So if firm 1 would
innovate, it would have to bear the fixed cost of research but could not charge a price to
cover these costs and would therefore lose money. Consequently there is no incentive to
innovate in a competitive market for capital goods.
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Proposition 2.4
Proof. i) Take the relative demand for the intermediate goods stated in equation (2.25)
for any two goods i, j, solve for Yi and insert the result into the total production costs:
N∑
i=1
piYi =
N∑
i=1
pi
(γ j
γi
)−ε( pi
p j
)−ε
Y j = γ
−ε
j p
ε
jY j
N∑
i=1
γεi p
1−ε
i =
( p j
γ j
)ε
Y j
N∑
i=1
γεi p
1−ε
i . (A.1a)
ii) Since the production of the final output uses N intermediate inputs, equation (2.23)
changes to
Y =
( N∑
i=1
γiY
ε−1
ε
i
) ε
ε−1
.
Use this expression and the relative factor demand from (2.25) for any two goods i, j to
manipulate the firms return PY:
PY = P
( N∑
i=1
γiY
ε−1
ε
i
) ε
ε−1
= P
( N∑
i=1
γi
((γ j
γi
pi
p j
)−ε
Y j
) ε−1
ε
) ε
ε−1
= P
( N∑
i=1
γi
(γ j
γi
pi
p j
)1−ε
Y
ε−1
ε
j
) ε
ε−1
= P
(( p j
γ j
)ε−1
Y
ε−1
ε
j
N∑
i=1
γεi p
1−ε
i
) ε
ε−1
= P
( p j
γ j
ε
Y j
( N∑
i=1
γεi p
1−ε
i
) ε
ε−1
. (A.1b)
Now combine the right hand sides of equations (A.1a) and (A.1b) to get
P
( N∑
i=1
γεi p
1−ε
i
) ε
ε−1
=
N∑
i=1
p1−εi γ
ε
i .
Solve for P gives the final result and proves the corollary stated in the text:
P =
( N∑
i=1
p1−εi γ
ε
i
) 1
1−ε
≡ 1. (A.1c)
Proposition 3.2
Proof. The proof simply follows from comparison of the exponents in the two expres-
sions: The statement is true, if 1
σ
< 1
σ(1−α)
which holds if α > 0. Since by assumption
α ∈]0, 1[, the condition is always fulfilled.
Lemma 3.1
Proof. Suppose condition (3.45) holds and
Vm,t = Vz,t t ≥ 0. (A.2)
This is equivalent to
V˜t = 1 t ≥ 0. (A.3)
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To prove the statement in the Lemma, we have to show that this implies
gm,t :=
Qm,t+1
Qm,t
− 1 =
Qz,t+1
Qz,t
− 1 =: gz,t t ≥ 0. (A.4)
The relative productivity of sectoral average capital goods quality was given in (3.32):
Q˜t =
(
γ˜−εZ˜σ−1
) 1
1−σ(1−α)
∀t ≥ 0. (A.5)
Solve for Qz,t:
Qz,t =
(
γ˜−εZ˜σ−1
) 1
1−σ(1−α)
Qm,t ∀t ≥ 0. (A.6)
The growth rates gm,t and gz,t are equal to
Qm,t+1
Qm,t
= 1 + ιηm
(
λm − 1
)
for all t ≥ 0 (A.7)
and
Qz,t+1
Qz,t
= 1 + (1 − ι)ηz
(
λz − 1
)
for all t ≥ 0. (A.8)
Since (A.5) holds for all t ≥ 0, we have
Qz,t+1 =
(
γ˜−εZ˜σ−1
) 1
1−σ(1−α)
Qm,t+1. (A.9)
Now insert (A.9) into the enumerator and (A.6) into the denominator on the left-hand side
of (A.8) yields:
1 + gz,t =
Qz,t+1
Qz,t
=
(
γ˜−εZ˜σ−1
) 1
1−σ(1−α)
Qm,t+1
(
γ˜−εZ˜σ−1
) 1
1−σ(1−α)
Qm,t
=
Qm,t+1
Qm,t
= 1 + gm,t. (A.10)
Hence gm,t = gz,t and we can conclude that if the productivity of capital goods in both
sectors grows, the growth rates are identical. This proves the statement in the lemma.
Lemma 3.2
Proof. The function F is defined on the interval [gu, g
o] with 0 < gu < g
o and according
to (3.65) given by
F(gt) := (gt(1 + gt)
2α − Λ¯. (A.11)
First, note that F(·) is continuous on its domain and strictly increasing in its argument
gt. Then, for a given parameter value Λ¯ > 0, we can choose a gu such that gu < Λ¯.
Then F(gu) < 0. Since Λ¯ is constant, we can find a g
o with go > Λ¯. Then F(go) > 0.
Together this implies F(go)F(g
u) < 0 and we can conclude using the intermediate value
theorem that g∗t in ]gu, g
o[ exist with F(g∗t ) = 0. This already shows that g
∗
t is a root of F.
Uniqueness of g∗t follows, since F is strictly increasing in gt. Therefore, the growth rate
of the balanced growth equilibrium is unique.
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Derivation of ω˜ (equation (3.30))
Proof. The first order optimality conditions for the factors Z and Z and in intermediate
goods production are given by
(1 − µ)pmM
−µ
(∫ 1
0
q
1−µ
ϑm
x
µ
ϑm
dϑm
)
= wM, (A.12a)
(1 − µ)pzZ
−µ
(∫ 1
0
q
1−µ
ϑz
x
µ
ϑz
dϑz
)
= wZ. (A.12b)
The capital goods demand functions of type ϑ j of quality q in sector j = {m, z} are equal
to
xϑm =
(
µ2pm
) 1
1−µ
qϑmM. (A.13a)
xϑz =
(
µ2pz
) 1
1−µ
qϑzZ. (A.13b)
Inserting these capital goods demand functions into the corresponding equations (A.12a),
(A.12b) respectively and take the ratio yields:
w˜ :=
wz
wm
=
(
pz
pm
) 1
1−µ
(
Qz
Qm
)
= p˜
1
1−µ Q˜. (A.14)
Insert p˜ from (3.5) gives (3.30) in the text:
w˜ =
(
γ˜εZ˜−1Q˜σ−1
) 1
σ
. (A.15)
Proposition 3.6
Proof. To prove the proposition, simply calculate the partial derivative of Λ¯ with respect
to λ¯m and λ¯z:
∂Λ¯
∂λ¯m
=
λ¯2z(
λ¯z +
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
λ¯m
)2
((
γεMσ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
W¯
1
σ−1
t+1
ζ
1−α
α (1 − µ)µ
)α
=
λ¯zλ¯
−1
m Λ¯
λ¯z +
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
λ¯m
> 0. (A.16)
and
∂Λ¯
∂λ¯z
=
λ¯zλ¯
−1
m Λ¯
(
(1 − γ)εZσ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
λ¯z +
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
λ¯m
> 0. (A.17)
Thus the greater the size of innovation λ j, the greater is Λ¯ and so the equilibrium growth
rate g∗t .
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Proposition 3.7
Proof. To prove the proposition, we compute the partial derivative of Λ¯ with respect to ζ:
∂Λ¯
∂ζ
=
−(1 − α)ζ−(2−αλ¯z
λ¯z +
(
γ˜εZ˜σ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
λ¯m
((
γεMσ−1
t+1
) α
ϕ
W¯
1
σ−1
t+1
ζ
1−α
α (1 − µ)µ
)α
= −
(1 − α)Λ¯
ζ
< 0. (A.18)
Proposition 3.8
Proof. The partial derivative of Λ¯ with respect to µ gives:
∂Λ¯
∂µ
= −
αΛ¯
µ
< 0, (A.19)
so larger values of µ imply lower values of Λ¯ and thus the larger µ the lower is the equi-
librium growth rate g∗t .
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Part II
THE ENVIRONMENT, BANKS, AND
DIRECTED TECHNICAL CHANGE
INTRODUCTION
Introduction
Economic growth is associated with increasing consumption of fossil fuels and their com-
bustion emits greenhouse gases, which are detrimental to the earth’s climate. Global
carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion and cement production have significantly
increased since 1900. Emissions increased by over 17 times between 1900 and 2010 and
by about 1.5 times between 1990 and 2010.52 If greenhouse gases (GHG’s) continue to
increase in the future, the effects of human induced climate change such as hurricanes,
floods and periods of aridity will occur more frequently with corresponding negative ef-
fects on economic growth.
To alleviate these growth-damping effects, the industrialized nations are faced with the
ambitious task to decouple economic growth and further increases of emissions. This
decoupling can be achieved for instance through (a combination of): (i) the invention of
emission-extensive or even emission-neutral production technologies, (ii) a shift in sec-
toral industrial production from GHG-intensive sectors towards GHG-extensive sectors,
(iii) within production sectors, the substitution of emission intensive production inputs
by emission neutral inputs (for instance the substitution of electricity from fossil fuels
by electricity from wind, water, nuclear and solar power etc.). The present study con-
centrates on (ii), the shifts in intermediate production from carbon intensive to carbon
extensive production, i.e. inter-sectoral structural change, especially analyzing the role
of financial intermediation.
This is well worth analyzing, because the previous parts suggest a systematic link between
the rate and direction of technical change and financial intermediation. Therefore, envi-
ronmental or climate policies that aim at shifting technical changes from “dirty” sectors
or factors towards “green” sectors/factors, have to take the effects of financial interme-
diation into account as well.53 Thus we build on the findings of part one and adjust the
developed model to additionally account for environmental constraints and examine the
following stylized research question of part two: What role do financial intermediaries
play in directing technical change towards “green” technologies?.
Thereby, the second part combines elements from different strands of literature and is
therefore related to each of them. The basis of the first part and thus also of the current
second part is the literature on endogenous directed technological change ( Acemoglu
(1998, 2002, 2007)): innovators have a choice to increase the quality of capital goods in
either a “green” or a “dirty” intermediate sector. Second, the explicit consideration of
financial intermediation builds on the findings of Schumpeter (1912), Boyd and Prescott
(1986), King and Levine (1993), Levine (1997) that banks do matter for economic devel-
opment. Here, innovators lack the capital resources to finance their ventures and banks
provide necessary funds. A consequence of these results is that banks might also matter
for the direction of “green” technical change. Third, the thesis is connected to the growing
52Data source: U.S. Department of Energy, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center.
53In the sequel, the study uses the terms ”green“ and ”dirty“ to describe an economy that is characterized
by low levels of atmospheric carbon concentration and small damages to aggregate output respectively an
economy with high levels of carbon concentration in the atmosphere with corresponding large damages to
aggregate output.
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literature on quantitative general equilibrium models of climate change (Nordhaus (1994,
2008), Hassler et al. (2012), Krusell and Smith (2009), Acemoglu et al. (2012), Golosov
et al. (2014) ). I follow these studies and implement a simple model of the atmospheric
carbon cycle within the general equilibrium model developed in the first part.
The rest of the second part is structured as follows: The next section presents the model
and derives the microeconomic decision problems (section 5). Afterwards, the study de-
fines and describes the corresponding equilibrium and derives the answer to the stylized
research question formulated above (section 6). This second part ends with some con-
cluding remarks (section 7).
5. The Model
We start again with a brief overview of the model and highlight the changes in the formal
framework in comparison to the model develpoed in part one. It will turn out that most of
the adjustments apply to the economy’s production side.
5.1. The Economy
Still, the economy evolves infinitely in discrete time t, t ∈ {0, 1, 2, ...} and in each t, a
continuum of overlapping generations populate the economy, whose life span being di-
vided into two periods. Population is constant over time. So at each t ≥ 0, two different
generations populate the economy. Each generation consists of workers, entrepreneurs
and innovators who differ in terms of their access to investment projects and consumption
profiles. Hence the model features heterogeneous consumers.
The other entities in the economy are: a banking sector and a “real” side of goods pro-
duction. The production side exhibits a downstream structure: during the first stage, firms
produce a variety of capital goods, the second stage contains two heterogeneous interme-
diate production sectors and during the last stage, firms produce one unique final good.
The final good can be consumed, transferred into future periods and invested in capital
goods production or in R&D. The final or consumption good serves as the numeraire: all
prices, returns, payments and costs are measured in terms of the consumption good. The
type of “agents” and market types remain unchanged and three different types of “agents”:
• Banks,
• Firms (final goods, intermediate goods, capital goods), and
• Consumers (workers, entrepreneurs and innovators)
act on three different market types:
• Goods markets (Final output, intermediate goods, capital goods),
• Capital markets (Deposit market, credit market), and a
• Labor market.
Figure 4 shows the different model entities and their mutual market interactions schemat-
ically. Red lines and red tagged areas indicate model changes compared to the model
presented in part one.
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FIGURE 4: The structure of the model
Banks
Financial intermediation is represented by a single aggregate competitive bank. The for-
mulation of financial intermediation remains unchanged compared to the model devel-
oped in part one: The banking sector demands the savings of young workers and repay
these deposits plus interest back to then old workers in the following period. The sav-
ings are pooled and as credit supplied to the innovators. The bank takes deposit interest
rates and credit interest rates as exogenously given and chooses sectoral credit supply and
deposit demand to maximize expected profits from financial intermediation.
Goods Production
In the first stage, firms combine the two different goods from the upstream intermedi-
ate stage to produce the unique final good. Still, inputs are instantaneously converted to
output, so decisions are static in this stage. Final output producers choose production
levels and input quantities to maximizes profits and take factor input prices and output
prices as given. Note that in contrast to the first part, final output is negatively affected
by CO2-emissions. This modeling of a negative external effect allows us to use the model
framework and general results of the first part to analyze the role of banks, if technical
change needs to be directed away from carbon-intensive industrial production towards
carbon-extensive, or even carbon-neutral goods production.
In the two sectors of the second downstream intermediate stage, price taking firms pro-
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duce a sector specific good and supply this output to the intermediate goods market. To
avoid confusion, note that the firms in the intermediate and the final output stage are
completely different firms. Intermediate firms convert inputs instantaneously into output.
Hence no intertemporal decisions occur in this intermediate stage. Firms in this stage take
wage and machine prices as given and set production quantities to maximize profits.
In comparison to the model of part one, two major differences apply in the intermediate
stage: First, intermediate production now emits carbon. More precisely, while production
of the good Ym is “green” in the sense that it creates no carbon emissions, production of
Yz is now “dirty”, because it emits a constant quantity of carbon per unit of output. Emis-
sions enter the atmosphere and increase global carbon concentration. This leads to a rise
in global mean temperature with negative effects on the economy. These negative effects
are measured in percentage damage to final output. Second, and of less importance, sec-
toral production in both sectors no longer uses the two different factors Mt (labor) and
Zt (another unspecified production factor). Instead, both firms use labor, denoted by L j,t,
j ∈ {m, z} and still a continuum variety of sector-specific capital goods (machines) xϑ j of
different quality qϑ j . Note that labor here is not of different quality in the sense that the
wages in the two sectors differ. So in the sequel, intermediate firms in both sectors pay
the wage wt to the workers. This adjustment helps to simplify the analysis.
In the third production stage, no model adjustments are necessary. Still, entrepreneurs and
innovators produce sector specific capital goods and supply these “machines” to the inter-
mediate firms. Young innovators need credit to finance R&D expenditures. Capital goods
exhibit different levels of quality. Naturally, better-quality goods are more productive in
manufacturing the intermediate goods. The rise in quality represents technical progress.
Consumers
Consumers in the model are the workers, entrepreneurs, and innovators. We adjust the
model and introduce lump-sum taxes levied on old workers’ income to finance subsidies
on R&D and lump-sum transfers to old workers from tax revenue on dirty production.
The rest of the consumer side remains unchanged: each consumer lives for two consec-
utive periods. Workers are endowed with one unit of labor time and supply their unit of
labor on the labor market to the intermediate firms of sector m and z, earn an income from
wage payments and save their entire income to finance second period of life consumption.
Hence, workers transfer their current wealth into the next period.
Entrepreneurs receive patents to produce capital goods of current quality for the two in-
termediate sectors. When old, they consume the profits from capital goods selling.
Innovators invest in R&D to improve the quality of existing capital goods. Investments
are financed by credit. Young innovators initially select either one of the two intermediate
sectors to potentially invent a new capital good of greater quality for. The expected prof-
its from innovation determine whether technical progress is directed to one or the other
or both sectors, because innovatiors choose those sectors that promise the highest return.
This search for sectoral profits is the engine that drives directed innovations. In their sec-
ond period of life, old innovators then receive the profits from monopolistic capital goods
supply. Since individuals have no bequests, they spend the profits entirely on final goods
consumption.
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Before we consider the adjustments and decision problems in detail, we describe how ag-
gregate carbon emissions behave over time and illustrate how aggregate emissions affect
final output and economic growth.
5.1.1. The Carbon Cycle
In this study, I assume that the effect of emissions is to raise the atmospheric CO2-
concentration, that a larger concentration of CO2 increases the global mean surface tem-
perature, and the rise in temperature then translates into economic damages.
Naturally, parts of the carbon emitted into the atmosphere by burning fossil fuels immedi-
ately exit into the biosphere and the surface oceans, while other parts decay slowly in time
or even remain permanently in the atmosphere. This reduction, absorption and emission
of carbon is commonly referred to as the (atmospheric) carbon cycle.54 There is a large
number of studies featuring various degrees of integration between carbon emissions, cli-
mate changes and economic development. A review of these studies is beyond the scope
of this thesis. The interested reader may start with Nordhaus (2011) and the references
therein. With respect to the degree of integration, my approach to modelling economic
development and climate change can be seen as a rather lean integrated assessment model
of climate change, since for instance the depreciation structure of carbon will be linear by
assumption and the response of global mean temperature to the carbon concentration in
the atmosphere here will be immediate.
The next assumption specifying this approximation of the carbon cycle in the atmosphere,
is taken from Golosov et al. (2014) and based on the work of Nordhaus (1994, 2008) and
Mendelsohn et al. (1994).
Assumption 5.1. Let T denote the first date when emission started and denote total car-
bon emissions in period t by Et. Then, the atmospheric carbon concentration in period t,
At, is determined as follows:
At − A =
t+T∑
τ=0
(1 − dτ)Et−τ, (5.1)
where A is the pre-industrial level of atmospheric carbon concentration, 1 − dτ ∈]0, 1[
is the amount of carbon emitted τ periods into the future and still left in the atmosphere.
The latter is determined by
1 − dτ = φL + (1 − φL)φ0(1 − φ)
τ, (5.2)
where φL ∈]0, 1[ is the share of carbon emissions that remains permanently in the atmo-
sphere, (1−φL)φ0 ∈]0, 1[ is the fraction of the remainder that quickly exits the atmosphere
and φ ∈]0, 1[ is the (geometric) rate of decay of carbon concentration over time.55
54See for instance Falkowski et al. (2000)
55This formulation of the atmospheric carbon concentration is a generalized version of the formulation
frequently used in the literature on economic growth and climate change. In many studies, the atmospheric
carbon concentration is given by At+1 = µEt+ (1−δ)At in discrete time and A˙ = µE−δA in continuous time,
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As in Golosov et al. (2014), the process of carbon concentration can be represented by a
recursive vector representation where A1,t denotes permanent carbon in the atmosphere,
and A2,t denotes carbon that depreciates at rate φ. Given the sequence of emissions {E}t≥0
which are determined below, assumption 5.1 implies that the climate state evolves as
A1,t = A1,t−1 + φLEt, (5.3a)
A2,t = (1 − φ)A2,t−1 + (1 − φL)φ0Et. (5.3b)
The atmospheric CO2-concentration is the sum of permanent and non-permanent emis-
sions in the atmosphere and given by
At = A1,t + A2,t. (5.4)
In general, there are several ways in which climate change harms economic development
in practice. To name only a few, through a rise in sea-levels, floods, droughts, wildfires
and extreme storms, climate change could destroy essential infrastructure such as homes,
roads, bridges, railroad tracks, airport runways, power lines, dams, levees and seawalls.
Moreover, disruptions in daily life related to climate change can mean lost work and
school days and harm trade, transportation, agriculture, fisheries, energy production, and
tourism. Severe rainfall events and snowstorms can cause power outages, snarl traffic,
delay air travel and so on.
In this study I assume that CO2-emissions do not affect production directly, but only indi-
rectly by affecting the climate of the earth, which in turn damages economic development
through the side effects mentioned. So to connect economic development with carbon
concentration, we need a map from the stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere At to
aggregate output Yt, where this connection could in general be either positive or negative
and in the sequel, I use the word “damage” in this sense.56 One can conceive of this
map as depicting the relation between carbon emissions and economic damages in of two
steps. The first one relates the global carbon concentration in the atmosphere to climate,
commonly represented by mean global temperature. The second one then relates climate
to economic damages, the latter being measured as a percentage of final output. Accord-
ingly, an increase in the atmospheric carbon concentration first would lead to a higher
surface temperature and this increase in the temperature would affect economic growth
where the parameter µ represents the absorbtion rate and δ represents the inverse of the lifetime of CO2. The
difference between the formulation used here and the one frequently used in the literature comes from the
assumption that some parts of the carbon emissions remain permanently in the atmosphere. For a fraction
of permanent emissions equal to zero (φL = 0) our formulation of the atmospheric carbon concentration
reproduces the mentioned dynamic (difference or differential equation) form of the atmospheric carbon
concentration. Therefore, the version used here contains the formulation commonly used in the literature
as a special case.
56Roughly speaking, to analyze the effects of climate change on economic development, economist as-
sume that CO2-pollution (directly or indirectly) either affects (i) the utility of the consumers, or (ii) goods
production function(s). Here, climate change affects the productivity of final output. In contrast to this,
for instance Acemoglu et al. (2012) assume that consumers’ utility depends positively on the quality of the
environment, where goods production is associated with a decrease in the quality of the environment. So in
their work, environmental degradation goes along with negative effects on consumers utility.
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for instance through more extreme weather situations.57 However, I skip this mapping
from carbon concentration to global mean temperature by formulating economic “dam-
ages” directly as a function of atmospheric carbon concentration:
Assumption 5.2. The damage function D : [A,∞[−→ [0, 1[ is differentiable, strictly
increasing in the atmospheric carbon concentration At and defined as
D(At) := 1 − e
−θ(At−A), (5.5)
where θ ≥ 0 is a scale parameter and A is the pre-industrial level of the atmospheric
carbon concentration.58
This function shows that the damage is higher, the higher the deviation of the actual global
atmospheric carbon concentration At is from the pre-industrial carbon concentration level
A. Moreover, this assumption implies the global mean temperature and thereby the dam-
age function to respond immediately to atmospheric carbon. One could also assume some
delay in the reaction of temperature to carbon concentration; for instance Nordhaus (1994)
assumes a slower temperature dynamic with respect to carbon concentration.
Climate scientists typically refer to a climate catastrophe, if the rise of global mean sur-
face temperature reaches or lies above some critical level (e.g. a rise in global mean tem-
perature of 3 degrees Celsius by the year 2100). Since this study does not consider the
global mean temperature explicitly and the effects of climate change are measured in per-
centage deterioration of aggregate output, let us define a climate catastrophe slightly dif-
ferently by putting forward the economic effects of climate change rather than the change
of climate or temperature itself:
Definition 5.1. A climate catastrophe occurs if D(At) > b¯ for some t < ∞ and b¯ > 0.
D(At) represents the damages to final output in period t measured in percent and b¯ repre-
sents a critical upper bound of those damages. So in the present study, the global economy
faces a climate catastrophe, if the percentage damages to global GDP caused by high lev-
els of atmospheric carbon concentration exceed a certain level (for instance if b¯ = 10%,
then a climate catastrophe occurs if climate change shrinks global economic output by
more than 10%).
It remains to show how the different potential threats of climate change, which are encap-
sulated in the single damage function, translate into economic performance. By assump-
tion, it is the economy’s production side that emits CO2 and it is also goods production
that bears the damages associated with increasing atmospheric carbon concentration.
5.2. Firms
In the first production stage, now global warming affects final output negatively through
the damage function formulated above. In the second stage of intermediate output, emis-
sions of carbon originate in one of the two sectors. In the third stage, entrepreneurs and
innovators produce capital goods that are used in intermediate production.
57See for instance Greiner et al. (2009).
58See Nordhaus (1994, 2008)
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5.2.1. Final output
The final output sector contains a large number of identical and profit maximizing firms
producing the unique consumption good. In addition, final output production is now
negatively affected by the amount of atmospheric carbon concentration, as given in the
assumptions 5.2 and 5.1 above. This leads to the following production function for final
output:
Assumption 5.3. The final good is produced using the production technology F : R2+ →
R+
Yt = (1 − D(At))F (Ym,t, Yz,t) = (1 − D(At))
(
γY
ε−1
ε
m,t + (1 − γ)Y
ε−1
ε
z,t
) ε
ε−1
, (5.6)
where D(At) := 1 − e
−θ(At−A) is the damage function, ε ∈ [0,∞[ represents the constant
elasticity of substitution between the inputs used in the production process, γ ∈]0, 1[ is a
distribution parameter and Ym, Yz represent intermediate input quantities.
In this stage, firms make no inter-temporal decisions. If ε = ∞, Ym and Yz are perfect
substitutes. If ε = 1, the production function will be Cobb-Douglas and if ε = 0, aggregate
production will be Leontieff. Throughout the rest of this thesis, we impose the following
assumption on the elasticity of substitution:
Assumption 5.4. The two intermediate goods Ym and Yz are gross substitutes (ε > 1).
First, an elasticity of substitution ε > 1 between clean and dirty (energy-) production is
frequently used in the literature. For instance Lo¨schel et al. (2009) and also Acemoglu
et al. (2012) assume gross substitutability between dirty and clean (energy-) inputs. In
addition, an elasticity of substitution smaller than one would imply that especially the
dirty input is an essential production input.
Given damage-adjusted productivity the firm in the final output sector takes the distribu-
tion parameter γ > 0, the price of the final good p, the prices of the two intermediate
inputs pm, pz and the production technology stated in (5.6) as given. The profit maximiza-
tion of the final goods sector (in period t ≥ 0) reads:
max
(Ym ,Yz)∈R
2
+
{
pY − (pmYm + pzYz) | Y = (5.6)
}
(5.7)
A solution to (5.7) satisfies the following first order conditions which equate prices and
marginal products of each production factor for all t ≥ 0:
pm,t = P(1 − D(At))γ
(
γY
ε−1
ε
m,t + (1 − γ)Y
ε−1
ε
z,t
) 1
ε−1
Y
− 1
ε
m,t (5.8a)
pz,t = P(1 − D(At))(1 − γ)
(
γY
ε−1
ε
m,t + (1 − γ)Y
ε−1
ε
z,t
) 1
ε−1
Y
− 1
ε
z,t . (5.8b)
The consumption good serves as the numeraire. Hence, the price of the final output or
consumption good p is normalized to pt ≡ 1 in all periods t ≥ 0. The normalization
of the final output price implies a normalization of the prices of the intermediate goods.
77
5 THE MODEL
Corollary (2.4) in part one describes this equivalence in price normalization of final output
and intermediate goods prices for the case of N different intermediate goods. The case of
two intermediate goods, as used in the present study, is then a special case of this corollary
for N = 2 and we get:
p =
(
γεmp
1−ε
m + γ
ε
z p
1−ε
z
) 1
1−ε
=
(
γεp1−εm + (1 − γ)
εp1−εz
) 1
1−ε
≡ 1. (5.9)
5.2.2. Intermediate Goods Production
Recall that this study assumes that product innovations are vertically related to existing
products. This means that newly invented products perform similar functions compared to
those performed by already existing products, but offer greater quality. So the developed
model equates economic growth with the rise of average capital goods quality. Thus,
every capital goods’ quality can be improved an unlimited number of times to ensure the
possibility of permanent economic growth.
Capital goods are used in the economy’s second downstream stage of goods supply, the
intermediate stage. The intermediate stage consists of the two different sectors m and m.
In both sectors, firms produce the intermediate goods denoted by Y j, j ∈ {m, z}. Production
inputs in both sectors are labor, denoted by L j, j ∈ {m, z} and a continuum variety of
sector-specific capital goods (machines) xϑ j of different quality qϑ j , where qnϑ j denotes
the quality of machine ϑ j of generation n = 0, 1, 2, ... in sector j (at time t) and xϑ j denotes
the input of capital good ϑ j in sector j (at time t). Note that labor here is not of different
quality in the sense that the wages in the two sectors differ. So in the sequel, intermediate
firms in both sectors pay the wage wt to the workers. The depreciation rate of the capital
goods is set to 100%, i.e. they depreciate fully after use.
The set of product lines or industries, where each member of this set representing one
line of capital good of probably infinite different qualities is constant through time. We
impose the following assumption with regard to the set of capital goods:
Assumption 5.5. Let the index j = {m, z} denote the two intermediate sectors and let Θ j
denote the set of industries or capital goods in sector j. Then each ϑ j ∈ Θ j corresponds
to a different capital goods line (machine type). The set of different industries Θ j is fixed
through time and hence, Θ j can be normalized to 1, i.e. Θ j := [0, 1] for j = {m, z}.
Consequently the continuum of capital goods in each intermediate sector has unit mass.
Capital goods of type ϑm (ϑz) cannot be used in production of the good Ym (Yz). With
regard to the capital goods quality we make the following:
Assumption 5.6. Let q(nϑ j) be defined as above. Then the quality of each new generation
of J-complementary capital goods is exactly λ j times the quality of the preceding product
generation. Hence,
q(nϑ j) = λ jq(nϑ j − 1) for all nϑ j = 0, 1, 2, ... and ϑ j ∈ Θ j, λ j > 1.
A larger quality of the capital goods increases the productivity of manufacturing the in-
termediate goods. In other words, a newly invented capital good or machine with higher
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quality produces a larger quantity of the intermediate good per unit of factor input com-
pared to the previous generation of product.
If intermediate production would require the combustion of some type of fossil fuel, a rise
in the quality of the capital goods could additionally imply an increase in the productivity
of the machines with respect to fossil fuel consumption or “energy”. That means, each
newly invented machine would decrease the amount of energy used per unit of output.
As a consequence, carbon emissions per unit of output, based on fossil fuel combustion,
would decrease with each newly invented machine.
However, in this study I assume that intermediate production emits carbon, but fossil fuels
are no additional input to production. This helps to keep the complexity of the following
calculations tractable. More precisely, while production of Ym is “green” in the sense that
it creates no carbon emissions, production of Yz is now “dirty”, because it emits κ > 0
units of carbon per unit of output. Denote the total amount of carbon emitted into the
atmosphere in period t measured in gigatonnes of carbon by Et, this implies
Et = κYz,t. (5.10)
Here, the parameter κ simply describes how polluting the production of the intermediate
good Yz is. For high values of κ a given level of production goes along with high emissions
and vice versa.
Although emissions enter the developed model, fossil fuels are not an explicit factor of
intermediate production. Hence, technical change increases the productivity of machines,
while according to equation (5.10), the emission intensity of intermediate production re-
mains constant over time. Consequently, technical changes do not lead to the development
of new technologies causing lower emissions per unit of output in the present study.59
The aggregate sectoral production function is defined as:
Assumption 5.7. In any period t, the intermediate sector j = {m, z} produces an interme-
diate good Y j using the technology
Y j = G(xϑ j , L j,t) =
(∫ 1
0
q
1−µ
ϑ j
x
µ
ϑ j
dϑ j
)
L
1−µ
j
, j ∈ {m, z}. (5.11)
Since intermediate goods markets are competitive, firms in the two sectors m and z take
the price of their product, p j, the rental prices of the machines, denoted by pϑ j , the qual-
ity of machines, qϑ j , j = {m, z} and the wage w j,t as given. The decision problem of a
59This approach of a constant “emission-to-output-ratio” can be found for instance in Acemoglu et al.
(2011). The authors assume constant emissions per unit of output, when analyzing the direction of techni-
cal change from dirty to clean technologies in a general equilibrium quality ladder model featuring climate
change. Other studies assume that technical change alters the emissions-to-output ratio. In their analysis of
taxes on fossil fuels in general equilibrium, Golosov et al. (2014) model energy as an input to production
explicitly and endogenous technological change here affects the energy productivity of the firms and there-
fore the emissions from combustion of fossil fuels as well. Acemoglu and Robinson (2012) analyze the
direction of technical change and the environment and assume that a rise in the quality of the capital goods
lowers the level of environmental degradation that is associated with production. Consequently technical
change is “emissions-saving“.
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representative firm in sector j = {m, z} then reads
max
(xϑ j ,L j)∈R
2
+
{
p jY j − w jL j −
∫ 1
0
pϑ j xϑ jdϑ j | Y j = (5.11)
}
(5.12)
A solution to the optimization problem (5.12) must satisfy the following first order con-
ditions:
(1 − µ)p jL
−µ
j
(∫ 1
0
q
1−µ
ϑ j
x
µ
ϑ j
dϑ
)
= w j, (5.13a)
µp jL
1−µ
j
(
q
1−µ
ϑ j
x
µ−1
ϑ j
)
= pϑ j . (5.13b)
Equations (5.13a) and (5.13b) state that the production factor prices equal their marginal
factor productivities. The demand for capital goods in sector j = {m, z} can be derived
from (5.13b) as60
xm(pϑm) =
(
µpm
pϑm
) 1
1−µ
qϑmLm. (5.14a)
xz(pϑz) =
(
µpz
pϑz
) 1
1−µ
qϑzLz. (5.14b)
Intermediate capital goods demand is increasing in the output price p j, in quality levels
q, and employment L j and decreasing in capital good prices pϑ j . These results are quite
similar to those of the first part, except for the fact that instead of the general factors
M and Z, intermediate firms in both sectors now use labor Lm and Lz and therefore, the
demand for capital goods depends on sectoral employment.
5.2.3. Capital Goods Production
The capital goods production stage is similar to the one of the first part. Entrepreneurs
and innovators supply the capital goods monopolistically to the intermediate firms. Within
any product line ϑ j either an entrepreneur or an innovator is the exclusive capital good
supplier. Still we assume that entrepreneurs hold patents to produce capital goods of ex-
isting quality and innovators try to invent new generations of product with higher quality
in some of the capital good lines. If innovation is successful, the innovators receive a
patent on that innovation and they supply the newly invented good of higher quality to the
intermediate firms. The entrepreneur on that product line makes zero profit. If innovation
is not successful, the entrepreneur exclusively sells the capital good with existent qual-
ity level to the intermediate sector. Key feature here is, that innovators decide to which
sector they direct their R&D effort on the basis of expected profits. This is the engine of
endogenous directed technical change.
Entrepreneurs and innovators operate in a market with Bertrand competition: no matter
what sector j ∈ {m, z} or capital good line ϑ j, marginal and average production costs
60Note that these capital goods demand functions contain the endogenous variables Lm and Lz and are
therefore not classical demand functions.
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are identical and entrepreneurs and innovators compete by setting prices simultaneously.
Thereby, each entrepreneur initially holds a patent on the blueprint to produce the current
highest quality capital good in capital good line ϑ j. Innovators can observe the prod-
uct characteristics of this “leading-edge” capital good and engage in R&D to invent new
capital goods of higher quality. Although competitors set prices equal to marginal costs
and so product prices are identical in principle. However, if an innovator develops a new
capital good of higher quality, this supplied good offers greater product quality compared
to previous generations of this specific product. Here, I consider an institutional setup,
where inventors of new “leading-edge” capital goods receive a one-period patent for the
production and sale of that good. Without any search- or transaction costs, intermediate
sectors want to buy capital goods of the highest quality standard, given that prices for
all generations of that product are identical. Consequently, the good offering the highest
quality or equivalently the good demanding the lowest quality-adjusted price within any
one industry ϑ j gains the complete market demand and the “leading-edge” capital good in
any industry is again monopolistically supplied. Therefore, positive monopolistic profits
are realized by successful innovators and by those entrepreneurs who operate on a capital
good line, where innovation was not successful or did not take place at all. Note that
competition between innovators and entrepreneurs takes place on an individual level.
With respect to the size of the rise in quality after innovation, we again assume that:
Assumption 5.8. Independent of the sectors j = {m, z} innovators direct their innovation
effort to, the size of the innovation is drastic if λ j is sufficiently high to guarantee the
innovator the unrestricted monopoly profit. This holds true if the price set after innovation
is less than or equal to the marginal cost of production:
pϑ j ≤ ψ for all ϑ j ∈ Θ j, j = {m, z}.
New born innovators choose either the “green” or the “dirty” intermediate sector direct
R&D to and -if the innovation is successful- to sell capital goods to. Innovators in sector
then j distribute across the different capital good lines ϑ j. Then each innovator observes
the characteristics of her current state of the art product with quality qϑ j := qnϑ j and spends
h units of the final good for R&D to improve the quality of that commodity to q′
ϑ j
= λ jqϑ j .
If successful, innovators hold the patent on the blueprint to produce this capital good and
allows them to sell the commodity exclusively in the following period. At the end of that
period, the corresponding patent protection ends. Production costs of capital goods equal
ψ units of the final good. Without loss of generality, I normalize ψ ≡ 1, so entrepreneurs
and innovators can convert final goods into capital goods on a one to one basis.
Each individual innovator needs credit equal to finance R&D expenditures so she borrows
h units of the final good for given credit interest rate. To indicate the dependence of R&D
expenditures on credit interest rates and also on current quality levels of the corresponding
good that is planned to be improved, we denote period t R&D expenditures as hϑ j,t (R j,t+1).
Accordingly, credit contracts between innovators and banks are signed on an individual
level.
Similar to the framework of part one, innovators and entrepreneurs face a two-stage deci-
sion process within two consecutive periods of time. Innovators’ first decision period is
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the research and planning period. In this stage, they decide how much to spend on R&D
to maximize expected profits. Entrepreneurs’ first decision period is a planning period.
They decide how much to produce in the second period given that innovation on their
product line was not successful or even did not take place at all. In the following, we refer
to all innovators and entrepreneurs who supply a capital good as “capital good produc-
ers”.
In the second decision stage, capital goods producers determine the optimal price at which
they are going to sell the capital goods to the intermediate sectors. Given intermediate de-
mand for capital goods, this price determines the profit flow in the second period and thus
determines the net present value of profit in the first stage.
Consider an arbitrary period t. This period t is referred to as the ”first” decision period
and the subsequent period t + 1 is the ”second” decision period. The decision problem is
solved recursively. First we establish the optimal price for a capital goods producer to set
in the second decision period, t+1, given that either he succeeded in the research lab in the
previous period t if he is an innovator or if he is an entrepreneur, given that no innovator
tried to improve the quality of his capital good or tried but failed. Afterwards, we derive
individual and sectoral R&D expenditures and compute the endogenous probability of
successful innovation.
Profit Maximization
Ignoring time subscripts for the moment, the demand for the capital good ϑ j in the inter-
mediate sector j is given in (5.14a) and (5.14b) and reads
x j(pϑ j) =
(µp j
pϑ j
) 1
1−µ
qϑ jL j, j ∈ {m, z}, (5.15)
where pϑ j denotes the price of the capital good, which is the choice variable of the capital
goods producer and will be determined next.
The rest of the derivations are identical to those of part one: Capital goods producers take
the demand above as given and maximize profits. The second period decision problem of
an innovator in period t + 1 then reads:
max
(pϑ j ,t+1)∈R+
{(
pϑ j ,t+1 − 1
)
x j,t+1(pϑ j) − R j,t+1hϑ j,t (R j,t+1) | x j,t+1(pϑ j,t+1) = (5.15)
}
(5.16)
and the decision of an entrepreneur is given by:
max
(pϑ j ,t+1)∈R+
{(
pϑ j,t+1 − 1
)
x j,t+1(pϑ j) | x j,t+1(pϑ j,t+1 ) = (5.15)
}
(5.17)
These optimization problems are identical in the second decision stage and differ only by
the term R j,t+1hϑ j,t representing the cost of R&D. As the time index indicates, this term is
determined in the first decision stage and thus plays no role in the determination of the
profit maximizing price. The first order optimality condition with respect to pϑ j,t+1 gives
the profit maximizing monopoly price of a capital good ϑ j:
pϑ j ,t+1 =
1
µ
, (5.18)
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which is a constant markup over marginal cost and equal across industries ϑ j.
The resulting flow of monopoly profit for an innovator then can be computed as
π
(i)
ϑ j ,t+1
= π¯ j,t+1qϑ j,t+1 − R j,t+1hϑ j,t(R j,t+1) (5.19)
and the monopoly profit for an entrepreneur e reads
π
(e)
ϑ j ,t+1
= π¯ j,t+1qϑ j,t+1, (5.20)
where π¯ j,t+1 := (1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µ p
1
1−µ
j,t+1
L j,t+1.
Optimal R&D and success-probabilities
In the first decision stage, innovators determine the amount of R&D expenditures they
need as credit from the banks. The formulation here is identical to part one. The net
present value of future profits from innovation in industry ϑ j is equal to
Vϑ j,t =
Et[π
(i)
ϑ j,t+1
]
rt
(5.21)
where Et denotes the expectation of future outcomes in period t, π
(i)
ϑ j ,t+1
is given in equa-
tion (5.19) and rt is the interest rate which is potentially time varying.
During the first stage, innovators and entrepreneurs face idiosyncratic risks. For an indi-
vidual innovator, the return is random, since R&D effort is successful only with a certain
probability. The return for an entrepreneur contains two sources of uncertainty: first,
since the unit mass of entrepreneurs/capital goods in each sector face a unit mass of inno-
vators in total, there exist capital good lines which remain without an innovator. On those
capital good lines, entrepreneurs produces the capital good with current quality using the
existing technology. Second, if an innovator is present in a capital good line, the innova-
tor probably fails to innovate. Then entrepreneurs also produce the existent capital good.
This setup is such that competition between entrepreneurs and innovators takes place on
an individual level and thus each person faces an idiosyncratic risk of return.
I again assume that individuals form “alliances” to protect themselves against these id-
iosyncratic risks to get deterministic income and consumption profiles for all individuals
nevertheless: Innovators in the green sector m and innovators in the dirty sector z each
form an ”R&D syndicate”, so there exist two different R&D-syndicates. All entrepreneurs
in both sectors together form one “entrepreneur association”.
Since realizations of individual innovation attempts are independent and thus uncorre-
lated, a fraction of the projects will be successful while the rest of the projects will be
unsuccessful. Then one could in principle conclude, applying a law of large numbers
type of reasoning that the fraction of successful projects in sector j ∈ {m, z} is equal to the
ex-ante probability of successful innovation η j, leading to aggregate average innovator
profits of η jΠ j, while the fraction of unsuccessful projects is equal to the ex-ante proba-
bility of innovation failure 1 − η j.
Moreover, using the same type of reasoning, the ex-ante probability of an innovator try-
ing to improve the quality of capital good in sector j is equal to the frequency or mass
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of innovators in sector m, denoted by ιm := ι and sector z, denoted by ιz := 1 − ι. So
entrepreneurs expected return is equal to (1− ιηm)Π
e
m + (1− (1− ι)ηz)Π
e
z . The η j’s and the
ι j’s are well defined in the present context, although the model here features a continuum
of capital goods/entrepreneurs and innovators (each normalized to unity) and so the η j’s
describe the “average” of a continuum of random variables (See Uhlig (1996) and also
Acemoglu (2009)). In this way, an alliance allows individuals to trade the high return
with idiosyncratic risk for a deterministic but lower return, i.e. an average return (for in-
novators the average return is sector-specific).
The next assumption specifies the relationship between R&D expenditures, generation of
product nϑ j and the probability of successful innovation:
Assumption 5.9. The individual probability of successful innovation ηϑ j , j = {m, z} is a
strictly concave function of R&D expenditures and is defined as
ηϑ j := h
α
ϑ j
φϑ j , j = {m, z}, (5.22)
where α ∈]0, 1[ and
φϑ j :=
1
ζ
q−αϑ j (5.23)
captures the effects of the capital good’s current quality ladder position.61
With this formulation, innovators treat ηϑ j as a choice variable.
62 In the first period of
decision, an innovator takes the interest rates rt,R j,t+1, the price of the intermediate good
p j,t, the profit maximizing price determined in the second decision stage pϑ j,t+1 , quality
level qϑ j ,t+1 factors Jt+1 and the function zϑ j as given. An innovator in capital goods line
ϑ j chooses R&D expenditures hϑ j,t to solve the following optimization problem
max
hϑ j ,t∈R+
{ηϑ j
rt
(
π¯ j,t+1qϑ j ,t+1 − R j,t+1hϑ j,t
)
| η j = h
α
j zϑ j
}
(5.24)
A solution to (5.24) satisfies the following first order conditions
α
(
π¯ j,t+1qϑ j,t+1 − R j,t+1hϑ j ,t
)
= R j,t+1hϑ j . (5.25)
Solve for hϑ j ,t gives
hϑ j ,t =
α
1 + α
π¯ j,t+1
R j,t+1
qϑ j,t+1. (5.26)
This expression implies that innovators direct a constant fraction of (expected) profits to
R&D such that the marginal benefit from one additional unit of R&D expenditure is equal
to the marginal additional individual expected profit from capital goods selling. For the
61Since the mapping from R&D to the probability of success is unbounded in general, the defined η’s are
not probabilities in a strict sense, i.e. they do not necessarily take values between zero and one. We account
for this and set the parameter appropriately, so that the success-probability values lie between zero and one.
62For a different formulation, where aggregate R&D expenditures determine the probability of success
and individuals take the probability as given, see for instance Barro and Sala-i Martin (2004).
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purpose of this thesis it is more important to note a negative influence of the loan interest
rate R j,t on R&D outlays. This suggests an influence of banks on R&D investment.
Using optimal R&D expenditures given in (2.16), expected profits for an innovator on
capital good line ϑ j then read
π
(i)
j,t+1
=
1
1 + α
η jπ¯ j,t+1qϑ j ,t+1. (5.27)
To derive the sectoral probabilities of innovation success use definition 5.9, insert indi-
vidual R&D-expenditures and the expression for φϑ j gives
ηϑ j = η j = ζ
−1
(
α
1 + α
π¯ j,t+1
R j,t+1
)α
(5.28)
Thereby, the function φϑ j :=
1
ζ
q−α
ϑ j,t+1
captures the effects of the current position on the
quality ladder. The present study assumes that successful innovation becomes more dif-
ficult the more product generations have been invented previously. The function φ now
states that this difficulty increases in proportion to the additional output that would be pro-
duced in case of successfully increasing the product quality from qϑ j,t to λ jqϑ j,t between
t and t + 1. The parameter ζ represents a cost of research measured in units of the final
consumption good. The probability of research success decreases with the loan rate R j.
However, the expression for η j in eq. (5.28) so far is incomplete, because R j depends
itself on η j, and the term π¯ j,t+1 contains the endogenous price p j for the intermediate good
Y j. I postpone this derivation of the explicit formula for η j until section five and instead
highlight the result implied by (5.28):
Remark 5.1. Banks influence the sectoral probabilities of successful innovation.
5.3. Banks
Consider next the decisions of the banking sector. No fundamentel changes compared
to part one occur in this stage. Similar to the first part, financial intermediation is repre-
sented by a single price taking aggregate bank. The set up in the credit market is such that
borrowers (innnovators) and lenders (the banking sector) have the same amount of infor-
mation in advance about the risk inherent in the projects. This symmetry in the ex-ante
information deficit rules out problems of adverse selection that are typically associated
with ex-ante informational asymmetries. Furthermore, innovators who have been suc-
cessful in the research lab cannot hide their success from the banks, claim unsuccessful
innovation and then deviate from the credit liability incurred. Hence, the present study
does also not consider moral hazard problems, typically associated with ex-post informa-
tion asymmetries in the credit market. What is more, innovators are not allowed to default
on credit, i.e. take the borrowed capital and run away. So there are no problems of com-
mitment in this model framework. On the basis of this information set-up, the banking
sector negotiates with the innovators on an individual level in the credit market and with
the workers in the deposit market.
Members of the working population save their labor income when young to finance con-
sumption when old. They take this income share and enter the deposit market to store
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their savings in a bank account and receive a certain deposit interest rate. In principle,
workers could also lend their savings directly to entrepreneurs. However, private savings
are typically small compared to business investment projects and more importantly, the
different projects of entrepreneurs contain idiosyncratic risks. Thus, the return on any
individual investment project and hence the income from savings would contain risks.
Risk-averse workers are not willing to bear these idiosyncratic risks. So in order to diver-
sify these risks, they would have to lend their savings to a very large number of different
firms. And before that, workers would have to evaluate each individual investment project
by themselves, which is impossible with a limited amount of time and capital. Therefore,
banks who specialize in these activities emerge.
The banking sector collects the savings from a large number of workers. Then these
savings are pooled and the capital resources are used to finance large scale business in-
vestments. Through financing a large number of different projects with stochastically in-
dependent returns, the banks fully diversify the idiosyncratic risk and the workers receive
a deterministic rate of interest on their “portfolio”.
The decision problem
The banks use these capital resources to finance business investment projects. Innovators
borrow capital to invest in R&D. Due to sector-specific credit risk, each banks charges a
sector-specific loan interest rate on credit liabilities.
The representative bank faces idiosyncratic uncertainty in credit supply: An innovator
(the borrower) trying to improve the quality of a sector-specific capital good in indus-
try ϑ j, in sector j = {m, z}, is successful in innovation with a sector-specific probability
η j(hϑ j), where still hϑ j represents R&D-effort measured in units of the final good.
However, the returns of the individual innnovators’ investment projects are stochasti-
cally independent and consequently, for a large number, in fact a continuum of different
projects, these idiosyncratic risks are completely diversified. Therefore, the randomness
in the returns vanishes in aggregate terms and the aggregate banks’ decision problem be-
comes completely deterministic.63
Since ηm , ηz holds true in general, the expected return from credit lending depends on
the total size of capital resources devoted to the green sector m or the dirty z. Credit sup-
ply in sector j at time t is denoted by D j,t. Credit demand in sector j is given by R&D
expenditures in sector j, denoted as H j,t. The aggregate banking sectors’ deposit demand
is Dt. This implies aggregate deposit cost for the banking sector equal to rt+1Dt. Total
deposit supply is given by aggregate savings S t. We assume that total deposit demand in
period t determines total credit supply in t + 1, so
Dt =
∑
j∈{m,z}
D j,t+1. (5.29)
With credit interest rates of R j,t, j = {m, z}, the return of funding equals ηmRm,t+1Dm,t +
ηzRz,t+1Dz,t. The bank takes the interest rates rt, Rm,t and Rz,t as given and chooses credit
63In principle, the underlying law of large numbers argument holds only for averages of a countable
sequence of random variables, where as the model here features a continnuum of random varibales. Uhlig
(1996) showed how to obtain a law of large number for a continuum of uncorrelated random variables.
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quantities to solve the following optimization problem:
max
(Dm,t ,Dz,t)∈R
2
+

∑
j∈{m,z}
η jR j,t+1D j,t − rt+1
∑
j∈{m,z}
D j,t
 (5.30)
A solution to (5.30) satisfies the following first order optimality conditions:
Rm,t+1 =
rt+1
ηm
and Rz,t+1 =
rt+1
ηz
. (5.31)
These conditions state the relationship between the sectoral loan interest rates R j,t, j ∈
{m, z} and the deposit interest rate rt+1 and shows that the loan rates contain the inverse of
the success-probabilities η−1m , η
−1
z as risk premiums: the greater the chance of success in
innovation, the lower is the corresponding rate of interest on business credit. Moreover,
one can derive the following relationship between sectoral credit interest rates:
ηmRm,t+1 = ηzRz,t+1. (5.32)
This simply gives the condition that in equilibrium, the expected loan interest rates in the
two intermediate sectors have to be equal.
Conditions (5.31) and (5.32) explain the relationship between the loan rates paid by inno-
vators and the deposit rates paid to workers and we get:
Proposition 5.1. Whenever banks finance innovative activities, an interest rate spread
between deposit rates paid to workers and loan rates paid by innovators exists: rt < R j,t
for j = {m, z}, i.e. the interst rate on business credit exceeds the interest rate on deposits.
This interest rate spread remains in place even in a financial market characterized by
perfect competition and is therefore not a result of monopoly distortion.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Moreover, the condition stated in equation (5.32) shows the relationship between sectoral
interest rates charged on credit:
Proposition 5.2. In all periods t ≥ 0, the interest rates on private sector lending Rm,t and
Rz,t used to finance R&D can vary between intermediate sectors m and z.
Proof: See appendix B.
On the one hand, equation (5.32) is an equilibrium condition for the bank sector. Banks
are indifferent between funding capital goods producers in the dirty and the green sector,
as long as the expected returns on sectoral funding are equal. In the case of ηm > ηz the
probability of successful innovation and therefore the probability of debt repayment in the
next period is greater for innovators directing R&D to the green sector m than for those
who direct R&D to the dirty sector z. Since the bank bears the risk of ”losing money”
a lower probability of success implies a larger risk of default on credit liabilities. The
interest rates on loans reflect these different risks and include a risk premium. In the
case considered here, the risk premium and thus the loan rate is higher for innovators
who direct their innovation effort to sector z. Without different loan rates, banks would
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always prefer the lowest risk borrowers, in this case innovators’ investments in sector m.
In other words, a higher interest rate enables higher risk borrowers to compete for capital
resources.
On the other hand, innovators are indifferent between capital goods invention in the two
intermediate sectors as long as the expected returns on innovation effort are equal across
m and z. In this case, innovators accept higher equilibrium interest rates paid on funds in
one sector and still direct innovation effort to that sector.
Finally, the conditions given in (5.31)-(5.32) replicate the results of part one perfectly.
This gives the followign remark:
Remark 5.2. Suppose banks fund potential entrepreneurs indiscriminately. Then pure
profit maximization considerations in financial intermediation ignore the presence of en-
vironmental constraints and sectoral credit lending strategies are independent of the neg-
ative externality associated with dirty sector production.
In other words, the implementation of carbon emissions into the model has no effect on
the microeconomic decisions of the banks. This should be intuitively clear, because the
banks supply capital resources to the innovators in the two different sectors on the basis
of profit maximization considerations. Consequently, banks fund capital good producers
in those sectors, with the highest expected return on funding. Whether capital goods
producers demand credit to invent new technologies for emission intensive or extensive
intermediate sectors is completely irrelevant to the bank in this framework.
5.4. Consumers
Consumers in the model are the workers, entrepreneurs, and innovators. In each period
a continuum of young consumers is born. Each consumer lives for two periods. Pop-
ulation is constant over time. The young generation is indexed by the superscript “y”,
members of the old generation are indexed with an “o”. In this setting, the attribute of
being a worker, an entrepreneur or an innovator is preassigned. So at each point in time,
two different generations populate the economy and each generation consists of workers
(w), entrepreneurs (e), and innovators (i), who differ in terms of their access to invest-
ment projects and consumption profiles. The subindex ℓ ∈ {w, e, i} identifies the different
consumer types. Preferences over consumption are identical for all consumers and equal
to:
Assumption 5.10. Consumption preferences can be represented by an utility function
U : R2+ → R, which is defined as
U(c
y
ℓ,t
, coℓ,t+1) := βu(c
o
ℓ,t+1), (5.33)
β is the individual discount factor and the “instantaneous” utility function u : R+ → R,
is logarithmic: u(c) := log(c),
So utility is defined as a function of only second period consumption.
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Workers
At each point in time a continuum of young workers is born whose mass is now normal-
ized to unity. Each worker is endowed with one unit of labor time. Workers supply their
labor inelastically to the labor market when young and receive a “real” wage rate of wt. At
the beginning of their second period of life, when old, they retire. Workers only consume
in the second period of life and, therefore, wish to transfer their current wealth into the
next period. For this purpose, they supply their labor income to the deposit market and
receive a deposit rate of rt+1 on these savings. Given labor income of wt and since the
entire income is saved, we have st = wt, and old workers have income of rt+1st.
This leads to the following aggregate budget constraint of old workers:
C
(o)
w,t+1
= rt+1S t = rt+1wt =: I
(o)
w,t+1
. (5.34)
Old workers do not care about the wealth of their descendants and leave no bequests.
Since utility is strictly increasing in consumption quantities, old workers spend their in-
come entirely for consumption of the final good.
Entrepreneurs
The formulation of the entrepreneurs remains unchanged. A continuum of mass 2 of
young entrepreneurs enters the economy at the beginning of each period t. Each en-
trepreneur receives a patent to produce capital goods of current quality for one of the two
intermediate sectors. Then the mass of entrepreneurs holding patents for capital goods
in each intermediate sectors j ∈ {m, z} equals unity. Recall that the continuum of capital
goods used in each intermediate sector has unit mass, so this ensures identical masses
of capital good lines and entrepreneurs. Hence each entrepreneur holds a patent for one
capital good line and consequently on each capital good line one entrepreneur is present.
Entrepreneurs form an “entrepreneur association” to protect themselves from idiosyn-
cratic risks in profits. Since realizations of individual innovation attempts are independent
and thus uncorrelated, a fraction of the projects will be successful while the rest of the
projects will be unsuccessful. Then using a law of large numbers type of reasoning for
a continuum of random variables (see Uhlig (1996)), the fraction of successful projects
in sector j ∈ {m, z} is equal to the ex-ante probability of successful innovation η j and the
fraction of unsuccessful projects is equal to the ex-ante probability of innovation failure
1 − η j. Moreover, using the same type of reasoning, the ex-ante probability that an in-
novator tries to improve the quality of a certain capital good in sector j is equal to the
frequency or mass of innovators in sector m, denoted by ιm := ι and sector z, denoted by
ιz := 1− ι. Entrepreneurs make profits in capital good lines without an innovator or where
innovators’ R&D is unsuccessful. Together this implies an income for the entrepreneur
association of
Π¯et = (1 − ηmι)Π
e
m,t + (1 − (1 − ι)ηz)Π
e
z,t (5.35)
The aggregate budget constraint of the entrepreneurs is then given by
C
(o)
e,t = Π¯
e
t =: I
(o)
e,t (5.36)
Old entrepreneurs also consume their income completely, since utility strictly increasing
in consumption.
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Innovators
The formulation of the innovators remains unchanged also. Each period, a continuum of
innovators is born whose mass is normalized to one. Young innovators engage in R&D
to improve the quality of existing capital goods. Young innovators need credit to finance
R&D expenditures and banks supply the necessary capital resources. If successful, they
receive a one period patent on that innovation and produce that capital good with greater
quality instead of the entrepreneur on that capital good line. Innovators direct their invest-
ment to capital goods innovation for either intermediate sector on the basis of expected
profits. Denote the share of innovators directing R&D investment to sector m by ι, then
the share of innovators investing in R&D in sector z equals 1− ι, where ι ∈ [0, 1] can vary
in equilibrium.
Similar to the entrepreneurs, innovators group in an “alliance” to protect themselves from
idiosyncratic risks in profits. Within one intermediate sector j = {m, z} innovators form
an “R&D syndicate”. Again, since investment projects contain idiosyncratic risk, we can
apply a law of large number argument for a contiuum of random variables, and conclude
that the fraction of successful projects is equal to the ex-ante probability of successful
innovation η j. Aggregate average profits for the R&D syndicate in sector j are given by
η jΠ
(i)
j
, so the income for innovators in sector j ∈ {m, z} reads
Π¯ j,t = ι jη jΠ j,t (5.37)
Old innovators also spend their income from monopolistic capital goods selling com-
pletely for consumption and leave no bequests for their descendants. Note that the aggre-
gate income of the innovators is sector-specific since innovators within one intermediate
sector form a “R&D-Syndicate”. Therefore, the aggregate income of the syndicate de-
pends also on the number of innovators ι j in sector j, since the more innovators try to
improve the quality of capital goods in one sector, the greater is the income of the R&D-
syndicate. This implies a budget constraint for innovators in sector j equal to
C
(o)
i, j,t
= Π¯ij,t =: I
(o)
i, j,t
. (5.38)
Total consumption of all innovators is then given by
C
(o)
i,t
= C
(o)
i,m,t
+ C
(o)
i,z,t
. (5.39)
5.5. Aggregation
The aggregate sectoral quality index for t ≥ 0 is defined as in part one:
Q j,t :=
∫ 1
0
qϑ j,tdϑ j for j = {m, z}. (5.40)
The aggregator is linear homogeneous, which captures the plausible feature that if we
increase all single productivities by a number a > 0 then the average sectoral productivity
will increase by a.
Although the qϑ j’s of each product line ϑ j are stochastic, we will argue now that the ran-
domness in microeconomic quality improvements vanishes in the sectoral and macroe-
conomic variables and the average sectoral quality Q j,t is completely deterministic: This
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holds, because the realizations of the quality increases of different capital goods are in-
dependent and thus uncorrelated. Then, we can conclude that the Q j,t’s are deterministic
based on Uhlig (1996) who showed how to obtain a law of large numbers for a continuum
of uncorrelated random variables.
The dynamics of the average sector-specific quality improvements can be derived as
Et[Q j,t+1 − Q j,t] = ι j,tη j,t
(
λ j − 1
)
Q j,t. (5.41)
Thereby, ιm := ι and ιz := 1 − ι, ι ∈ [0, 1] enter this expression, since quality probably
increases only in those capital good lines where innovators are present. If for instance
ι = 1, all innovators direct their R&D effort to the green sector m and the quality of all
capital goods used in dirty sector production would remain constant.
Using the law of large numbers argument given above to conclude that the average sectoral
capital goods quality develops deterministically over time - even though individual R&D
projects exhibit stochastic returns - the expectations operator in the equation above can be
dropped and the dynamic development of average sectoral capital goods quality Qm,t and
Qz,t is given by
Qm,t+1 − Qm,t
Qm,t
= ιtηm,t (λm − 1) for all t ≥ 0, (5.42a)
Qz,t+1 − Qz,t
Qz,t
= (1 − ιt)ηz,t (λz − 1) for all t ≥ 0, (5.42b)
where by assumption (5.6), λ j > 1 so ι j,tη j,t
(
λ j − 1
)
> 0 and Q j,0 is some given initial
quality level. According to equations (5.42a) and (5.42b), the dynamic development of
the average quality of the capital goods in each intermediate sector can be represented by
a deterministic, linear first order difference equation. Denote the economy-wide average
capital goods quality as Qt. Then, Qt is defined as the weighted average of the two sectoral
quality indices Qm,t and Qz,t, where the weights are given by the distribution parameter of
the intermediate inputs Ym,t, Yz,t in final goods production, γ and 1 − γ:
Qt = γQm,t + (1 − γ)Qz,t. (5.43)
It is important to bear in mind that the average quality of sector-specific capital goods
used in the production of the two intermediate goods Ym and Yz are different, allowing
technical change to be biased or directed to one intermediate sector. The average quality
of capital goods Qm and Qz, determine aggregate productivity, while the quotient Qz/Qm
determines the relative productivity of the dirty sector z.
Aggregate sectoral R&D expenditures can be computed from individual R&D expendi-
tures of an innovator in industry ϑ j, given in (5.26), as
H j,t =
α
1 + α
π¯ j,t+1
R j,t+1
ι j,tQ j,t+1, j ∈ {m, z}, (5.44)
where still ιm,t := ιt and ιz,t := 1 − ιt. The expression shows that aggregate sectoral R&D
is increasing in the average sectoral capital goods quality Q j,t+1, decreasing in the credit
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interest rate R j,t+1 and increasing in the mass of innovators per sector ι j ∈ [0, 1]. In this
regard ιt controls the direction (and also rate) of technical change: for instance, if ιt = 1,
all innovation effort would be directed to sector m and consequently, R&D expenditures
in sector z would be zero. From (5.42a) and (5.42b) then follows that only the quality of
capital goods in sector m changes over time, while the quality of capital goods in sector z
remains constant, i.e. technical change would occur only in sector m.
Total R&D in period t is simply given by the sum of aggregate sectoral R&D:
Ht = Hm,t + Hz,t. (5.45)
Spending on capital goods in sector j can be derived from (5.14a) and (5.14b):
X j,t =
∫ 1
0
xϑ j,tdϑ j = µπ¯ j,tQ j,t, (5.46)
where π¯ j,t :=. Aggregate capital goods spending is the sum over sectoral capital goods
spending equal to
Xt = Xm,t + Xz,t. (5.47)
Finally, aggregate savings are given by total labor income of the workers (whose mass is
normalized to unity)
S t = wt (5.48)
and aggregate consumption in period t is given by consumption of old workers, old en-
trepreneurs and old innovators:
Ct =
∑
ℓ
C
(o)
ℓ,t
, ℓ ∈ {w, e, i}. (5.49)
5.6. Market clearing
Finally, the remaining requirement to describe an equilibrium of the economy is that all
markets clear.
Capital markets
Total deposit supply is given by aggregate savings of young workers S t. Market clearing
on the deposit market requires that workers’ aggregate savings are equal to the deposit
demand of the representative aggregate bank:
S t
!
= Dt ∀t ≥ 0. (5.50)
Credit demand in each sector j = {m, z} is given by aggregate sectoral R&D expenditures
(eq. (5.44)). Market clearing requires that in each sector, credit supply is equal to credit
demand:
D j,t
!
= H j,t j = {m, z},∀t ≥ 0. (5.51)
Moreover, the bank cannot supply more capital to the innovators than received from the
workers, so we impose the condition that total deposit demand today determines total
credit supply tomorrow:
Dt =
∑
j = {m, z}D j,t+1 ∀t ≥ 0. (5.52)
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Labor market
Instead of the two more general factors M and Z, intermediate firms in part one used
as production inputs, now both intermediate sectors use labor, denoted by Lm and Lz.
The mass of workers is normalized to unity, so market clearing on the labor market then
requires
Lm,t + Lz,t = 1 ∀t ≥ 0. (5.53)
Goods markets
The entrepreneurs and innovators represent the supply side of capital goods, the demand
side is given by the intermediate firms in the two sectors. For each capital good ϑ j, market
clearing requires:
xSϑ j ,t
!
= xDϑ j ,t ϑ j ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {m, z},∀t ≥ 0. (5.54)
Market clearing on the markets for the intermediate goods requires
Y Sj,t
!
= YDj,t j ∈ {m, z}. (5.55)
Market clearing on the final goods market requires that final goods demand (consump-
tion, investment in R&D and machine production) equals supply and gives the economy’s
resource constraint:
Yt = Xt + Ht +Ct ∀t ≥ 0, (5.56)
where Ct is given in (5.49), Xt is given in (5.47) and Ht is given in (5.45).
Finally, we also need a “market clearing” condition for the mass of innovators. For all
t ≥ 0:
ιm,t + ιz,t = 1. (5.57)
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6. Equilibrium
The following general equilibrium analysis emphasizes the role of banks in directing
technical change, when industrial production emits greenhouse gases that cause climate
change. In the sequel, the study refers to an economy that is characterized by relatively
low levels of atmospheric carbon concentration and corresponding low damages to aggre-
gate output, i.e. a “green” economy. In contrast to that, an economy that is characterized
by relatively high levels of carbon concentration in the atmosphere and corresponding
large damages to aggregate output is referred to as a “dirty”economy. With this under-
standing, “green” intermediate sector m represents a sector that is carbon neutral and
“dirty” intermediate sector z represents a sector where production emits carbon.
This chapter derives the answer to the stylized research question formulated at the begin-
ning of part two: What role do financial intermediaries play in directing technical change
towards a “green“ economy?
Note that the results of this part will be used in the third part to analyze different envi-
ronmental policy instruments and also for a quantitative assessment of financial interme-
diation and environmental regulation. In this regard, the following results can be charac-
terized as laissez-faire equilibrium outcomes, i.e. we analyze a decentralized equilibrium
without any policy intervention. Therefore, part two and three are more closely related to
each other than each of them is to part one.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: The following section derives the equi-
librium of the economy where firms, banks and consumers behave optimally and markets
clear, given that production emits CO2-emissions that causes climate change.
Then we state the determinants of ”green“ technical change and analyze the influence of
financial intermediation on the development of ”green“ technologies.
6.1. Properties of equilibrium
The following definition of equilibrium is similiar to the one defined in the first part, ex-
cept that now climate variables such as emissions, atmospheric CO2-concentration, and
damages from climate change are considered. The induced equilibrium allocation consti-
tutes an important benchmark in the subsequent discussion. It is clear that this solution
will, in general not constitute a Pareto optimal outcome due to the climate externality in
production and monopolistic competition in innovation effort.
Definition 6.1. An equilibrium of the economy considered here is an allocation
A = (Yt,Ct, (Y j,t, X j,t,H j,t, L j,t, ι j,t, (qϑ j,t, xϑ j,t)ϑ j∈[0,1]) j∈{m,z},Dt+1)t≥0
and a price system
P = (rt,w j,t,R j,t, p j,t, pϑ j,t)t≥0
such that
(i) The allocation is consistent with the production technologies (5.11), (5.6), and the mar-
ket clearing conditions/resource constraints (5.50), (5.51), (5.53), (5.54), (5.55), (5.56),
and (5.57).
(ii) Banks behave optimally, i.e. equations (5.31) and (5.32) hold for all t ≥ 0.
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(iii) Producers behave optimally, i.e. equations (5.18), (5.26) , (5.13) hold for all t ≥ 0.
(iv) Consumers behave optimally with (profit) incomes determined by (5.34), (5.35) and
(5.37) for all t ≥ 0.
(v) Average capital goods qualities in sector j ∈ {m, z} evolve according to (5.42).
(vi) Climate variables evolve according to (5.3) with emissions given by (5.10) and cli-
mate damages in (5.6) determined by (5.4) and (5.5).
Recall that the process of R&D effort for the individual innovator is stochastic. Therefore,
the quality of capital good ϑ j in sector j ∈ {m, z} is random and thus the corresponding
prices, quantities and values. However, since the outcomes from random individual ”ex-
periments“ are stochastically independent, the uncertainty vanishes in aggregate terms
and the corresponding sectoral and macroeconomic variables are non-stochastic. This
implies deterministic time paths of the aggregate sectoral and macroeconomic variables
and the equilibrium analysis becomes completely deterministic.
Similar to the first part, we analyze the direction of technology development on a balanced
growth path. Recall that we view a balanced growth path to be a trajectory such that all
variables grow at constant rates.
Again, we start with properties of some equilibrium variables that will be used throughout
the rest of the analysis. First, we compute aggregate production of the two intermediate
goods Ym,t and Yz,t as functions of output prices pm,t, pz,t, labor inputs Lm,t, Lz,t and aggre-
gate sectoral quality indices Qm,t,Qz,t. Insert the equilibrium demand schedules for capital
goods xm,t, xz,t stated in equations (5.14a) and (5.14b) into the production function of the
intermediate goods given in (5.11):
Ym,t = µ
2µ
1−µ p
µ
1−µ
m,t Lm,tQm,t, (6.1)
Yz,t = µ
2µ
1−µ p
µ
1−µ
z,t Lz,tQz,t. (6.2)
The ratio of (6.1) and (6.2) is then equal to
Yz,t
Ym,t
=
(
pz,t
pm,t
) µ
1−µ Lz,t
Lm,t
Qz,t
Qm,t
. (6.3)
For purpose of compact notation, we use the following convention throughout the rest of
this equilibrium analysis:
For any pair of sectoral variables aM for sector m and aZ for sector Z define the relative
variable with respect to sector Z by aZ
aM
=: a˜.
With this convention, (6.3) reads
Y˜ = p˜
µ
1−µ L˜Q˜. (6.4)
Now we use the first order conditions of the final good sector, as stated in (5.8), to elim-
inate the term Y˜ from (6.4). This gives us the expression for the relative price of the two
intermediate goods Ym and Yz as a function of relative factor supply and relative produc-
tivity:
p˜t :=
pz,t
pm,t
=
(
γ˜−εL˜tQ˜t
)− (1−µ)
σ
(6.5)
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where γ˜ := 1−γ
γ
, and σ := 1+ (1−µ)(ε−1). By construction, σ > 1 whenever ε > 1. Note
that this relative price is decreasing in relative employment L˜ and relative productivity of
capital goods Q˜.
Furthermore, we can express the relative price in terms of the relative productivity Q˜.
Combine the demand functions for the capital goods (equation (5.13b)) with the first
order conditions for labor (equation (5.13a)) yields:
p˜t = Q˜
−(1−µ)
t . (6.6)
This equation simply shows that the input produced by means of more productive capital
goods will be relatively cheaper.
Next we derive equilibrium credit and deposit interest rates, and sectoral credit quantities.
Note that the stated equations all contain various endogenous variables on their right
hand side that will be determined next, so the treatment here is incomplete. To get the
equilibrium deposit interest rate rt use (5.50) together with (5.52), (5.51), (5.44), and
(5.31), we get
rt+1 =
α
S t
(
ιtEt[Πm,t+1] + (1 − ιt)Et[Πz,t+1]
)
(6.7)
where Et[Π j,t] denotes sectoral average expected profits for innovators containing en-
dogenous intermediate output prices, capital good qualities and success-probabilities. I
determine the expressions in detail below.
The equilibrium interest rate on deposits is decreasing in aggregate savings which is
equivalent to deposit supply, and increasing in sectoral expected profits from innovation.
Insert (6.7) into (5.31) to get the credit interest rates for sector j :
R j,t+1 =
α
η jS t
(
Et[Πm,t+1] + Et[Πz,t+1]
)
, j ∈ {m, z}. (6.8)
Take the ratio of (6.8) to compute the relative credit interest rate R˜t:
R˜t =
Rz,t
Rm,t
=
ηm,t
ηz,t
= η˜−1t , (6.9)
so the relative credit interest rate is inversely related to the ratio of success-probabilities
in innovation effort.
Now use (5.28) and (5.31), the success-probability in sector j reads
η j,t = ζ
−1
(
α
1 + α
π¯ j,t+1
rt+1
) α
1−α
, j ∈ {m, z}, (6.10)
where π¯ j,t := (1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µ p
1
1−µ
j,t
L j,t.
6.2. Determinants of green technical change
Average profits from capital goods selling for old innovators in sector m read
Πm,t = (1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µ p
1
1−µ
m,t Lm,tQm,t (6.11)
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and in sector z
Πm,t = (1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µ p
1
1−µ
z,t Lz,tQz,t. (6.12)
The net present discounted value of expected profits for young innovators in sector j,
denoted by V j,t, j ∈ {m, z}, are then given by
V j,t =
Et[Π j,t+1]
rt
. (6.13)
one can show that the V ′s are equal to
Vm,t = µ0p
1
1−µ
m,t+1
Lm,t+1Qm,t+1R
−1
m,t+1 Vz,t = µ0p
1
1−µ
z,t+1
Lz,t+1Qz,t+1R
−1
z,t+1. (6.14)
where µ0 := (1 − µ)µ
1+µ
1−µ . So the greater Vz,t relative to Vm,t, the greater is the reward
for innovators to develop dirty capital goods (see Acemoglu (2002) p.789). The two
profit equations given in (3.20) suggest that capital goods producers’ profits increase
with greater output prices, with greater factor use and with greater productivity in the
intermediate sectors and decrease with larger interest rates on business credit. The lat-
ter effect simply follows from the relationship between credit interest rates and success-
probabilities given in (2.3).
To show and discuss these determinants in more detail, take the ratio of Vz,t and Vm,t. This
gives
Vz,t
Vm,t
=
(
pz,t+1
pm,t+1
) 1
1−µ
︸      ︷︷      ︸
Price
effect
×
Lz,t+1
Lm,t+1︸︷︷︸
Market size
effect
×
(
Rz,t+1
Rm,t+1
)−1
︸     ︷︷     ︸
Risk
effect
×
(
Qz,t+1
Qm,t+1
)
︸   ︷︷   ︸
Productivity
effect
. (6.15)
The higher this ratio, the greater is the incentive for innovators to develop new tech-
nologies for the dirty sector z, so it is more profitable to direct innovation effort towards
dirty technologies. The four different market forces stated in equation (6.15) shape the
incentive to innovate on clean versus dirty technologies: The price effect (captured by
the term (pz/p
1
1−µ
m ) directs technology innovations towards the sector with higher prices;
the market size effect (captured by the term Lz/Lm encourages innovations in the sector
with the greater employment and therefore the larger market for capital goods; the pro-
ductivity effect (captured by the term Qz/Qm) pushes innovation effort towards the sector
with the greater productivity; the risk effect (captured by the term (Rz/Rm)
−1) encourages
innovations in the sector with a lower credit interest rate and comes from the additional
consideration of capital constrained innovators and capital supplying banks in the econ-
omy.
This suggests that if innovative firms are capital constrained and financial intermediaries
finance R&D expenditures, then the resulting additional term in the determinants of green
technical change should be considered in policy evaluation. For instance, if (environmen-
tal) policies seek to direct technical change towards the development of new carbon low
technologies - via subsidies on green R&D or taxes on dirty inputes etc.- the instruments
should consider the risk effect in firms relative profitability of developing these green
commodities.
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6.3. Laissez-faire equilibrium
In this subsection, we briefly characterize equilibrium labor decisions and intermediate
output prices and derive the growth rate of the economy in a laissez-faire equilibrium out-
come, i.e. a decentralized equilibrium without any policy intervention as defined in 6.1.
Note that we relax the condition of innovation and thus growth in both sectors and addi-
tionally allow ”corner solutions“, where innovations are exclusively directed to either the
green or the dirty intermediate sector. Here, we focus on the implications of these cases
of laissez-faire equilibrium for climate change in view of definition 5.1. The analysis of
”corner solutions“ is important, since climate policy intervention in part three seeks to
direct technical change -possibly completely- towards ”green“ technologies.
With the notational simplification introduced previously, the relative profitability of di-
recting R&D to the dirty sector z becomes
V˜t = p˜
1
1−µ
t+1
˜Lt+1Q˜t+1R˜
−1
t+1. (6.16)
First, eliminating the endogenous relative price given in (6.5), the relative expected prof-
itability of directing R&D towards the dirty sector becomes
V˜t =
(
γ˜εL˜σ−1t Q˜
σ−1
t R˜
−σ
) 1
σ
. (6.17)
Relative credit interest rates – the risk effect – still equals
R˜t+1 =
Rz,t+1
Rm,t+1
=
ηm,t
ηz,t
= η˜−1t =
(
p˜
1
1−µ
t+1
L˜t+1
) α
1−α
. (6.18)
so the relative credit interest rate is inversely related to the ratio of success-probabilities in
innovation effort, given in (6.10) and endogenously determined by sectoral R&D expen-
ditures. Inserting (6.18) into (6.17) relative expected profits from innovation in the dirty
sector read:
V˜t =
(
γ˜εL˜σ−1t Q˜
−ϕ
t
) 1
1−ϕ
, ϕ := 1 − σ(1 − α). (6.19)
To get relative sectoral labor as a function of relative productivity, take the relative price
from (6.5), solve for L˜ and insert p˜ from (6.6):
L˜t = γ˜
εQ˜σ−1t . (6.20)
This equation simply states that if the two intermediate inputs are gross substitutes ε > 1
(and therefore σ > 1), the sector employing a greater share of people is also the sector
featuring greater aggregate productivity.
Using (6.20), the expected relative profitability of innovation in the dirty sector finally can
be written as
V˜t =
(
γ˜εQ˜σ−1−αt+1
) 1
1−α
. (6.21)
The next proposition then can be derived from (6.21):
Proposition 6.1. In a “laissez-faire equilibrium”, innovation at time t ≥ 0 occurs in the
“green“ sector m only if Qm,t > γ˜
ε
σ−1−α (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
−1Qz,t, in the ”dirty“ sector z only if
Qz,t > γ˜
− εσ−1−α (1 + ηz,tλ¯z)Qm,t and in both sectors if Qz,t/Qm,t = γ˜
−ε
σ−1−α .
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Proof: See Appendix B.
Accordingly, since innovators direct their investment to the sector that promises the higher
return from innovation, three situations implied in proposition 6.1 can occur:
(i) V˜t > 1, (ii) V˜t = 1, (iii) V˜t < 1. (6.22)
If V˜t > 1, innovation in the dirty sector is more profitable than innovation in the green
sector. Hence, all innovators direct their R&D to sector z and so ιt = 0 and innovation
occurs only in the dirty sector.
If V˜t = 1, innovation is equally profitable in the two sectors and consequently innovators
are indifferent. A mass of ιt innovators direct their R&D to sector m and a mass of 1 − ιt
direct innovation effort to sector z and innovation occurs simultaneously in both sectors.
This is similar to the situation in part one.
If V˜t > 1, innovation in the green sector is more profitable than innovation in the dirty
sector. Hence, all innovators direct their R&D to sector m and so ιt = 1 and innovation
occurs only in sector m. In part three, we will concentrate on the first two situations, how-
ever, since in the latter scenario, policy intervention is obsolete, because the conditions
are such that in this ”corner solution“ only green technologies grow.
The normalized price term of the final good was given in equation (5.9):
P = [γεp1−εm + (1 − γ)
εp1−εz ]
1
1−ε ≡ 1. (6.23)
Taking the relative price of the intermediate goods given in (6.6), solving for pz and
inserting the result into the previous expression gives prices of good Ym:
pm,t =
(
Q1−σz,t
Wˆt
) 1
1−ε
(6.24)
and of good Yz:
pz,t =
(
Q1−σm,t
Wˆt
) 1
1−ε
, (6.25)
where Wˆt = γ
εQ1−σz,t + (1 − γ)
εQ1−σm,t . To get levels of sectoral employment, use (6.20),
solve for Lz and insert this result into the labor market clearing condition (5.53):
Lm,t =
γεQ1−σz,t
Wˆt
(6.26)
and
Lz,t =
(1 − γ)εQ1−σz,t
Wˆt
. (6.27)
These expressions are used below to derive equilibrium variables for the case of i) inno-
vation in both sectors and ii) the ”corner solution“ of dirty innovation only.
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Green and dirty innovations
First, consider the situation of innovation on green and dirty capital goods. To have inno-
vators who are willing to invest in R&D in both sectors, expected profits from improving
the productivity of capital goods in both sectors have to be equal and thus for t ≥ 0, the
condition
V˜t = 1 (6.28)
must hold, where V˜t is given in equation (6.21). Recall that lemma (3.1) showed if V˜t = 1,
then intermediate sector growth rates are identical, so gm,t = gz,t =: gt.
Insert endogenous prices and employment levels into (6.7) to compute the equilibrium
deposit interest rate:
rt =
αγε
1 + α
(
µ(1 + gt)
2
ζ
)1−α( Qz,t
Wˆ
1
1−σ
t
)1+α−σ
, (6.29)
where Wˆt = γ
εQ1−σz,t + (1 − γ)
εQ1−σm,t . Note that rt is constant, since the term Qz,t/Wˆ
1
1−σ
t is
constant as long as Qm,t and Qz,t grow at identical rates.
Inserting endogenous prices, employment levels and the deposit interest rate into (6.10),
sectoral success-probabilities are given by
ηm,t =
(
Qz,tWˆ
1
σ−1
t
ζ
1−α
α µ(1 + gt)2
)α
(6.30)
and
ηz,t =
(
γ˜
ε
1−α Wˆ
1
σ−1
t
ζ
1−α
α µ(1 + gt)2
)α( Q2−σm,t
Q1+α−σz,t
) α
1−α
. (6.31)
Credit interest rates can be computed from (5.32), (6.29), (6.30), and (6.31):
Rm,t =
αγεµ(1 + gt)
2
1 + α
Qz,t
Wˆ
1
1−σ
t
(6.32)
and
Rz,t =
αγεµ(1 + gt)
2
(1 + α)Wˆt
(Q1+α−σz,t
Q
(2−σ)α
m,t
) 1
1−α
. (6.33)
The mass of innovators in sector m is given by ιt and in sector z by 1 − ιt. In equilibrium,
the term ιt ∈]0, 1[ can be computed as
ιt =
λ¯z
λ¯z + γ˜
− εα(1−α)(1+α−σ) λ¯m
. (6.34)
Intermediate production equals
Ym,t = µ
2µ
1−µγε
(
Qz,tWˆ
1
σ−1
t
)2−σ
Qm,t (6.35)
100
6 EQUILIBRIUM
Yz,t = µ
2µ
1−µ (1 − γ)ε
(
Qm,tWˆ
1
σ−1
t
)2−σ
Qz,t (6.36)
These two expressions imply
Ym,t+1
Ym,t
=
Qm,t+1
Qm,t
=: gm,t
Yz,t+1
Yz,t
=
Qz,t+1
Qz,t
=: gz,t, (6.37)
so sectoral output grows with the rate of average sector capital goods quality (because
the terms in brackets are constant as long as Qm,t and Qz,t grow at identical rates). Since
gm,t = gz,t =: gt if V˜t = 1 (lemma 3.1), intermediate output growth rates are identical.
Equation (5.10) implies that final output grows also at the rate gt.
This equilibrium growth rate gt is given by an implicit expression:
gt(1 + gt)
2α =
λ¯zλ¯m
λ¯z + γ˜
− εα(1−α)(1+α−σ) λ¯m
(
Qz,tWˆ
1
σ−1
t
ζ
1−α
α µ
)α
(6.38)
Note that the term on the right hand side is constant over time, as long as growth of Qm,t
and Qz,t is identical (which follows from Lemma (3.1). Define this term as
Λˆ :=
λ¯zλ¯m
λ¯z + γ˜
− εα(1−α)(1+α−σ) λ¯m
(
Qz,tWˆ
1
σ−1
t
ζ
1−α
α µ
)α
(6.39)
Similar to part one, in equilibrium with innovation in both sectors, the growth rate has to
be such that the equality condition in (6.38) holds. This is again equivalent to the problem
of finding the root(s) of the function
Fˆ(gt) := gt(1 + gt)
2α − Λˆ. (6.40)
The economy’s growth rate is unique if the function Fˆ(·) has only one root. The following
lemma – similar to lemma 3.2 in part one – states the conditions under which Fˆ has
one zero point. We use these results to characterize the implications on climate change
afterwards.
Lemma 6.1. Let F given in (3.65) be defined on the interval [gu, g
o], with 0 < gu < g
o.
Then for appropriate values of gu, g
o there exist one g∗t such that F(g
∗
t ) = 0.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Finally, to get the implications for CO2 emissions and climate change if innovation occurs
in both sectors, take the relationship between emissions and dirty sector production given
in (5.10)
Et = κYz,t. (6.41)
This shows that carbon emissions grow also at the rate gt and we can conclude:
Proposition 6.2. Suppose, V˜t = 1 for t ≥ 0 and σ > 1. In this case, a a laissez-faire
equilibrium exists where innovation occurs in both sectors and intermediate outputs, final
output, and CO2-emissions grow at identical rates.
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Equations (5.3a), (5.3b), and (5.4) state the relationship between CO2 emissions Et and
atmospheric CO2-concentration At:
A1,t = A1,t−1 + φLEt, (6.42a)
A2,t = (1 − φ)A2,t−1 + (1 − φL)φ0Et, (6.42b)
At = A1,t + A2,t. (6.42c)
So rising emissions increase the carbon concentration in the atmosphere and we get the
following result:
Proposition 6.3. If V˜t = 1 andσ > 1. Then, although innovation occurs in the dirty sector
z and in the green sector m, the laissez-faire equilibrium runs into a climate catastrophe,
according to definition 6.1, where losses in aggregate output are above a critical bound
b¯ > 0.
This result directly follows from the fact that rising emissions over time increase atmo-
spheric carbon concentration At (equations (5.3a)-(5.4)) and that damages to aggregate
output D(At) increase with increasing At (equation (5.5)).
So even if both sectors co-exist and grow over time at identical growth rates, the economy
runs into a bad climate state, featuring a high atmospheric carbon concentration and large
damages (in fact, damages above b¯) to final output due to climate change. In this regard,
the ”size“ of the dirty sector is too large.
Dirty sector innovations
Consider first the ”corner solution“ where innovation is completely directed to sector z.
With regard to the implications for climate change, the result will be similar to the scenario
of growth in both sectors, i.e. the economy will run into a climate catastrophe. This is
unsurprising since in the previously considered case of simultaneous growth, production
levels in sector z were already too large and now, dirty intermediates gain even more
weight in final output production.
To have innovators who are willing to invest in dirty technologies only, expected profits
from improving the productivity of capital goods in sector z have to be greater than those
of sector m and therefore, for t ≥ 0, the condition
V˜t > 1 (6.43)
must hold, where V˜t is again given in equation (6.21). The equilibrium deposit interest
rate is given by
rt =
α(1 − γ)ε
(1 + α)Qσ−1−αm,t
(
µ(1 + gz,t)
2
ζ
)1−α(Wˆσ−2
t+1
Wˆ1−α
t−1
) 1
σ−1
, (6.44)
where Wˆt = γ
εQ1−σz,t + (1 − γ)
εQ1−σm,t .
Innovators in sector z are successful in research with a probability equal to
ηz,t =
( Qm,tWˆ 1σ−1t−1
ζ
1−α
α µ(1 + gz,t)2
)α
. (6.45)
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Banks demand credit interest in sector z equal to
Rz,t =
α(1 − γ)εµ(1 + gz,t)
2
(1 + α)Qσ−1m,t
(Wˆ2−σ
t+1
Wˆt−1
) 1
σ−1
. (6.46)
Intermediate production still equals
Ym,t = µ
2µ
1−µγε
(
Qz,tWˆ
1
σ−1
t
)2−σ
Qm,t (6.47)
and
Yz,t = µ
2µ
1−µ (1 − γ)ε
(
Qm,tWˆ
1
σ−1
t
)2−σ
Qz,t. (6.48)
One can show that dirty sector production grows at a rate equal to gz,t, while green in-
termediate production grows at a rate equal to (1 + gz,t)
2−σ, even though the productivity
of green capital goods is constant. If σ > 1, however, the fraction of green intermediate
input use in total intermediate production decreases, since dirty sector production grows
faster compared to green sector production.64
This implies for CO2 emissions and climate change that carbon emissions also grow at
the rate gz,t and we can conclude:
Proposition 6.4. Suppose, V˜t > 1 for t ≥ 0 and σ > 1. In this case a laissez-faire
equilibrium exists where innovation occurs in sector z only. Dirty intermediate output
and CO2-emissions grow at a rate equal to ηz,tλ¯z.
Since rising emissions increase the carbon concentration in the atmosphere, this immedi-
ately implies:
Proposition 6.5. If V˜t > 1 and σ > 1. Then, a laissez-faire equilibrium with dirty
innovation runs into a climate catastrophe, according to definition 6.1, where losses in
aggregate output are above a critical bound b¯ > 0.
This result directly follows from the fact that rising emissions over time increase atmo-
spheric carbon concentration At (equations (5.3a)-(5.4)) and that damages to aggregate
output D(At) rise with increasing At (equation (5.5)).
Green sector innovations
Finally, consider the ”corner solution“ where the conditions are such that innovations are
completely directed to sector m. To have innovators who are willing to invest in green
technologies only, expected profits from improving the productivity of capital goods in
sector m have to be greater than those of sector z and therefore, for t ≥ 0, the condition
V˜t < 1 (6.49)
64If Yz grows at a rate equal to 1+gz,t, then Ym grows at a rate (1+gz,t)
2−σ. Then 1+gz,t > (1+gz,t)
2−σ ⇔
1 > 1/(1 + gz,t)
σ−1. This condition is fulfilled if σ > 1.
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must hold, where V˜t is given in equation (6.21). The equilibrium deposit interest rate is
then given by
rt =
αγε
(1 + α)Qσ−1−αm,t
(
µ(1 + gm,t)
2
ζ
)1−α(Wˆσ−2
t+1
Wˆ1−α
t−1
) 1
σ−1
, (6.50)
where Wˆt = γ
εQ1−σz,t + (1 − γ)
εQ1−σm,t .
Innovators in sector z are successful in research with a probability equal to
ηm,t =
((1 − γ)εQz,tWˆ 1σ−1t−1
ζ
1−α
α µ(1 + gm,t)2
)α
. (6.51)
Banks demand credit interest in sector m equal to
Rm,t =
αγεµ(1 + gmt)
2
(1 + α)Qσ−1z,t
(Wˆ2−σ
t+1
Wˆt−1
) 1
σ−1
. (6.52)
Similar to the”corner solution“ of dirty innovation only, intermediate production in case
of exclusively green innovations equals
Ym,t = µ
2µ
1−µγε
(
Qz,tWˆ
1
σ−1
t
)2−σ
Qm,t (6.53)
and
Yz,t = µ
2µ
1−µ (1 − γ)ε
(
Qm,tWˆ
1
σ−1
t
)2−σ
Qz,t. (6.54)
One can show that in this scenario, green sector production grows at a rate gm,t, while dirty
intermediate production grows at a rate equal to (1+gm,t)
2−σ, even though the productivity
of dirty capital goods is constant. If σ > 1, however, the fraction of dirty intermediate
inputs used in final output production decreases, since the production of ym grows faster
than the production of Yz.
65
This implies for CO2 emissions and climate change that carbon emissions also grow at
the rate (1 + gz,t)
2−σ and we can conclude:
Proposition 6.6. Suppose, V˜t > 1 for t ≥ 0 and σ > 1. In this case a laissez-faire
equilibrium exists where innovation occurs in sector m only. Dirty intermediate output
and CO2-emissions ”grow“ at a rate equal to (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
2−σ.
Note that the growth rate (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
2−σ is not necessarily greater than one. For σ < 2
this holds and in this case emissions rise. This immediately implies:
Proposition 6.7. If V˜t > 1 and σ < 2. Then, a laissez-faire equilibrium with green
innovation runs into a climate catastrophe, according to definition 6.1, where losses in
aggregate output are above a critical bound b¯ > 0.
65If Ym grows at a rate equal to 1+gm,t, then Yz grows at a rate (1+gm,t)
2−σ. Then 1+gm,t > (1+gm,t)
2−σ ⇔
1 > 1/(1 + gm,t)
σ−1. This condition is fulfilled if σ > 1.
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The argument is similar to the previous case of dirty innovation: rising emissions over
time increase atmospheric carbon concentration At (equations (5.3a)-(5.4)) and damages
to aggregate output D(At) rise with increasing At (equation (5.5)).
One interpretation for the case where σ < 2 and dirty production increases although only
green capital goods improve over time is that improvements in ”green“ technologies also
correspond to improvements in the technology of final good production which uses them
as inputs; the final good, in turn, is an input for the dirty sector because machines em-
ployed in this sector are produced using the final good; hence, technical change in sector
m creates a force towards the expansion of sector z.
These three cases combined with the fact that the risk effect enters the determinants of
directed technical change represent a major argument for the analysis of part three: to
protect the economy from running into a climate catastrophe, some form of policy inter-
vention is indeed necessary, and in this the role of credit and financial intermediation has
to be taken into account.
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7. Concluding Remarks II
The macroeconomic model presented in the second part of this dissertation is a first step
towards a comprehensive framework that can be used for theoretical and quantitative anal-
ysis of the interactions between climate change, endogenous technology and financial in-
termediation. This part formulates a dynamic general equilibrium endogenous technical
change model of the world, treated as a uniform region and inhabited by two generations
of consumers, where there is a global externality from emitting carbon. This externality
is a by-product of using fossil fuel or generally a ”dirty” good as an input into produc-
tion. The formal framework complements to the existing literature on quantitative general
equilibrium models of climate change by introducing capital constrained firms and credit
supplying financial intermediaries together with a simple model of the atmospheric car-
bon cycle into the model.
The analysis lead to two major outcomes. One result of the second part was that banks in-
fluence the direction of “green” technical change. This influence manifests itself through
the presence of the risk effect in the determinants of directed private innovation effort.
The risk effect encourages innovations in those sectors, where the risk of failure during
the innovation process is lower.
The long run properties of the laissez-faire equilibrium found in the analysis are related
to the rate of substitutability between CO2 intensive or ”dirty“ inputs and CO2 neutral or
”green“ inputs. When the two intermediate inputs are sufficiently substitutable and the
CO2 neutral sector is initially relatively less productive, then the economy always runs
into a climate catastrophe here defined as damages to GDP above a critical threshold.
Hence, additional market forces associated with profit maximizing financial intermedi-
aries do not change the general outcome that under laissez-faire, the economy always
runs into a state of high atmospheric CO2 concentration and significant damages to GDP.
This is intuitive, since financial intermediaries finance the ventures of firms in those sec-
tors with the highest expected return from credit lending and especially do not consider
the negative emission externality associated with dirty sector production in their lend-
ing strategy. And this already implies the second outcome: policy intervention is indeed
necessary to avoid a climate catastrophe.
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B. Appendix: Mathematical proofs part II
Proposition 6.1
Proof. 66
In the following proof, I characterize the equilibrium allocations of innovators in the two
sectors m and z for the case of gross substitutability between intermediate goods Ym and
Yz (i.e. ε > 1), and provide a proof of proposition 6.1.
The equilibrium relative profitability is given in (6.21) and reads:
V˜t =
(
γ˜εQ˜σ−1−αt+1
) 1
1−α
. (B.1)
Use development of average sectoral capital goods quality (B.1) can be written as:
V˜t = γ˜
ε
1−α
(
1 + (1 − ιt)ηz,tλ¯z
1 + ιtηm,tλ¯m
)σ−1−α
1−α
(
Qz,t
Qm,t
)σ−1−α
1−α
. (B.2)
The mass of innovators is given by ιt ∈ [0, 1]. For ιt ∈ [0, 1], we can define a function
f (ιt) as
f (ιt) := γ˜
ε
1−α
(1 + (1 − ιt)ηz,tλ¯z
1 + ιtηm,tλ¯m
) σ−1−α
1−α
(
Qz,t
Qm,t
) σ−1−α
1−α
(B.3)
and rewrite f (ιt) = V˜t. Clearly, if f (0) > 1, then ιt = 0 is an equilibrium; if f (1) < 1,
then ιt = 1 is an equilibrium; and finally if f (ι
∗
t ) = 1 for some ι
∗
t ∈]0, 1[, then ι
∗
t is an
equilibrium. Given these observations, we have to distinguish three possible situations:
1. If σ−1−α
1−α
> 0, then f (ιt) is strictly decreasing in ιt. Then it immediately follows that: (i)
if f (0) > 1, then ιt = 0 is the unique equilibrium and all innovators direct R&D towards
the dirty sector; (ii) if f (1) < 1, then ιt = 1 is the unique equilibrium and all innovators
direct R&D towarss the green sector; (iii) if f (1) > 1 > f (0), then by continuity there
exists a unique ι∗t ∈]0, 1[ such that f (ι
∗
t ) = 1, which is the unique (interior) equilibrium
and innovation occurs in both sectors.
2. If σ−1−α
1−α
< 0, then f (ιt) is strictly increasing in ιt and we have: (i) if 1 < f (1) < f (0);
then ιt = 0 is the unique equilibrium; (ii) if f (1) < f (0) < 1; then ιt = 1 is the unique
equilibrium; (iii) if f (1) < 1 < f (0) < 1; then there we have an interior equilibrium with
a unique ι∗t ∈]0, 1[ such that f (ι
∗
t ) = 1.
3.If σ−1−α
1−α
= 0, then f (ιt) ≡ f is a constant. If f > 1, then ιt = 0 is the unique equilibrium;
if f < 1, then ιt = 0 is the unique equilibrium.
Together this characterizes the allocation of innovators across sectors and implies the
results in proposition 6.1.
Lemma 6.1
Proof. The function F is defined on the interval [gu, g
o] with 0 < gu < g
o and according
to (3.65) given by
F(gt) := (gt(1 + gt)
2α − Λ¯. (B.4)
66The proof follows the arguments given in Acemoglu et al. (2012) appendix A.
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First, note that F(·) is continuous on its domain and strictly increasing in its argument
gt. Then, for a given parameter value Λ¯ > 0, we can choose a gu such that gu < Λ¯.
Then F(gu) < 0. Since Λ¯ is constant, we can find a g
o with go > Λ¯. Then F(go) > 0.
Together this implies F(go)F(g
u) < 0 and we can conclude using the intermediate value
theorem that g∗t in ]gu, g
o[ exist with F(g∗t ) = 0. This already shows that g
∗
t is a root of F.
Uniqueness of g∗t follows, since F is strictly increasing in gt. Therefore, the growth rate
of the balanced growth equilibrium is unique.
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8 CLIMATE POLICY
Introduction
The previous section revealed that under certain conditions, the decentralized equilibrium
leads into a climate catastrophe, meaning that at some point in time, losses per period in
aggregate output due to climate change will lie above a critical level.
In the context of this thesis, the aim of any environmental policy instrument is to reduce
the damages to aggregate output resulting from climate change. So the third and last part
of this thesis analyzes which environmental policy instruments can help avoid a climate
catastrophe, especially given that banks have an influence on the direction of R&D effort.
This work highlights the importance of the risk effect for the direction of green technical
changes. Recall that this risk effect encourages innovations in those sectors where the
interest rate on business credit is lower, which in the present framework is equivalent
to saying that the risk effect encourages innovations in those sectors where the chances
of successful innovation are greater. I also examine to what extent the consideration of
financial intermediaries affect the results of the existing literature on directed technical
progress and climate change. Given the findings of parts one and two, the third part
answers the stylized research question: What policy rule helps the economy move towards
a path of sustained and green economic growth?
The remainder of this part is organized as follows. Section 8 briefly shows how simple
policy interventions can prevent a climate catastrophe and clarifies the role of banks in
these results. Different measures to evaluate climate policy intervention are considered.
This section characterizes the equilibrium of the economy for a given climate policy and
analyzes optimal climate policy in this setup. Section 9 contains a numerical simulation
example. This dissertation ends with a conclusion and an outlook on possible future
research directions (10).
8. Climate Policy
In order to avoid a climate catastrophe as defined in 5.1, some type of policy intervention
is necessary, since under laissez-faire, the economy runs into such a state. In this connec-
tion, the need for policy intervention does not hinge on whether financial intermediation
is explicitly considered, but the results with respect to the speed of adjustment, the tem-
porary cost of policy intervention, the strength of intervention et cetera may alter when
the risk effect associated with private sector lending is taken into account. This could
imply changing results with respect to environmental policy evaluation when we consider
capital constrained innovators and credit markets.
8.1. Directed Technical Change and a Climate Catastrophe
For an initial and preliminary analysis of such a policy intervention, suppose a govern-
ment subsidizes R&D in the green sector by a subsidy proportional to green sector profits
(financed through a lump-sum tax on consumers income). The results with respect to the
role of banks would be identical if instead of a subsidy on green R&D, the government
would impose a tax on the profits from research in the dirty sector. So from a formal
perspective, it is irrelevant for the results of this thesis whether the government uses a tax
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or a subsidy in order to direct technical changes towards the green sector. However, it
is important from an economic perspective, because the resources for a subsidy need to
be raised first. For instance, the German Renewable Energy Act (EEG) aims to promote
the development of environmentally friendly technologies through a feed-in tariff, i.e. a
legally guaranteed payment for electricity produced by green energies such as solar, wind,
biomass or small hydro power plants that is being fed into the national electricity grid and
is financed through a renewable energy surcharge paid by firms and private households.
To retain some analogy to the empirically observed policy, I assume that the government
subsidizes research in the green sector. Assume for the moment that initially, innovators’
expected profits in sector z are greater than those in sector m:
Vz,0 > Vm.0. (8.1)
Then, with regard to the relative expected profits of different periods, the following lemma
holds:
Lemma 8.1. Let Vz,t◦ ≥ Vt◦ hold for some t
◦ ≥ 0. Then we have Vz,t ≥ Vm,t for all t ≥ t
◦.
Proof: See appendix C.
Remark 8.1. From lemma 8.1 directly follows that if Vz,t◦ < Vm,t◦ holds for some t ≥ 0,
then Vt,z < Vm,t holds for all t ≥ t
◦.
So if expected profits are such that in some t, innovators direct their investment to either
one sector or are indifferent between sectors respectively, then expected profits in all sub-
sequent periods will be such that innovators direct their investment to either one sector or
are indifferent between sectors respectively.
Given (8.1), Lemma 8.1 implies
Vz,t > Vm,t for all t ≥ 0. (8.2)
If initially, young innovators direct R&D to sector z, then all future generations of young
innovators in all subsequent periods will direct R&D to dirty capital goods improvement.
This implies on the one hand, that without intervention, innovation in the green sector is
absent. On the other hand, this also implies that a government could in principle introduce
a subsidy proportional to profits in the green sector that is sufficiently high to redirect
innovators’ investment decisions towards the green sector. In period t ≥ 0, the government
could introduce a subsidy rate denoted by dt, so that
Vz,t < (1 + dt)Vmt, (8.3)
which is equivalent to
dt > V˜t − 1. (8.4)
Inserting the expected relative profits from (6.21) into equation (8.4), using the dynamics
of capital goods quality (5.42) and solving for dt, gives a lower bound for the subsidy rate
dt:
dt ≥ dˆt ≡
[(
1 − γ
γ
)ε(1 + (1 − ιt)ηz,tλ¯z
1 + ιtηm,tλ¯m
)σ−1−α( Qz,t
Qm,t
)σ−1−α] 11−α
− 1. (8.5)
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Note that this lower bound decreases with the mass of innovators in sector m, denoted by
ιt. Thus the greatest lower bound for the subsidy dt is equal to
dt ≥ dˆt ≡
[(
1 − γ
γ
)ε (
1 + ηz,tλ¯z
)σ−1−α ( Qz,t
Qm,t
)σ−1−α] 11−α
− 1. (8.6)
This implies:
Proposition 8.1. The implementation of a subsidy on R&D in the green sector m equal to
dt = dˆt + ν, where dˆt is given by equation (8.6) and ν > 0 is an arbitrary small positive
number, is sufficient to achieve the desired objective of redirecting innovation effort and
thus technical change away from the dirty sector towards the green sector.
This proposition shows the relevance of endogenous directed technical change: govern-
mental intervention can influence profit incentives and thus redirect technical change to-
wards green sectors. Given that the intermediate goods are sufficiently substitutable, once
the green sector is sufficiently advanced, market forces of profit maximizing product inno-
vation will guarantee that only the productivity of the green, emission free capital goods
will be further developed. This result does not depend on whether the risk effect enters the
determinants of directed technical change. It will turn out in the next section, however,
that the size of dt, sufficient to redirect innovators’ investment decisions, does depend on
the risk effect.
Whether intervention can be temporary or needs to be permanent in order to avoid a cli-
mate catastrophe depends on the value of ε as the next proposition shows:
Proposition 8.2. If the two intermediate goods are gross substitutes and ε ∈ [
2−µ
1−µ
,∞[,
a temporary intervention- the implementation of a subsidy on R&D in sector m for a
finite number of periods t- will limit climate change and prevent a climate catastrophe as
defined in 5.1.
Proof: See Appendix C.
We can conclude that intervention can redirect all research to the green sector. Equation
(6.36) however implies that even after this happens, Yz,t and thus Et will grow at a rate of
(1+ηm,tλ¯m)
2−σ. Nevertheless, if the two intermediate goods Ym and Yz are sufficiently sub-
stitutable, i.e. ε > (2−µ)/(1−µ) (wich is equivalent to σ > 2), then it follows from (6.36)
and (5.10) that dirty production and CO2 emissions will not grow. In this case, temporary
intervention is sufficient to redirect technical change towards green technologies and thus
to limit the effects of climate change.
8.2. Measures of policy intervention
Nevertheless, financial intermediaries might affect environmental policy, because after
intervention, the economy needs some time to close the technology gap between the dirty
and the green sector. The lenth of time required for adjustment could depend on the
risk effect and thus on the consideration of the banks. Moreover, the optimum strength
of policy intervention, measured by the size of the temporary subsidy could change; the
length of intervention, given by the number of periods with an active intervention, or the
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cost of delaying policy intervention into the future, might also alter with the consideration
of credit and banks.
Throughout the rest of this section, we assume for the initial level of relative productivity
in the two sectors:
Assumption 8.1.
Qz,0
Qm,0
> min
{(
1 − γ
γ
)1+α−σ (
1 + ηm,0λ¯m
)
,
(
1 − γ
γ
)1+α−σ (
1 + ηz,0λ¯z
)−1}
. (8.7)
This assumption imposes the condition that initially, the green sector is sufficiently back-
ward or less productive relative to the dirty sector so that in a decentralized laissez-faire
equilibrium, the economy starts innovating in the dirty sector.67 Lemma 8.1 then implies
that innovators direct R&D exclusively to the dirty sector in all subsequent periods and
thus only the productivity of capital goods used in the dirty sector improves over time.
Since in this case, dirty sector output grows at a rate equal to the average quality of dirty
sector capital goods, the economy runs into a climate catastrophe under laissez-faire.
If we take a brief look at empirical observations, assumption 8.1 seems to be justified:
First, according to the statistics of the International Energy Agency (IEA), the share of
fossil fuel based energy in world primary energy consumption equals almost 82%, so the
world economy uses mostly CO2-emitting or dirty energy type. In view of the present
model, this implies a relatively large dirty sector z. Second, the share of clean (CO2-
neutral) technologies in world electricity generation account for less than 1/3 (16.3%
Hydro, 10.6% Nuclear and 5.7% Renewables). Third, the energy conversion efficiency
of clean power plants is lower than in conventional thermal power plants based on fossil
fuel.68
The strength of intervention
The first measure is given by subsidy rates sufficiently high to redirect R&D towards the
green sector. To show the role of credit and banks, this paragraph considers the direction
of innovation effort with the risk effect (I) and without the risk effect (II) and discusses
the influence of banks on the size of the subsidy rate, i.e. the strength of intervention.69
When the risk effect enters the determinants of endogenous directed technical change, the
67This assumption is based on intial expected relative profitability of technology development Vz,0/Vm,0].
If initially (in period t = 0) the expected (for period t = 1) profits from innovation in the dirty sector
are greater than the expected profits from innovation in the green sector, i.e. Vz,t/Vm,t > 1, innovators
would direct R&D to the dirty sector in all subsequent periods and the economy moves towards a climate
catastrophe. See also Acemoglu et al. (2012) page 139.
68The German Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy (2013) reports efficiency conversion rates of
about 15% for photovoltaics, 33% for nuclear power and 50% for wind, and 45% for power plants based on
fossil fuel.
69The hypothetical situation without the risk effect in the determinants of directed technical change can
be interpreted as a situation where the risk effect is equal to one. This would occur for instance in the
special case where innovation takes place in both intermediate sectors and the ”size“ of sectoral innovations
are identical, i.e. λ¯m = λ¯z.
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relative expected profitability from innovation effort in the dirty sector is equal to
V˜
(I)
t =
(
Vz,t
Vm,t
)(I)
=
[(
1 − γ
γ
)ε(1 + (1 − ιt)ηz,tλ¯z
1 + ιtηm,tλ¯m
)σ−1−α( Qz,t
Qm,t
)σ−1−α] 11−α
. (8.8)
Recall from the previous analysis that subsidy rate dt in this case (I) must satisfy:
d
(I)
t ≥ dˆ
(I)
t ≡
[(
1 − γ
γ
)ε (
1 + ηz,tλ¯z
)σ−1−α ( Qz,t
Qm,t
)σ−1−α] 11−α
− 1. (8.9)
One can show that relative expected profits of dirty sector R&D without the risk effect are
given by
V˜
(II)
t =
(
Vz,t
Vm,t
)(II)
=
(
1 − γ
γ
)ε(1 + (1 − ιt)ηz,tλ¯z
1 + ιtηm,tλ¯m
)σ−1( Qz,t
Qm,t
)σ−1
. (8.10)
and the subsidy rate in this case (II) must satisfy
d
(II)
t ≥ dˆ
(II)
t ≡
(
1 − γ
γ
)ε (
1 + ηz,tλ¯z
)σ−1 ( Qz,t
Qm,t
)σ−1
− 1. (8.11)
Equations (8.9) and (8.11) state subsidy rates on profits from innovation for the emission
free green sector that are sufficiently high to create an incentive for entrepreneurs to direct
their R&D effort solely to that sector. For the purpose of this study it is most important to
note that d(I)t and d
(II)
t have different values, indicating an influence of credit and banks on
the strength of intervention.
Moreover, for the case of σ > 1+α the subsidy and, thus, the strength of intervention has
the following properties:
Proposition 8.3. The strength of intervention dt is non-decreasing in the productivity
gap Q˜t and in the elasticity of substitution ε. In addition, increases in dt are stronger
the greater the elasticity of substitution ε is. These properties hold with and without
consideration of the risk effect.
Proof: Appendix C.
The subsidy increases with the technology gap Qz,t/Qm,t. An initially greater gap leads to
greater initial relative expected profitability of developing new capital goods for the emis-
sion intensive sector z. Therefore, the subsidy on green R&D has to be larger in order
to redirect innovations to the green sector. In addition, a larger elasticity of substitution
(ε > 1 ⇔ σ > 1) leads to a greater initial gap in relative expected profits V˜t.
For a given level of initial relative expected profits, i.e. an initial profit gap V˜t, it is straight-
forward to compute the following relationship between relative profits with and without
the risk effect:
V˜
(I)
t = R˜
−1
t+1V˜
(II)
t . (8.12)
This equation implies that the initial profit gap including the risk effect V˜ (I)t is greater than
the initial profit gap without the risk effect V˜ (I)t if and only if
V˜
(II)
t > V˜
(I)
t ⇔ V˜
(II)
t > R˜
−1
t+1V˜
(II)
t ⇔ 1 < R˜t+1 ⇔ Rz,t+1 > Rm,t+1. (8.13)
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This implies that if the credit interest rate is smaller in sector m, the subsidy rate suffi-
ciently high to create an incentive for innovators to direct innovation effort towards sector
m can be lower if the risk effect associated with banks and credit enters the determinants
of directed technical change. With smaller credit interest rates in sector m, the credit
costs in the dirty sector are relatively greater (given an idential credit volume, which is
implicitly assumed here). Hence, the expected relative profits from innovation in sector z
inclusive credit costs are ceteris paribus smaller compared to the case without the credit
costs (and so without the risk effect). Therefore, a subsidy rate that contains these credit
costs can be smaller and still be sufficiently high to create the incentive for innovators to
direct R&D towards the green sector.
Clearly, this result holds vice versa, whenever credit interest rates in sector z are greater
than those in sector m. In this case, the presence of the risk effect implies that policy
intervention has to be stronger to redirect innovators R&D effort to the green sector.
The question which situation is empirically more relevant is debatable. One could argue
that a sector with a low number of previous product generations offers a higher probabil-
ity of successful innovation, because it gets more difficult to ”find“ a product of higher
quality, the further up one hase come on the quality ladder. Then credit interest rates
would be lower in ”less advanced“ sectors. One could also mention that the probability of
successful innovation is greater in more advanced sectors, because training curves make
it easier to invent a new capital good of higher quality the higher the number of previous
inventions. Then credit interest rates would be lower in ”more advanced“ sectors.
For the purpose of this study it is more important to note that credit and banks generally
influence the strength of climate policy intervention as long as ηz,t , ηm,t (which holds in
equilibrium) and therefore should be taken into account in climate policy evaluation.
Moreover, according to (8.8) and (8.10) relative profits in situation (I) change with a rate
equal to (1 + ηm,t◦ λ¯m)
1+α−σ
1−α and in situation (II) the rate of change equals (1 + ηm,t◦ λ¯m)
1−σ.
By assumption ε > 1 ⇔ σ := 1+(1−µ)(ε−1) > 1. Relative expected profits (Vz,t/Vm,t)
(II)
thus decline over time. If σ > 1+α, then relative expected profits including the risk effect
(Vz,t/Vm,t)
(I) also decline over time.
If 1 < σ ≤ 1 + α ⇔ 1 < ε ≤ (1 + α − µ)/(1 − µ), however, relative expected profits
do not decline during time of (temporary) intervention, although capital goods quality in-
crease. This implies that paying regard to credit and banks in the determinants of directed
technical change imposes a stronger requirement on the degree of substitutability between
green an dirty capital goods; and an omission of this requirement consequently could lead
to misleading results in the evaluation of effectiveness of climate policy intervention.
The length of intervention
Closely connected to the previous analysis of how strongly climate policy has to intervene
is the examination of how long governmental intervention should be maintained in order
to redirect technical change towards an emission free path of economic growth even with-
out the subsidy.
Let us proceed in a manner similar to the previous paragraph and compare the length of
policy intervention with (case (I)) and without (case II) the risk effect. Suppose a govern-
ment starts regulation in some period t◦ ≥ 0 (for instance as stated in proposition 7.5 in
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part two, where without such an intervention, technical change is completely directed to
dirty capital goods leading to climate change). Then the length of intervention depends
on the ”profit gap“ in t◦, V˜t◦ , i.e. the differences in innovation returns in sectors m and z.
Since average productivity of capital goods determine profits, this immediately implies
that the ”productivity gap“ Qz,t◦/Qm,t◦ determines the length of intervention. Clearly, the
larger the profit gap, ceteris paribus the longer it takes the economy to adjust towards a
state where green innovations occur even without intervention. So the length of interven-
tion depends on the rate at which the profit gap declines. We will show now that this rate
depends on whether we consider the risk effect.
Denote the number of periods until the green sector overtakes the dirty sector in terms
of innovation profitability by jt. After jt periods, innovation returns are such that techni-
cal change is directed towards the green sector even without the subsidy. Formally this
implies
V˜t+ j−1(1 + dt+ j−1) ≤ 1 V˜t+ j < 1. (8.14)
Propositions 9.1 and showed that temporary climate policy intervention can redirect tech-
nical change towards green capital goods improvement, proposition 9.2 stated conditions
for intervention to be temporary. Recall that average sectoral quality of capital goods in
sector z is freezed during intervention (and also afterwards) so so Qz,t+1 = Qz,t for all
t ≥ t◦ and average productivity of capital goods in sector m increases and changes over
time according to Qm,t+1 = (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)Qm,t for t ≥ t
◦, because the mass of innovators in
sector m is equal to ιt = 1 for all t ≥ t
◦. In period t◦ + j the average productivity of capital
goods in sector m can be computed recursively as
Qm,t◦+ j =
j∏
n=0
(1 + ηm,t◦+nλm)Qm,t◦ . (8.15)
Use this expression to compute the relative expected profits from innovation with the risk
effect in period t◦ + j recursively as
V˜
(I)
t◦+ j
=
(
Vz,t◦+ j
Vm,t◦+ j
)(I)
=
[(
1 − γ
γ
)ε j∏
n=0
(
1 + ηm,t◦+nλ¯m
)1+α−σ ( Qz,t◦
Qm,t◦
)σ−1−α] 11−α
. (8.16)
and in situation (II)
V˜
(II)
t◦+ j
=
(
Vz,t◦+ j
Vm,t◦+ j
)(II)
=
(
1 − γ
γ
)ε j∏
n=0
(
1 + ηm,t◦+nλ¯m
)1−σ ( Qz,t◦
Qm,t◦
)σ−1
. (8.17)
Accordingly relative profits in situation (I) change with a rate equal to (1 + ηm,t◦ λ¯m)
1+α−σ
1−α
and in situation (II) the rate of change equals (1 + ηm,t◦ λ¯m)
1−σ. By assumption ε > 1 ⇔
σ := 1 + (1 − µ)(ε − 1) > 1. Relative expected profits (Vz,t/Vm,t)
(II) thus decline over
time. If σ > 1+α, then relative expected profits including the risk effect (Vz,t/Vm,t)
(I) also
decline over time. Clearly, these rates differ, indicating an influence of credit and banks
on the length of intervention (the number jt◦ is different in (I) and (II)).
Since again, as in the previous analysis of strength of intervention, if 1 < σ ≤ 1 + α ⇔
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1 < ε ≤ (1 + α − µ)/(1 − µ) relative expected profits do not decline during the time of
(temporary) intervention, even though productivity of green capital goods increase over
time. This means that paying regard to credit and banks in the determinants of directed
technical change imposes a stronger requirement on the degree of substitutability between
green an dirty capital goods. Climate policy evaluations without considering the risk
effect in the determinants of technical change could probably misjudge the effectiveness
of climate policy intervention.
Equations (8.16) and (8.17) implicitly contain the number of necessary time periods until
the expected profits from innovation in the green sector are greater than those of the dirty
sector even without the subsidy. For an elasticity of substitution ε > (1 + α − µ)/(1 − µ)
and intervention starting in any period t ≥ 1, the following properties for the length of
intervention hold:
Remark 8.2. The length of intervention is non-decreasing in the ”technology gap“ Qz,t/Qm,t
and the elasticity of substitution ε. These properties hold with and without consideration
of the risk effect and are thus independent of credit and financial intermediation.
First, the length of intervention rises with increasing Qz,t/Qm,t. The larger this gap is
when governmental intervention starts, the greater are initial relative expected returns on
innovation in sector z. Since the ”profit gap” (Vz,t/Vm,t)
(I) closes at a rate (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
1+α−σ
1−α ,
a greater initial technology gap implies a longer time period until the economy reaches a
point, where profits from innovation in the green sector are strictly greater than the profits
from innovation in the dirty sector even without a subsidy on green R&D.
Second, larger values of ε lead to greater initial gaps in relative expected profits Vz,t/Vm,t.
The argument now is similar to the previous one: during the time of intervention, in
situation (I), (Vz,t/Vm,t)
(I) closes at a rate (1+ηm,tλ¯m)
1+α−σ
1−α and in situation (II), (Vz,t/Vm,t)
(II)
closes with rate (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
1−σ. Intuitively, if the two inputs are close substitutes, final
output production relies mostly on the more productive input, and therefore, productivity
improvements in the green sector (taking place during the intervention phase) will have
less impact on overall productivity until green capital goods surpass the dirty ones. This
holds for both situations (I) and (II).
Cost of adjustment
The third measure of climate policy is the cost of adjustment defined as the number of
periods necessary for the economy under the policy intervention to reach the same level of
output growth as it would have done within one period in the absence of the intervention.
The cost of adjustment occurs, because after intervention, the less advanced green sector
productivity catches up on the more advanced productivity in the dirty sector and final
output increases more slowly than the case where innovation continues to be directed
towards the dirty sector.
Suppose governmental intervention starts in an arbitrary period t◦ ≥ 0. Then we have to
analyze the number of periods the economy needs to achieve the same output growth as it
would have achieved in just one period in the laissez-faire equilibrium. Denote aggregate
output under laissez-faire as Y (LF)t◦ and under period t
◦ intervention as Y (IN)t◦ . Formally, this
means we are looking for the number of periods denoted by j ∈ N the economy needs
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until
Y
(LF)
t◦+1
Y
(LF)
t◦
=
Y
(IN)
t◦+ j
Y
(IN)
t◦+ j−1
(8.18)
The cost of delay
The last measure is given by the cost of delay, i.e. the cost of delaying policy intervention
(one period) into the future. Then, the following result holds:
Proposition 8.4. Suppose the government postpones intervention from period t◦ ≥ 0 to
period t◦+1. Then the subsidy rate of period t◦+1 intervention is greater than the subsidy
rate that would have been sufficient to redirect innovation effort to the green sector in
period t: dt+1 > dt.
Proof: See appendix C.
The proposition shows that delaying intervention is costly, not only because of the contin-
ued rise in atmospheric carbon concentration and thus greater economic damages due to
climate change in the future, but also because it will make stronger intervention necessary.
During the delay of intervention (from t to t + 1 or even more periods), the technology
gap Qz,t+1/Qm,t+1 increases further and, thus, so does the profit gap Vz,t/Vm,t. Hence, the
subsidy rate, sufficient to close this gap in profits and thereby redirect entrepreneurs in-
novation effort to sector m, has to be higher compared to the subsidy rate that would have
been sufficient if intervention had not been postponed. Moreover, since the technology
gap widens with a delay in intervention, postponed intervention will make longer inter-
vention necessary as well.
Summarizing, this section has established that a simple policy intervention that ”redi-
rects“ technical change toward emission free sectors or technologies can help to prevent
a climate catastrophe. The discussion showed that postponing intervention into the future
leads to greater economic costs, not only because it further contributes to climate change,
but also because it widens the gap between dirty and green technologies, thereby inducing
a longer period of catch-up with slower growth.70
8.3. Equilibrium with climate policy
In the following we study optimal (climate) policies which implement a social optimal
allocation as an equilibrium allocation. To reduce carbon emissions, a social planner can
use a tax on dirty intermediate production Yz,t –a carbon tax– and a subsidy on innovation
return in the green sector. Formally, we define these two climate policy instruments as
follows:
Definition 8.1. A carbon tax and a subsidy on ”green“ R&D are non-negative sequences
τ = (τt)t≥0 and d = (dt)t≥0 where τt is the tax rate to be paid per unit of CO2 in period t ≥ 0
and dt is the subsidy rate proportional to the return on ”green“ capital good innovations
in period t ≥ 0.
70See also Acemoglu et al. (2012).
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The emissions tax levied on dirty intermediate input use is paid by firms in the final output
sector. The taxes are collected by governmental authorities and passed on as a lump-sum
transfer T Yt to consumers in equal shares. Subsidies are paid on returns from R&D in
sector m and financed by a lump-sum tax TRt on consumers income also in equal shares.
This formulation of governmental intervention implies slight adjustments in the decision
problems of final output and income profiles of consumers.
Final output production uses the technology given in (5.6):
Yt = (1 − D(At))F (Ym,t, Yz,t) = (1 − D(At))
(
γY
ε−1
ε
m,t + (1 − γ)Y
ε−1
ε
z,t
) ε
ε−1
, (8.19)
where still D(At) := 1 − e
−θ(At−A) is the damage function and At represents atmospheric
CO2-concentration and is defined in (5.4). Given damage-adjusted productivity the final
output sector also takes prices, taxes and technology parameters as given. The profit
maximization inclusive a tax on dirty input use –a carbon tax– reads:
max
(Ym,Yz)∈R
2
+
{
Yt − (pm,tYm,t + (1 + τt)pzYz,t) | Yt = (5.6)
}
(8.20)
A solution to (8.20) satisfies the following first order conditions which equate prices and
marginal products of each production factor for all t ≥ 0:
pm,t = (1 − D(At))γ
(
Ym,t
Yt
)− 1
ε
(8.21a)
(1 + τt)pz,t = (1 − D(At))(1 − γ)
(
Yz,t
Yt
)− 1
ε
. (8.21b)
Note that the solution to (8.20) is identical to the laissez-faire equilibrium of part two if
τt = 0.
Consumers’ preferences over consumption are given in assumption 5.10 and read
U(c
y
ℓ,t
, coℓ,t+1) := βu(c
o
ℓ,t+1) = β log(c
(o)
ℓ,t
), (8.22)
where the subindex ℓ ∈ {i,w, e} identifies consumption of workers (w), entrepreneurs (e)
and innovators (i).
Given labor income of wt and since the entire income is saved, we have st = wt, and
old workers have income of rt+1st. In addition, old workers’ income may alter due to
transfers and taxes given that a government introduces a tax and transfer scheme. More
precisely, carbon taxes levied on the use of dirty intermediate inputs are collected by
governmental authorities and passed on as a lump-sum transfer T Yw,t to old workers. If the
goverment subsidizes R&D expenditures, a lump-sum tax TGw,t is levied on old workers
income to finance the subsidy. This leads to the following aggregate budget constraint of
old workers:
C
(o)
w,t+1 = rt+1S t + T
Y
w,t − T
R
w,t = rt+1wt + T
Y
w,t − T
R
w,t =: I
(o)
w,t+1. (8.23)
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In a similar way, the income of old entrepreneurs and innovators alters. The aggregate
budget constraint of the entrepreneurs including taxes proceedings and subsidy costs is
then given by
C
(o)
e,t = Π¯
e
t + T
Y
e,t − T
R
e,t =: I
(o)
e,t (8.24)
and the budget constraint for innovators in sector j is equal to
C
(o)
i, j,t
= Π¯ij,t + T
Y
i,t − T
R
i,t =: I
(o)
i, j,t
. (8.25)
The rest of the decision problems, market clearing conditions and resource constraints
remain unchanged and we can define an equilibrium for a given climate tax τ and subsidy
d as:
Definition 8.2. An equilibrium of the economy considered here is an allocation A =
(Yt,Ct, (Y j,t, X j,t,H j,t, L j,t, ι j,t, (qϑ j,t, xϑ j,t)ϑ j∈[0,1]) j∈{m,z}, At,Dt+1)t≥0 and a price system P =
(rt,wt,R j,t, p j,t, pϑ j,t)t≥0 such that
(i) The allocation is consistent with the production technologies (5.11), (5.6), and the
market clearing conditions/resource constraints (5.50), (5.51), (5.53), (5.54), (5.55), and
(5.56).
(ii) Banks behave optimally, i.e. equations (5.31) and (5.32) hold for all t ≥ 0.
(iii) Producers behave optimally, i.e. equations (5.18), (5.26) , (5.13) hold for all t ≥ 0.
(iv) Consumers behave optimally with (profit) incomes determined by (8.23), (8.24) and
(8.25) for all t ≥ 0.
(v) Average capital goods qualities in sector j ∈ {m, z} evolve according to (5.42).
(vi) Climate variables evolve according to (5.3) with emissions given by (5.10) and cli-
mate damages in (5.6) determined by (5.4) and (5.5).
Thereby Ct =
∑
ℓ∈{w,e,i}Cℓ,t is the sum over period t consumption of old workers (w), old
entrepreneurs (e) and old innovators (i). Note that the laissez-faire equilibrium defined
in part two can be interpreted as a special case of the equilibrium defined here with no
taxation (τ = 0) and no R&D subsidy (d = 0).
Carbon taxes and green subsidies also affect different equilibrium variables. First the
relative price of the two intermediate goods including an emissions tax can be computed
from (8.21) as
p˜t :=
pz,t
pm,t
=
(
(1 + τt)
εγ˜−εL˜Q˜
)− 1−µσ
, (8.26)
where still µ ∈]0, 1[ and σ := 1 + (1 − µ)(ε − 1). So the relative price is decreasing in τt.
Expected profits from innovation, as given in (6.14), equal to
V˜t = p˜
1
1−µ
t+1
L˜t+1Q˜t+1R˜
−1 (8.27)
and the risk effect (eq. (6.9)) equals
R˜t =
(
p˜
1
1−µ
t L˜t
)− α1−α
. (8.28)
120
8 CLIMATE POLICY
Inserting (8.26) these two expressions become
V˜t =
(
γ˜ε(1 + τt)
−εL˜σ−1t+1 Q˜
σ−1
t+1 R˜
−σ
) 1
σ
. (8.29)
and
R˜t =
(
γ˜ε(1 + τt)
ε
σ L˜σ−1t Q˜
−1
)− α
σ(1−α)
. (8.30)
So while expected relative profits are decreasing in τt, the risk effect is increasing in τt.
After elimination of R˜t, V˜t reads
V˜t =
(
γ˜ε(1 + τt)
−εL˜σ−1t+1 Q˜
−ϕ
t+1
) 1
σ(1−α)
. (8.31)
where ϕ := 1 − σ(1 − α). This influence of τt and since the risk effect is an additional
determinant of directed technical change, these expressions play an important role in the
following analysis.
8.4. Optimal allocation
In this section we determine an optimal allocation as the solution to a social planning
problem which maximizes a weighted utility index of different generations of consumers
subject to the constraints imposed by technology, resources, and climate change.
Consider a social planner who chooses a feasible allocation subject to restrictions imposed
by technology, factor mobility, and resource constraints. Formally, the planner takes ini-
tial capital goods quality Q j,0 > 0, and the initial climate state A−1 as given. Compared to
the laissez-faire equilibrium the planning problem incorporates the link between produc-
tivity in final production, damage, and climate change. Thus, the decision involves the
choice of a feasible allocation defined next.
Definition 8.3. (i) A feasible allocation is a sequence
A = (Yt,Ct, (Y j,t, X j,t,H j,t, L j,t, ι j,t, (qϑ j,t, xϑ j ,t)ϑ j∈[0,1]) j∈{m,z}, At,Dt+1)t≥0 (8.32)
which satisfies technologies (5.6), (5.11), and (5.22), resource constraints (5.53), (5.51)
(L), (H), (X), (ι), (D) (market clearing/ resource constraints) (A), (Q) (climate evolution
and capital goods quality development) for all t.
(ii) The set of feasible allocations of the economy considered here is denotedA.
Thereby Ct =
∑
ℓ∈{w,e,i}Cℓ,t is the sum over period t consumption of old workers (w), old
entrepreneurs (e) and old innovators (i). Since by assumption young individuals do not
consume, only old individualsmatter for the social planner and we can skip the superindex
”o“ indicating old consumers in the following derivations. The social planner’s objective
is to maximize welfare which is here given by a weighted sum of utilities of all generations
of old consumers (workers entrepreneurs and innovators):
W :=
∞∑
t=0
ωt
( ∑
ℓ∈{w,e,i}
χℓβu(Cℓ,t)
)
. (8.33)
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Parameter ω ∈]0, 1[ represents the constant social discount factor and states how the so-
cial planner weights the welfare of future generations. The parameter β ∈]0, 1[ is the
private discount factor of the consumers. Moreover, the social planner distributes con-
sumption across different consumers within one generation. The parameters χℓ ∈]0, 1[ for
ℓ ∈ {w, e, i}with χw+χe+χi = 1 represent utility weights for the different consumer types.
In principle, for ω = 1 all generations would receive the same weight and there would be
no discounting of utility of future generations. However, in this thesis, I leave open the
question which values for ω and χℓ would characterize an appropriate choice.
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The social planner’s optimization problem is given by
max
A
{ ∞∑
t=0
ωt
( ∑
ℓ∈{w,e,i}
χℓβu(Cℓ,t)
)
| s.t. A = (8.32) ∈ A
}
(8.34)
A solution to (8.34) is
A
∗ = (Y∗t ,C
∗
t , (Y
∗
j,t, X
∗
j,t,H
∗
j,t, L
∗
j,t, ι
∗
j,t, (q
∗
ϑ j,t
, x∗ϑ j,t)ϑ j∈[0,1]) j∈{m,z},D
∗
t+1)t≥0 (8.35)
and referred to as the optimal allocation. Adopting an infinite-dimensional Lagrangian
approach, we can now derive conditions which completely characterize this solution. I
provide detailed computations in appendix C. Standard arguments imply that
A = (Yt,Ct, (Y j,t, X j,t,H j,t, L j,t, ι j,t, (qϑ j,t, xϑ j,t)ϑ j∈[0,1]) j∈{m,z}, At,Dt+1)t≥0
is a solution to (8.34) if there exist non-negative Lagrange multipliers λ = (λt)t≥0,
λt :=
(
λ0,t, λ
A
1,t, λ
A
2,t, λ
D
t , λ
L
t , λ
ι
t, (λ
Y
j,t) j∈{m,z}, (λ
x
ϑ j,t
, λ
q
ϑ j,t
, λhϑ j,t)ϑ j∈[0,1], j∈{m,z}
)
such that (A, λ) solve the resulting first order and complementary slackness conditions.
For t ≥ 0, define
Ωt := κ
φLλ
A
1,t
λ0,t
+ (1 − φL)φ0
λA2,t
λ0,t
 . (8.36)
After eliminating as many Lagrange variables as possible and using the functional forms
for technology given in (5.6) and (5.11), and preferences over consumption represented
by logarithmic utility, the first order conditions hold for all t ≥ 0 and can be interpreted as
follows.
The first order condition of the social planning problem with respect to Cℓ,t gives:
λ0,t = χℓu
′(Cℓ,t) ℓ ∈ {w, e, i}. (8.37)
This implies an intra-temporal optimality condition for consumption across different con-
sumers:
χwu
′(Cw,t) = χiu
′(Ci,t) = χeu
′(Ce,t). (8.38)
71See for instance Hillebrand (2012).
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The shadow price of intermediate goods use equal
λˆm,t = ∂YmF(Ym,t, Yz,t) = γY
1
ε
t Y
− 1
ε
m,t . (8.39a)
λˆz,t = ∂YzF(Ym,t, Yz,t) −
λA1,t
λ0,t
φLκ − (1 − φL)φ0κ
λA2,t
λ0,t
= (1 − γ)Y
1
ε
t Y
− 1
ε
z,t − κ
(λA1,t
λ0,t
φL + (1 − φL)φ0
λA2,t
λ0,t
)
. (8.39b)
These two equations define the true shadow price of intermediate goods. Key difference
between the optimal allocation and the equilibrium equations, as stated in (5.13), is a
wedge between the marginal product and the shadow price of Yz,t. This implies that the
laissez-faire equilibrium equations fail to take the cost of emissions into account and the
social planner introduces the wedge equal to κ(φLλ
A
1,t/λ0,t+(1−φL)φ0λ
A
2,t/λ0,t). This wedge
is equal to the emission cost of an additional unit of the dirty input (evaluated in terms of
units of the final good at time t).
The first order condition with respect to sectoral capital goods investment X j,t implies:
λx
ϑ j ,t
λ0,t
= 1 ∀ϑ j ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {m, z}. (8.40)
So in the optimal allocation, shadow prices for all capital good lines in the two interme-
diate sectors are identical and equal to one. The latter result contrasts to the laissez-faire
equilibrium, where capital good producers set prices equal to a mark-up over marginal
prodution costs: 1/µ. This can also be interpreted as the socially-planned allocation in-
volving a subsidy of µ in the use of capital goods.
To compute optimal capital goods quantities, insert (8.40) into the first order conditions
with respect to xϑ j ,t:
x∗ϑ j ,t =
(
µλˆ j,t
) 1
1−µ
L j,tqϑ j,t. (8.41)
Next, eliminate λLt from the first order conditions with respect to Lm,t, Lz,t, this gives
λYm,t∂LmG(Lm, xϑm) = λ
Y
z,t∂LzG(Lz, xϑz), (8.42)
which ensures intra-temporal efficiency of sectoral employment in the optimal allocation.
Optimal emissions tax
To compute the optimal tax on dirty input use, i.e. the optimal CO2 tax, use the first order
conditions with respect to emission components A1,t and A2,t:
λA1,t = λ0,t
∂D(A1,t + A2,t)
∂A
Yt
1 − D(A1,t + A2,t)
+ ω
λA1,t+1
λ0,t
. (8.43a)
λA2,t = λ0,t
∂D(A1,t + A2,t)
∂A
Yt
1 − D(A1,t + A2,t)
+ ω(1 − φ)
λA2,t+1
λ0,t
. (8.43b)
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These two conditions can be solved forward to obtain
λA1,t
λ0,t
=
∞∑
n=0
ωn
λ0,t+n
λ0,t
∂D(At+n)
∂A
Yt+n
1 − D(At+n)
(8.44a)
λA2,t
λ0,t
=
∞∑
n=0
ωn(1 − φ)n
λ0,t+n
λ0,t
∂D(At+n)
∂A
Yt+n
1 − D(At+n)
. (8.44b)
Inserting (8.44a) and (8.44b) into (8.36) and use (8.37) gives
Ωt = κ
∞∑
n=0
ωn
u′(Cℓ,t+n)
u′(Cℓ,t)
∂D(At+n)
∂A
Yt+n
1 − D(At+n)
(
φL + (1 − φL)φ0(1 − φ)
n
)
. (8.45)
So the total costs of emitting one additional unit of CO2 in period t, i.e. the total cost
associated with one additional unit of dirty production Yz,t (measured in units of time
t consumption) equals the discounted sum of all future climate damages caused by this
emission. Note thatΩt depends on the structural parameters of the model and endogenous
model variables in a complicated way. The term (8.45) is the key quantity to incorporate
the climate externality into the (shadow) price of dirty input production and thus forms
the basis for the optimal tax on CO2 emissions.
Consider briefly the comparative static influence of the parameters in Ωt. Emissions per
unit of dirty good production, given by parameter κ, as well as greater expected damages
given in the function D(At), increase Ωt. The pattern of atmospheric carbon cycle also
influences total cost of emissions: the longer emissions remain in the atmosphere (per-
manently φL and temporary over some periods 1 − φ), the larger is Ωt. In contrast to this,
higher values for the discount factor ω lower total costs of emissions.
Then the social planner can implement an emissions tax, i.e. a tax on the use of dirty input
by the final good producer equal to:
τt =
κ
λˆz,t
∞∑
n=0
ωn
u′(Cℓ,t+n)
u′(Cℓ,t)
∂D(At+n)
∂A
Yt+n
1 − D(At+n)
(
φL + (1 − φL)φ0(1 − φ)
n
)
. (8.46)
Beside similar influences that parameters have onΩt, this tax rate will be higher when the
shadow value of emissions quality is greater, when the marginal utility of consumption
today is lower, and when the price of dirty input is lower.
Knowledge externality
The optimal allocation also corrects for a knowledge externality, because in the decentral-
ized equilibrium, innovators do not internalize the effects of their research on productivity
in the future. Using the functional form for intermediate productionG given in (5.11) the
partial derivative of G with respect to qϑ j can be computed as
∂G
∂qϑ j
= (1 − µ)µ
µ
1−µ λˆ
µ
1−µ
j,t
L j,t. (8.47)
The first order conditions of the Lagrange function with respect to qϑ j give:
λ
(q)
ϑ j,t
/λ0,t = (1 − µ)µ
µ
1−µ λˆ
1
1−µ
j,t
L j,t + ω(1 + ι j,tη j,tλ¯ j)λ
(q)
ϑ j,t+1
/λ0,t. (8.48)
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Amarginal increase in quality qϑ j in t affects the productivity ofG in t and the productivity
of that capital good in t + 1. Since these effects are symmetric accross ϑ j, this expression
can be written as (define λˆq j,t := λ
(q)
ϑ j,t
/λ0,t):
λˆq j,t = (1 − µ)µ
µ
1−µ λˆ
1
1−µ
j,t
L j,t + ω(1 + ι j,tη j,tλ¯ j)λˆq j ,t+1. (8.49)
Intuitively, the shadow value of a unit increase in average productivity in sector j ∈ {m, z}
is equal to its marginal contribution to time-t productivity plus its shadow value at time
t + 1 times 1 + ι j,tη j,tλ¯ j (the further productivity increase it enables at time t + 1). This
last term captures the intertemporal ”knowledge externality”, because in the decentralized
equilibrium, innovators do not internalize the effects of their research on productivity in
the future.
In the optimal allocation of resources, the social planner allocates innovators towards the
sector yielding the higher social gain from innovation. The social value of innovation is
measured by the term λˆq j,tη j,tλ¯ jQ j,t−1, j ∈ {m, z}. Using the dynamics of average capital
goods quality, we can write:
λˆq j ,tη j,tλ¯ jQ j,t = η j,tλ¯ j(1 + ι j,tη j,tλ¯ j)
−1Q j,t+1λˆq j ,t. (8.50)
Now inserting the right hand side of (8.49) into (8.50) and iterating forwards gives
λˆq j ,tη j,tλ¯ jQ j,t = η j,tλ¯ j(1 + ι j,tη j,tλ¯ j)
−1(1 − µ)µ
1
1−µ
∑
n≥t
λˆ
1
1−µ
j,n
L j,nQ j,n. (8.51)
This implies that the social planner will allocate scientists to the clean sector whenever
the ratio
Rm,tλ¯z(1 + ιz,tηz,tλ¯z)
−1
∑
n≥t λˆ
1
1−µ
z,n Lz,nQz,n
Rz,tλ¯m(1 + ιm,tηm,tλ¯m)−1
∑
n≥t λˆ
1
1−µ
m,nLm,nQm,n
. (8.52)
is smaller than 1. Clearly this expression depends on various endogenous variables, most
importantly for our analysis, this ratio depends on the (endogenous) credit interest rates
Rm,t and Rz,t, indicating an influence of credit and banks on the size of the subsidy neces-
sary to redirect technical change. We determine this subsidy next.
Subsidy to green R&D
We compute the subsidy on the basis of technology constraints and conditions from the
social planning problem. First, we combine the partial derivatives of intermediate produc-
tion technology, as given in (5.11), with respect to xϑ j,t, L j,t with the first order conditions
of the Lagrange function with respect to Lm and Lz:
λ
(Y)
m,t∂GLmG(Lm, xϑm) = λ
(Y)
z,t ∂GLzG(Lz, xϑz) (8.53)
to get
λˆ
1
1−µ
m,t Qm,t = λˆ
1
1−µ
z,t Qz,t, (8.54)
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where λˆ j,t := λ j,t/λ0,t for j ∈ {m, z}. Next use the first order condition of L with respect to
Ym,t, Yz,t for given intermediate production technology. After elimination of all Lagrange
multipliers, we get
Lz,t
Lm,t
= (1 + τt)
−ε
(
Qz,t
Qm,t
)σ−1
. (8.55)
Insert this result into relative expected profits from innovation in the dirty sector (using
the optimality conditions with respect to capital goods xϑ j), the equivalent of (6.21) under
laissez-faire, then can be written as
Vz,t
Vm,t
= (1 + dt)
−1
(
1 − γ
γ
) ε
1−α
(1 + τt)
−ε
1−α
(
Qz,t+1
Qm,t+1
)σ−1−α
1−α
. (8.56)
Use sectoral capital goods quality dynamics to rewrite this as
Vz,t
Vm,t
= (1 + dt)
−1
(
1 − γ
γ
) ε
1−α
(1 + τt)
−ε
1−α
(
1 + (1 − ιt)ηz,tλ¯z
1 + ιtηm,tλ¯m
)σ−1−α
1−α
(
Qz,t
Qm,t
)σ−1−α
1−α
. (8.57)
So if the optimal allocation involves ιm,t := ιt = 1, the social planner can can choose a
subsidy dt to make this expression smaller than one. Or more explicitly, the planner can
set
dt ≥ dˆt ≡
((
1 − γ
γ
)ε
(1 + τt)
−ε
(
1 + ηm,tλ¯m
)1+α−σ ( Qz,t
Qm,t
)σ−1−α) 1
1−α
− 1 (8.58)
If the optimal allocation involves ιt ∈]0, 1[, then setting dt to ensure that Vz,t/Vm,t = 1
achieves the desired objective. The next proposition summarizes the previous computa-
tions of optimal climate policy and represents a major result of part three of this thesis:
Proposition 8.5. The socially optimal allocation can be implemented using a tax on emis-
sions, i.e. a tax on dirty input, a subsidy to green R&D and a subsidy for the use of capital
goods, whereby all proceeds from taxes and subsidies are redistributed/financed lump-
sum.
8.5. Properties of climate policy
Let me finish the analysis of optimal climate policy by elaborating the results and relating
them to the findings of some earlier studies.
First it is important to note that the main results derived above are a consequence of en-
dogenous and directed technical change. The framework developed here would be with-
out endogenous directed technical change, if – instead of basing the decision to innovate
for a certain sector on expected profits – innovators were randomly allocated across the
different capital goods in the two sectors. The analysis based on endogenous directed
technical change suggests that a temporary subsidy can redirect innovation towards the
green sector, whereas without directed technical change such redirecting is not possible,
and thus temporary interventions cannot prevent a climate catastrophe.
So far, the above results taken together suggest that governmental intervention should use
both a tax on carbon emissions and a subsidy on R&D in the green sector in order to im-
plement a socially optimal allocation. This is intuitive, since the tax deals more directly
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with climate externalities by reducing the production of the dirty intermediate good; but
also indirectly, because lower production discourages innovators R&D effort in the dirty
sector. The use of taxes and subsidies in climate policy is also suggested for instance in
Acemoglu et al. (2012).
The size of the subsidy that is necessary to create an incentive for innovators to direct
their innovation effort towards the green sector depends on the presence of the risk effect.
An important implication of this result is that the role of the financial sector should be
taken into account when evaluating the effects and costs of climate policy instruments.
Let me relate the results derived above to the findings of the literature on climate change
and economic growth. The main difference lies in the answers to the questions of how
strong intervention should be in order to avoid a climate catastrophe, should intervention
be temporary or permanent and what are the long-term implications and what are the costs
of delaying these policies into the future?
The approaches citet below can be subdivided into two different approaches: in the first
group of studies technology is exogenous by assumption, in the second group technol-
ogy is endogenous. Somewhat oversimplifyingly, one could roughly subdivide the first
strand of work into three different opinions regarding the derived answers to the question
formulated above:
• The first answer, labelled the Greenpeace answer by Acemoglu et al. (2012), repre-
sents the most pessimistic view that essentially all growth needs to come to an end
in order to save the planet.
• The second answer, represented by Stern (2009b) is slighty less pessimistic, but
calls for extensive and immediate interventions. Moreover, optimal environmen-
tal regulations need to be implemented permanently even though they may induce
significant economic costs.
• The third answer, represented by Nordhaus (2008) is even more optimistic and sug-
gests that only limited and gradual intervention is necessary to limit the effects
of climate change and thereby affect long-run economic growth only by a modest
amount.
The second group, where technology changes endogenously, provide additional answers
that can be related to the three positions above
• The fourth answer, represented by the work of Acemoglu et al. (2012), recommends
immediate and decisive intervention, because delaying intervention into the future
is costly. But due to endogenous directed technical change, a single policy can
redirect technical change and thus intervention needs only to be temporary, because
once the green, emission extensive technologies have been sufficiently advanced,
R&D would be directed towards these technologies without further intervention.
This view is even more optimistic than the Nordhaus answer, but holds only under
certain conditions: in fact only if substitutability between emission-intensive and
clean sectors is sufficiently high.
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However, their work also combines the Greenpeace and Stern answer, when substi-
tution between emission intensive and clean sectors is not sufficiently high.
Therefore when evaluating the costs and effectivity of environmental policy, one has
to carefully consider the relationships between the different industrial sectors in an
economy in order to get precise estimates of the effects of environmental regulation.
With regard to these different positions, I take a position that is most closely connected
to the findings of Acemoglu et al. (2012). This is not surprising, since the present work
builds on a model framework of endogenous and directed technical change taking envi-
ronmental constraints into account and implementing credit constraints and a financial
sector.
Nevertheless the explicit consideration of banks in the process of technical change sug-
gests an additional answer and hence contributes to the strands of literature stated above.
On the one hand, the consideration of financial intermediation leads to an answer that is
even more optimistic than Acemoglu et al. (2012): if the substitutability between the two
sectors is sufficiently large and the risk effect is strictly smaller than one, financial interme-
diation helps to direct technical changes towards the green sector and thereby strengthens
the impact of environmental policy intervention. This implies that intervention only has
to be temporary (this replicates the findings by Acemoglu et al. (2012)) but in addition,
the length and the strength of intervention that are sufficient to redirect technical change
towards the green sector are even smaller compared to those measures that would have
been suggested by an analysis that does not consider the role of financial intermediaries.
On the other hand, even if the substitutability between the two sectors is sufficiently large,
the answer containing the effects of financial intermediation can nevertheless be less op-
timistic compared to the most optimistic case found in Acemoglu et al. (2012): If the risk
effect is strictly greater than one, the banks slow down the effects of a governmental in-
tervention that aims at redirecting technical change towards green sectors. Although even
in this case, intervention only has to be temporary, however the length and the strength
of intervention that are sufficient to redirect technical change towards the green sector are
greater compared to the measures computed without the role of financial intermediaries.
Together, the analysis of environmental policy with explicit consideration of banks in the
process of technical change provides an answer that is close to the opinions of Nordhaus
(2008) and Acemoglu et al. (2012). However, we suggest that when computing the costs
and effects of environmental policies, one should consider the impact of banks on the
determinants of directed technical change.
9. Numerical Simulations
The next section states the results of a simple numerical simulation. The objective here is
not to provide a comprehensive quantitative evaluation but to highlight the role of financial
intermediation in the process of green directed technical change.
In the calibration of the developed model the first step is to relate a model period to real
time. Since the consumer side in the current model framework features an overlapping
generations structure with two periods of living, one might be inclined to interpret one
model period as a rather long time period that measures the living time of one generation,
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e.g. a time period of 20 to 40 years. This would be problematic due to the following two
points:
• First a comparison of the numerical results with those of other studies is at least
difficult -if not impossible. Current studies on climate change or the environment
and economic growth typically describe the consumer side by an infinitely lived
representative agent (among many others see Nordhaus (2008), Acemoglu et al.
(2012), Golosov et al. (2014) ). This way of modeling the consumer side enables
researchers to relate a model period to any real counterpart, e.g. one model period
could represent a quarter, a year, five years etc. So a model period in these studies
has a much smaller counterpart in real time, making it difficult to compare these
results with those of long term studies.72
• Second, the short to medium-term effects of climate policy are simply not appro-
priately measured in such a setup.
However, Aiyagari (1985) showed in a paper the “observational equivalence” of two-
period overlapping generations models and representative agent economies, meaning that
under certain conditions, the models lead to identical time paths for aggregate capital,
output, consumption, investment, real wage, and the real interest rate. The critical con-
dition for such an equivalence is that the steady state real interest rate is strictly greater
than the growth rate of the labor force (Aiyagari (1985) p. 202.). Since in the current
framework the population is constant and naturally the interest is positive, the condition
for observational equivalent model results is always fulfilled. Hence, it is legitimate to
interpret the period in the current overlapping generations model as shorter than initially
presumed and to use this framework for analyzing short to medium-term effects of climate
policy taking into account the effects of banks on directed technical change. Thereby, we
compare three different scenarios:
• a) Laissez-faire without any climate policy,
• b) Immediate (year 2015) intervention using optimal emissions taxes, and
• c) Immediate (year 2015) intervention using optimal emissions taxes and subsidies
to green R&D.
9.1. Parameter Calibration
The following numerical analysis takes each model period to be five years in real time
and the time horizon is 42 model periods. The model is calibrated to the year 2010, so
the horizon is given by the time period 2010 to 2220.73 In order to focus on the influence
of the risk effect, governmental intervention here is given by a subsidy to green R&D to
72In Acemoglu et al. (2012) a model period corresponds to five years, in Golosov et al. (2014) a model
period represents 10 years.
73Comparable studies have a time horizon of 2010 to 2220 Golosov et al. (2014), 300 Years Acemoglu
et al. (2012) and about 200 years in Nordhaus (1994).
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redirect technical change towards the green sector and the elimination of the emission
externality through a “carbond tax” levied on the use of the dirty input in final goods pro-
duction.
Recall that a climate catastrophe here is defined as a situation where climate damages to
aggregate output exceed an upper bound. The concrete value of the upper bound is of less
importance for the results and thus can be set almost arbitrarily. What is more important,
is that damages increase further under laissez-faire. So given a time horizon of 210 years,
this study sets the upper bound of climate damages to 5 % of world GDP.
Altogether, we need to calibrate three sets of parameters: the general parameters of pref-
erences and technology, those involving the damage function, and the parameters that
describe the carbon cycle in the atmosphere. The next table summarizes all the parameter
choices of the numerical example; the rest of this section discusses how the choices were
made.
TABLE 3: Parameter decisions for numerical simulation
µ = 0.33 γ = 0.45 ε = 1.6 α = 0.06 ζ = 1.6 λm = 1.065 λz = 1.040
A¯ = 581 β = 0.961 ω = 0.961 θ = 5.3 ·10−5 φL = 0.2 φ0 = 0.397 φ = 0.0115
Preferences and technology
The study uses the assumptions made in the model description in part two above: log-
arithmic preferences, CES final-goods production, CES intermediate-goods production
and 100% depreciation of capital goods. Such a depreciation rate is too high for a 5-year
model period, presumably even for a period of 10 years. With regard to the effects of
depreciation below 100% and directed technical change, Acemoglu (2002) points out that
slower depreciation affects the results of directed change models along the transition, but
long run growth rates remain unchanged.My concern in this thesis is to analyse the role of
banks in the process of technical change. The general results of parts one and two did not
consider depreciation rate levels. In this view, the assumed 100% depreciation of capital
goods is tolerable for the numerical analysis.
We set the capital goods share µ = 0.33 so the share of national income spend on cap-
ital goods (or machines) approximately equals the share of capital, which is commonly
set to a value in the interval [0.3, 0.4] in textbooks.74 The distribution parameter γ is set
to 0.45, so the weight of two intermediate goods in final output production is compar-
atively equal, nevertheless we put a slightly higher weight on dirty inputs since current
global GDP mainly uses energy goods and services based fossil fuel (electricity genera-
tion, transportation etc).
Estimating the economy wide elasticity of substitution between the two intermediate
goods is beyond the scope of this thesis. However, since fossil and non-fossil fuels should
be substitutes and not complements, we choose a value of ε = 1.6. This value is low
compared to the values for the elasticity of substitution between dirty and clean inputs of
74In fact, in 2001 Bernanke and Gu¨rkaynak (2002) estimated a value of 0.36 for the share of capital in
aggregate output.
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ε = 3 and ε = 10 in Acemoglu et al. (2012), but rather high compared to the values chosen
in Golosov et al. (2014) and estimated in Stern (2009a) for different energy inputs.75
The analysis sets the parameter representing cost of research ζ = 1.6 and the fraction
of profits devoted to R&D,α = 0.06. These values ensure that sectoral probabilities of
successful innovation are smaller than one and the resulting values for these probabilities
imply annual expected default rates of about 1.0% in sector m and 4.4% in sector z. The
success-probabilities measure the risk of default from credit obligations. In this regard,
the empirically observed default rates justify these parameters: In a study, Giesecke et al.
(2011) estimated the default risk in corporate bonds over the last 150 years. They derived
an average annual default rate for corporate bonds of 0.304% in the period 1946-2008.
And according to the economic data set of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System of the United States, the annual, seasonally adjusted delinquency rate on business
loans of all commercial banks was on average 4.4% between 1991 and 2012. So the pa-
rameter values in this thesis lie within the range of possible values according to empirical
observations.
The size of the jump in the product quality after a new capital good is invented are given
by λm = 1.065 and λz = 1.040. This implies a jump in productivity of 6.5% (4%) in sector
m (z) whenever a new capital good of higher quality is invented. The study assumes this
value for the step size in innovation, because taken together with the success-probabilities,
these parameter values imply future annual growth rates of sectoral average capital goods
quality of about 2% and therefore, the annual GDP growth rate is approximately equal to
2%. This matches the assumptions of Nordhaus (2008), Golosov et al. (2014) and Ace-
moglu et al. (2012) of output growth quite well.
The private and social discount factors are set equal to ω = β = 0.961. The optimal tax on
emissions is a function of the social discount factor ω, where with a higher discount factor
there is less weight put on the welfare of future generations. For instance an annual social
discount factor of ω = 0.999 implies a social discount rate of 0.1% per annum, which is
used by Stern (2007) and a value of ω = 0.985 implies a social discount rate of 1.5% per
annum, which is close to the value used in Nordhaus (2008). Golosov et al. (2014) plotted
their optimal tax rate for different values of the discount rate and found out that the higher
the discount rate, the lower is the optimal tax. However, this thesis does not aim to make
a stand with regard to the “best” value for ω and therefore the reported carbon tax should
be viewed more in light of the effects of the financial intermediaries rather than an extact
quantitative assessment that can be compared with the results of other studies.
The carbon cycle
Burning fossil fuel in order to use the released energy in goods production emits carbon.
The emissions then enter the global carbon circulation system. This circulation system
75This decision is supported by the findings of a more recent study: Papageorgiou et al. (2013) build on
the theoretical work of Acemoglu et al. (2012) and derive estimates for the elasticity of substitution between
clean an dirty inputs. Their results support the assumption that the elasticity of substitution between clean
and dirty energy inputs exceeds the value of one significantly, both in the electricity generating sector and
in non-energy industries. Given this results, they conclude that the economy-wide elasticity can also be
expected to exceed the value of one, possibly even two. However, they do not find evidence of an extremely
high elasticity (around ten).
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contains different reservoirs such as the atmosphere, the terrestrial biosphere, and differ-
ent layers of the ocean. Between these reservoirs exchanges of carbon emssions occur.
Among other greenhouse gases, CO2 or, more specifically the atmospheric CO2 concen-
tration, is the key driving force behind climate change. In order to analyze the effects
of climate change in the present framework, we need to specify how emissions influence
the CO2 concentration in the atmosphere over time. A good starting point would be to
formulate the different carbon reservoirs as a system of linear difference equations as in
Nordhaus (2008). However, Golosov et al. (2014) point out that the model specified in
Nordhaus (2008) abstracts from important mechanisms that affect the atmospheric carbon
concentration in the long run: most importantly this linear formulation abstracts from the
so-called Revelle buffer factor (Revelle et al. (1957)) that describes the capacity of the
ocean to act as a carbon reservoir in dependence of the accumulated CO2 in the water.
76
However, this feedback effect can be ignored in economic models, since it is very slow.
Thus Golosov et al. (2014) also develop a linear specification of CO2 emission develop-
ment, but one with a different interpretation that implies dynamics that are qualitatively
different from those in Nordhaus (2008). In addition, the approach taken by Golosov et al.
(2014) leads also to quantitatively different results. In fact, their formulation leads to sig-
nificantly larger effects of man-made emissions on the climate.
In the sequel, we follow the approach developed in Golosov et al. (2014) and assume that
(i) a share φL of carbon emissions remains permanently in the atmosphere, (ii) a share
1 − φ0 of the remainder exits the atmosphere into the biosphere and the surface oceans
within a decade; and (iii) a remainder of (1 − φL)φ0 decays at a geometric rate.
The approach taken here leads to a three parameter formula for a unit of carbon emitted at
time 0 that is left in the atmosphere τ periods later equal to: 1−dτ = φL+(1−φL)φ0(1−φ)
τ.
The analysis calibrates the parameters φL, φ0, φ as follows. According to the estimate
in the 2007 IPCC report about 20% of any emission pulse will stay in the atmosphere
“forever”. Hence, we set φL = 0.2. Archer (2005) estimated the lifetime of the excess
carbon that slowly exists the atmosphere to be 300 years. Since in this study, one model
period corresponds to five years, we impose (1 − φ)60 = 0.5. This gives φ = 0.0115.
The 2007 IPCC report states that about half of the emission pulse to the atmosphere ex-
its within a time scale of 30 years. This implies d4 = 1/2 in the formula above and
1 − 1/2 = 0.2 + 0.8φ0(1 − 0.0115)
4, so φ0 = 0.397. Finally, the initial condition for the
pre-industrial atmospheric carbon concentration is A = 581 GtC (gigatonnes of carbon).
Part two introduced the following formula to determine the atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tion:
At =
t+T∑
τ=0
(1 − dτ)Et−τ + A, (9.1)
where T denotes the first date when emissions started. The observed global carbon emis-
sions in GtC and the atmospheric CO2 concentration is given in figure 5 above, where fig-
ure 5 a) shows the evolution of global carbon emissions from 1900 to 2008 in gigatonnes
76The accumlation of CO2 in the oceans acidifies the water, which in turn limits the capacity of the oceans
to absorb more CO2. This can reduce the effective “size” of the oceans as carbon reservoirs (See Golosov
et al. (2014)).
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FIGURE 5: Observations on global carbon emissions and atmospheric CO2 concentration
and figure 5 b) shows the observed atmospheric CO2 concentration in the same time pe-
riod and the data generated by the model equation given above in (9.1). The dynamics
implied by the linear depreciation rate for CO2 used here together with the parameter
values given above match the observed evolution of the atmospheric CO2 concentration
over the past century quite well as shown by the close correspondence between the dashed
black line representing the oberserved values and the solid grey line representing the CO2
concentration in the atmosphere implied by the model.
The Damage Function
The damage function used in this thesis follows the exponential damage formulation de-
veloped in Golosov et al. (2014). This formulation has the atmospheric CO2 concentration
A as its argument. This is in contrast to other models that typically express damages as a
convex function of global temperature (see for instance Nordhaus (2008)). The mapping
from CO2 concentration to damages hence should be interpreted as a composition of two
mappings, where the first maps CO2 concentration into temperature and the second maps
temperature into damages. Nordhaus’s mapping from global mean surface temperature to
damages is specified as
1 − DN(Tt) =
1
1 + θ2T
2
t
,
where T is the mean global increase in temperature above the pre-industrial level, with
θ2 = 0.0028388. The damage functionDN is convex for a range of values with some upper
bound, for temperature values greater than this upper bound the function is concave.
The standard form for the second mapping from atmospheric carbon concentration A to
temperature T is a logarithmic function and given by
Tt = T (At) = λ log
(
At
A
)
/ log 2,
where A = 581 GtC is the pre-industrial level of atmospheric CO2-concentration. The
parameter λ represents the sensitivity of the temperature and a standard value is λ = 3.0
degree Celsius, which means that a doubling of the stock of carbon in the atmosphere
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leads to an increase in the global mean temperature by 3 degree Celsius.
The exponential “γ” parameter in the damage formulation of Golosov et al. (2014) is
equal to 5.3x10−5 GtC. We choose our parameter θ -which is the parameter γ in Golosov
et al. (2014)- to be the same as theirs. Note that this value is probably too low, since in
this study, θ is constant, where in Golosov et al. (2014), the parameter is stochastic and
adjusts to new information about damages.
The parameter κ represents specific CO2 emissions per unit of output and is chosen to
link current emissions to the output level of the model. This constant emission parameter
might overestimate the amount of emitted CO2, because this formulation abstracts from
changes in the emissions productivity. Hence, we calibrate this parameter in a way that
takes this possible overestimation into account.77
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FIGURE 6: Share of dirty input use: laissez-faire vs intervention
Finally, the two intermediate inputs Ymt, Yz,t here represent fossil fuel based energy pro-
duction (dirty production Yz,t) and non-fossil fuel based energy production (green produc-
tion Ym,t). The initial values for dirty and green production are calibrated to the average
of 2005-2015 fossil and non-fossil energy production in world primary energy supply
according to US Energy Information Administration.
9.2. Implications for the Future: Climate, Damages, Output and the Role of Financial
Intermediation
Given the assumptions and results of the previous sections, we can now generate quantity
paths for output, climate damages, dirty and green intermediate input use and the different
77Note that “fossil fuel” is a composite mainly consisting of coal, oil and natural gas. Each of these
fuels have a different carbon content (for instance coal has a carbon content of 716KgC/ton coal and crude
oil has 846 KgC/ton oil). The carbon content of the composite good “fossil fuel” should therefore be a
weighted average of the carbon content of coal, oil and gas, where the weights for this average are given by
the relative production of one energy source to total fossil fuel production. This implies that the parameter κ
could change in the future if for instance the relative importance of natural gas in total fossil fuel production
increases. Thereby, changes in κ due to technological changes are not consered yet.
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policy measures etc. for the laissez-faire equilibrium and the equilibrium with govern-
mental intervention in order to analyze the role of financial intermediation in the process
of green technical change. Basically, we subdivide the results into two parts: First we
show the general effects of climate policies on the paths of the different economic vari-
ables, taking financial intermediation into account; and here compare the results of the
laissez-faire case to the case of immediate intervention. Second, we show the differences
in the results by comparing the policy measures, namely the strength and length of in-
tervention, the cost of adjustment and the cost of delay, for the cases with and without
financial intermediaries.
Figure 6 depicts the use of dirty energy under laissez-faire and in the two cases of imme-
diate intervention. Comparing the paths of dirty energy use in the three situations, we find
that immediate intervention leads to a much lower use compared to laissez-faire. This is
plausible, since the technology gap between the dirty and the green input is initially wide
enough to direct productivity-increasing innovations solely to the dirty sector. Hence,
fossil fuel use increases over time under laissez-faire. Comparing the two intervention-
scenarios, we find that dirty input consumption steadily decreases over time
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FIGURE 7: Share of green input in total intermediate input use: laissez-faire vs intervention
in both scenarios. Interestingly, however, the use of a carbon tax reduces dirty energy use
over the next 50 years only gradually, while a climate policy using a carbon tax and a
subsidy to green R&D leads to an immediate decline of dirty energy use. Although the
optimal tax discourages profits from dirty capital good innovations, closing the profit gap
between dirty and green capital goods takes time. So over the next 50 years, innovations
still would be directed to dirty technologies, even though the carbon tax is introduced.
A subsidy on green innovations can help to further shrink dirty energy input use. This
is because immediate intervention using additionally green subsidies freezes the existing
productivity level of the dirty sector and redirects innovations towards the green sector.
So the subsidy affects future emissions while at the same time, the tax controls current
emissions from dirty energy use.
Inversely related to these results are the shares of non-fossil fuel use in the two scenarios
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illustrated in figure 7. While in the laissez faire case, the share of inputs supplied by
the green sector declines from 20% in 2015 to around 15% in 2090 to be less than 10%
after 100 years from now. Immediate intervention leads to increasing shares of green
input consumption over time. However, even though the switch to green innovations is
immediate, if intervention uses taxes and subsidies to green R&D, it takes much longer
(over 100 years) for 90% of inputs to be supplied by the green sector.
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FIGURE 8: Damages as percentage of GDP: laissez-faire vs intervention
The paths for total damages in percent of final output are plotted in figure 8. The gains
from immediate intervention through a subsidy on green R&D and an optimal tax on the
use of fossil fuel are significant. In the short and medium term (up to 2050) the gains are
small. However, they permanently grow over time. Around 2100, damages from climate
change are almost 6% of GDP in the laissez-faire scenario rather than 4% in the optimal
tax and 2.8% in the optimal tax and subsidy intervention scenario. By 2200, damages
will have increased to almost 14% under laissez-faire while immediate intervention keeps
damages lower at 6% in the optimal tax and 4% in the optimal tax and subsidy scenario.
This is approximately similar to the results of Golosov et al. (2014), who stated damages
in 2200 of above 10% in the laissez-faire regime and 1.5% in the optimal allocation.
Using the relation between the atmospheric CO2 concentration A and the temperature T as
described above, where T depends logarithmically on A, we can also compute the paths of
global mean temperature in the two scenarios. Figure 9 illustrates these findings. Without
immediate climate policy intervention, the global mean surface temperature will have
increased by 3 degrees Celsius within the next 100 years. Immediate intervention with
a carbon tax on the optimal use of CO2 intensive dirty goods leads to a global warming
of only 2.5 degrees Celsius. Climate policy using an optimal CO2 tax and subsidies
to green R&D can limit temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius. In the year 2200
the corresponding temperature increases are 7 degrees under laissez-faire and 3.8 (2.8)
degrees under optimal tax (optimal tax plus subsidy) intervention.
136
9 NUMERICAL SIMULATIONS
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
2015 2030 2045 2060 2075 2090 2105 2120 2135 2150 2175 2190 2205 2220
Laissez-faire
Optimal tax
Opt.tax plus subsidy
t
◦C
FIGURE 9: Global mean surface temperature: laissez-faire vs intervention
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FIGURE 10: Subsidy on green R&D in % of net-output: banks vs no banks
The role of credit and banks
We use different policy measures introduced previously such as the strength of interven-
tion, the length of intervention, the cost of adjustment, and the cost of delay to analyze
the effects of credit and banks on climate policy. Thereby we take scenario c), where a
government introduces the optimal CO2 tax and subsidizes returns on R&D directed to
green capital goods, and compare the results with those that would have occured if the
effects of credit and banks on the direction of technical change would be ignored.
First consider the strength and length of intervention, both determined by the subsidy on
green R&D return. Recall that the subsidy is introduced to redirect innovations from dirty
to green technologies and remains in place as long as relative expected profits from in-
novation in the dirty sector are greater or equal to profits from green innovation without
this subsidy. The number of periods necessary to create profit incentives to green R&D
even without a subsidy is the length of intervention. The size of a subsidy sufficiently
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high to create the incentive of green innovations in the first place represents the strength
of intervention.
Figure 10 shows the development of the subsidy over time. Comparing results, we find
that the consideration of credit and banks in the determinants of technical change has no
effect on the length of intervention: in both scenarios, a declining fraction of final output
should be used to finance green R&D over the next 50 years. Then green sector tech-
nologies overtake dirty technologies in terms of productivity so from then on, innovations
are directed to green capital goods even without a subsidy. The decline in the subsidy is
due to a decrease in the technology gap, i.e. the relative productivity between the dirty
and the green sector declines, since after intervention, the productivity in the dirty sector
is freezed, while the productivity in the green sector increases. In contrast to this, the
strength of intervention is lower if climate policy accounts for the risk effect in the deter-
minants of directed technical change: Accumulated over the time period of intervention,
the cost of financing green R&D are 6.5% higher if climate policy ignores the effect of
credit and banks on profit incentives in directed innovations.
Next, the cost of adjustment is given by the number of periods the economy needs to
achieve the same output growth as it would have achieved in just one period in the laissez-
faire equilibrium. Figure 11 shows the percentage deviation of growth rates from one
period of laissez-faire growth in the “bank” and “no bank” case. First the results suggest
lower growth rates of aggregate output in case of intervention indicated by the negative
percentage deviation from laissez faire growth. Second the cost of adjustment in the bank
scenario is much smaller compared to the no bank scenario, since i) the negative per-
centage values are greater in absolute terms and ii) the number of years with negative
percentage output deviations is significantly greater if climate policy ignores the effects
from credit and bank. In this case, the model predicts that it takes the economy almost
fourty years longer to reach the same level of output growth as it would have achieved in
the laissez-faire equilibrium.
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FIGURE 11: Percentage change in net-output growth compared to laissez-faire: banks vs no banks
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Figure figure 12 depicts the development of net-of-damage final output production for
scenario c), where climate policy uses carbon taxes and subsidies to green R&D, and
compares this with net final output that would have occured if climate policy would have
ignored the effects from credit and banks on the determinants of directed technical change.
We find that 100 years from now, aggregate output is 2.1% greater if climate policy ac-
counts for credit and banks and continues to increase: At the end of the simulation period,
this difference in output levels is almost 11%.
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FIGURE 12: Net-output for carbon tax and green subsidy intervention: banks vs no banks
Consider now the cost of delaying climate policy intervention into the future. We relate
intervention delay by one, two respectively three decades to the additional economic costs
given by losses in aggregate output at the end of the simulation period. A delay here means
the number of additional periods where the government keeps the emissions tax and the
subsidy on green R&D at zero. We find that a delay of intervention can be substantial
no matter whether climate poliy considers the effects of credit and banks. For example, a
10-year delay leads to output losses of approximately 3%. This loss in aggregate output
doubles to 6% in case of 20-year delay and triples to output losses of 9% compared to
intermediate intervention. Let us close the numerical example with the analysis of the
optimal tax on carbon emissions in scenarios b) and c) The optimal tax on the use of dirty
input is characterized in equation (8.46). The epxression shows that the tax rate especially
depends on the social discount factor ω: the greater ω,
the lower is the tax rate. This relationship implies that it is not exactly clear what the
“best” social discount rate is with respect to the emissions tax.78 Figure 13 plots the CO2
tax for an annual discount rate of 0.87 for the scenarios b) and c). This discount rate
is close to 0.8 which equals the average of the two discount rates used in Stern (2007)
and Nordhaus (2008). From figure 13 we see that the optimal tax increases over time. A
climate policy using only a carbon tax leads to higher tax rates in the future. Moreover,
if climate policy takes into account the risk effect associated with financial intermediaries
and capital constrained innovators, this has almost no effect on the optimal tax rate. A
78For an analysis of the tax rate as a function of the discount factor, see Golosov et al. (2014) p. 70 f.
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FIGURE 13: Tax on dirty input production: banks vs no banks
marginal shift is still existent (the taxes rates are identical at the beginning of intervention
and at the end of the simulation horizon, the tax is 1.6% higher under the no bank regime).
This is intuitive, because the tax is equal to the marginal externality damage from emis-
sions and the emission externality is a function of intermediate production, whereas in
this framework, credit constraints and thus financial intermediation matters on the down-
stream capital goods production stage.
In contrast to this, the subsidy to green R&D deals with future emission externalities by
re-directing innovators R&D effort away from the dirty and towards the green sector.
Moreover, figure 13 suggests that relying intervention exclusively on a carbon tax to
reduce dirty production (current emission externalities) and also stimulate green sector
R&D (future knowledge based externalities) would demand a much higher tax on carbon
emissions. This implies that an optimal policy relies not only on carbon taxes to avoid a
climate catastrophe; one should also use additional instruments that direct innovation to-
wards green technologies, thereby increasing future production by using more productive
green technologies.
To relate the numerical tax result found here to available estimates, consider the work of
Nordhaus (2008) and Stern (2007) and more recently Acemoglu et al. (2012) and Golosov
et al. (2014). The former two amount to a tax of 30$ and 250$ per ton coal, respectively.
As already mentioned, one explanation for these deviating results is the use of very dif-
ferent subjective discount rates. Using the same subjective discount rates, Golosov et al.
(2014) find an optimal carbon tax of $56.9/ton and $ 496/ ton of coal. A key difference
for this higher optimal tax is the depreciation structure of emitted carbon in the atmo-
sphere. The fact that a fraction of carbon remains permanently in the atmosphere implies
that more carbon stays and that it stays longer in the atmosphere.
This holds also true for the present findings, since our carbon concentration uses the ap-
proach of Golosov et al. (2014). However, our tax rate is nevertheless lower compared
to Golosov et al. (2014). This difference can be explained, since the environmental pol-
icy in Golosov et al. (2014) relies solely on a carbon tax instead of combining it with
a subsidy on green R&D together with the catalyzing effect of financial intermediaries
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on environmental policies. Acemoglu et al. (2012) showed that without a subsidy (and
without financial intermediaries presumably even more) the carbon tax needs to be signifi-
cantly higher: The carbon tax deals more directly with the current emission externality by
reducing the production of the dirty input. In the process the carbon tax also discourages
innovation in the emission intensive sector. The subsidy deals with future environmental
externalities by directing technical changes towards the green sector, hence the subsidy
reduces future damages from carbon emissions.79
79Another point is that our dirty sector produces “fossil fuel”, which represents a composite good of
different energy sources with different carbon contents that are not explicitly modeled. So in this study,
climate policy taxes the use of the dirty input and hence implicitly the use of emissions from a fossil fuel
mix with a corresponding carbon content. This is probably in contrast to Golosov et al. (2014), where a
carbon tax is levied on the carbon content of coal, which should be higher compared to the carbon content
of a fossil fuel mix including for instance natural gas.
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10. Conclusions and Outlook
The objective of this dissertation was to analyze the effect of banks on the direction of
endogenous technical change with regard to climate change and economic growth. The
thesis answered the question to what extent existing climate policy evaluations alter, if a
credit market and capital constraints enter the determinants of directed R&D investment.
The first part developed a macroeconomic model to analyze the general relationship be-
tween banks and the rate and direction of technical change. Existing approaches of en-
dogenous directed technical change models allow innovations on technologies to be di-
rected towards different factors or sectors: firms can invest resources to develop new
sector or factor specific technologies. Accordingy, the relative profitability of generating
innovations for these specific technologies shape the direction of technical change. The
work of this dissertation complements these existing approaches and shows that when
innovating firms lack the necessary capital resources to finance their investments, four
market forces determine the relative profitability of the different types of technology: (i)
the price effect, which encourages innovations on technologies that use more expensive
factors; (ii) the market size effect, which directs innovations towards technologies that
use the more abundant factor; (iii) the productivity effect, which increases the incentive
to develop technologies for sectors with a higher productivity ; and last but not least (iv)
the risk effect. This risk effect creates incentives to develop technologies complement-
ing sectors where the probability of successful innovation is higher and originates from
banks’ external funding of innovators’ investment projects. Thus the first part showed in
a general framework that banks influence the direction of technical change.
Utilizing the findings of the first part, the second part of this thesis formulated a dynamic
general equilibrium endogenous technical change model with financial intermediation and
an environmental constraint. This constraint is an externality from emitting carbon and
modeled as a by-product of using a “dirty” intermediate good as an input to final output
production. Here, we emphasized the impact of credit supplying financial intermediaries
on the long run properties of a laissez-faire equilibrium with environmental constraints by
again assuming that innovating firms in two intermediate sectors were capital constrained.
We found that banks influence the direction of “green” technical change through the risk
effect. Moreover, the analysis showed for sufficiently substitutable dirty and green inter-
mediate inputs combined with an initially relatively less productive carbon neutral sector
that the laissez-faire economy always runs into a climate catastrophe. This suggests in
turn that additional market forces associated with financial intermediation do not change
the general outcome that without policy intervention, the long run properties of the equi-
librium are a high atmospheric carbon concentration associated with significant damages
to GDP. This is intuitive, since naturally, the emission externality creates economic costs
that are not borne by the polluter. In addition, the lending strategies of profit maximizing
banks do not contain this emission externality, i.e. they do not automatically fund invest-
ment projects in sectors characterized by lower carbon emissions, but instead they finance
the ventures of firms in those sectors that promise the highest expected return from credit
lending. Consequently, climate policy intervention is indeed necessary to avoid a climate
catastrophe, even when taking into account the role of banks in the process of technical
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change.
In the third part, we analyzed optimal climate policies and conducted a simple quantita-
tive evaluation of environmental policy regulation. We found first that in the case of a
sufficiently high elasticity of substitution between fossil and non-fossil fuel inputs, a tem-
porary policy intervention by a subsidy on research effort in the carbon neutral sector can
redirect technical changes towards the emission neutral sector, thus pushing the economy
towards a path of sustainable growth. The consideration of financial intermediaries has
no effect on this result. Second, optimal climate policy involves a carbon tax as well as
research subsidies, so that taxes need not be excessively used. Third and for the purpose
of this study more important, the analysis showed that the consideration of financial inter-
mediaries affects different policy measures quantitatively and should therefore be taken
into account in climate policy evaluation. Our estimates of the cost of adjustment in case
of immediate intervention, e.g. the lower aggregate output transition phase that results
from the catch up of the less productive green sector, is roughly 75 years when we ex-
plicitly consider the risk effect and significantly longer (125 years) when we ignore the
impact of credit and banks on the direction of technical change. In contrast to this, the
length of intervention, i.e. the time period with an implemented subsidy on green R&D
that is needed to create an incentive for innovators to direct their R&D investment to the
green sector even without the subsidy, is almost identical when we consider the banks.
We get a similar outcome for the size of the subsidy, i.e. the strength of intervention that
is necessary to create profit incentives for innovation in the green sector. If the risk effect
enters the relative profitability of green product innovation this leads to a reduction in the
size of the subsidy.
Finally, a delay in policy intervention is costly, meaning that all policy measures increase
with postponed intervention, the effect of the banks here is minor. Together this implies
that the response of technology to policy, taking credit and banks into account, leads
to more optimistic scenarios compared to what emerges from models with endogenous
technology without financial intermediaries and even more optimistic results compared to
outcomes that emerge from models with exogenous technology. Nevertheless the analysis
overall suggests an immediate and strong environmental regulation.
The model framework developed in this thesis eliminates the weakness in existing ap-
proaches by accounting for financial intermediation in an endogenous growth model with
directed technical change. Still, there are some weaknesses in the present analysis. First,
the emissions per unit of output were constant by assumption. This formulation ignores
the “technology effect”, meaning that technological change leads to falling emissions per
unit of output over time. This simplification is in contrast to empirical observations.
Hence, the current model might tend to overestimate the quantity of aggregate emissions
in the future.
Altogether this dissertation is a first step towards a comprehensive framework that can
be used for theoretical and quantitative analysis of the interaction between banks and
endogenous (directed) technology in general and economic responses to environmental
regulation and climate change considering financial intermediaries in particular. Several
extensions to the present setting appear fruitful. First it would be a straightforward idea
to extend the financial side in this work from just banks to a general financial market
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formulation. Then, one could use this framework to analyze the relationship between fi-
nancial market development and the direction of technical change. Second, it would be
interesting to develop a multi-country version of the model formulated in the second part
of this thesis in order to analyze issues of global policy coordination and the problem
of “carbon leakage” that describes the problem of globally increasing carbon emissions
in response to environmental regulation in some countries, since this policy may induce
greater fossil fuel use and hence greater carbon emission in countries that do not imple-
ment environmental regulation. One could furthermore extend the energy supply side by
explicitly modelling energy sources as in Golosov et al. (2014), implement exhaustible
resources and address the issue of whether optimal policy should use price or quantity
instruments. Finally one could incorporate aggregate uncertainty (productivity shocks or
uncertain climate damages) into the model.
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C. Appendix: Mathematical proofs part III
Proof of Lemma 8.1
Proof. Suppose the condition in Lemma 8.1 holds and Vz,t◦ ≥ Vm,t◦ for some t
◦ ≥ 0. This
is equivalent to (just insert terms from eq. (6.21)):
(1 − γ)
ε
σ−1−αQz,t◦+1 ≥ γ
ε
σ−1−αQm,t◦+1. (C.1)
Suppose that Vz,t < Vm,t for some t > t
◦ ≥ 0.
i) If Vz,t◦ = Vm,t◦ , then from Lemma 3.1 gm,t = gz,t =: gt, i.e. sectoral growth rates are
identical and
Qz,t◦+1 = (1 + g
◦
t )Qz,t◦ and Qm,t◦+1 = (1 + g
◦
t )Qm,t◦ . (C.2)
Iterate forward to t > t◦:
Qz,t+1 = (1 + g
◦
t )
t+1−t◦Qz,t◦ and Qm,t+1 = (1 + g
◦
t )
t+1−t◦Qm,t◦ . (C.3)
One can show that this implies
Vz,t = (1 + gt◦)
t−t◦Vz,t◦ (C.4)
and
Vm,t = (1 + gt◦)
t−t◦Vm,t◦ . (C.5)
So from the condition in the Lemma we have Vz,t◦ ≥ Vm,t◦ and assumed above that Vz,t <
Vm,t. Using (C.4) and (C.5) the latter is equivalent to
(1 + gt◦)
t−t◦Vz,t◦ < (1 + gt◦)
t−t◦Vm,t◦ , (C.6)
which is a contradiction, so Vz,t = Vm,t if Vz,t◦ = Vm,t◦ .
ii) If Vz,t◦ > Vm,t◦ , then
Qz,t◦+1 = (1 + gz,t◦)Qz,t◦ and Qm,t◦+1 = Qm,t◦ . (C.7)
Iterate forward to t > t◦:
Qz,t+1 = (1 + gz,t◦)
t+1−t◦Qz,t◦ and Qm,t+1 = Qm,t◦ . (C.8)
This implies
Vz,t = (1 + gz,t◦)
t−t◦Vz,t◦ (C.9)
and
Vm,t = Vm,t◦ . (C.10)
So from the condition in the Lemma we have Vz,t◦ ≥ Vm,t◦ and assumed above that Vz,t <
Vm,t. Using (C.9) and (C.10) the latter is equivalent to
(1 + gt◦)
t−t◦Vz,t◦ < Vm,t◦ , (C.11)
which is also a contradiction, since gz,t > 0 and t > t
◦ so Vz,t > Vm,t if Vz,t◦ > Vm,t◦ .
i) and ii) together prove the Lemma in the text.
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Proposition 8.2
Proof. We prove the proposition in two steps. First, we show that the introduction of a
subsidy can be sufficient to redirect technical changes. In a second step, we show that the
size of ε determines whether this intervention can be temporary or permanent.
(i) Suppose a government introduces a subsidy rate given in (8.6) in an arbitrary period
t◦ ≥ 0. Then, the subsidy has to be implemented until expected profits from innovation
in sector m are greater than those of innovating in sector z even without the subsidy.
Suppose, this needs j > 1 periods. Then we have to show that in period t◦+ j the condition
Vm,t◦+ j > Vz,t◦+ j holds. Inserting terms, expected profits in sector m can be written as
Vm,t = µ¯
(
γεQσ−1−αm,t+1
) 1
1−α
= µ¯
(
γε(1 + ιtηm,tλ¯m)
σ−1−αQσ−1−αm,t
) 1
1−α
(C.12)
and in sector z
Vz,t = µ¯
(
(1 − γ)εQσ−1−αz,t+1
) 1
1−α
= µ¯
(
(1 − γ)ε(1 + (1 − ιt)ηz,tλ¯z)
σ−1−αQσ−1−αz,t
) 1
1−α
. (C.13)
During intervention, i.e. in periods t◦ < t < t◦ + j,the expected profits from innovation
in sector m including the subsidy, are greater than the expected profits from innovation in
sector z. Thus ιt = 1 and
Qm,t+1 = (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)Qm,t, and Qz,t+1 = Qz,t. (C.14)
This implies a decrease in the ”productivity gap“ Qz,t/Qm,t:
Qz,t+1
Qm,t+1
=
Qz,t
(1 + ηm,tλ¯m)Qm,t
<
Qz,t
Qm,t
. (C.15)
Proceeding forward, this implies for period t◦ + j, j > 1:
Qz,t◦+ j
Qm,t◦+ j
=
Qz,t
(1 + ηm,tλ¯m) jQm,t
<
Qz,t
Qm,t
. (C.16)
Expected profits can be written as
Vm,t◦+ j = (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
σ−1−αVm,t◦ (C.17)
and
Vz,t◦+ j = Vz,t◦ . (C.18)
Between t◦ and t◦+ j expected profits in sector m increase with a rate 1+ηmλ¯m per period,
while expected profits in sector z remained constant.
So it remains to show that the government can set a subsidy dt+ j in period t + j such that
Vm,t◦+ j(1 + dt◦+ j) > Vz,t◦+ j (C.19)
and
Vt◦+ j+1 > Vz,t◦+ j+1 (C.20)
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hold.
From (C.19) we get
V˜t◦ < (1 + dt◦+ j)(1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
j(σ−1−α)
1−α (C.21)
From (C.20) we get
V˜t◦ < (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
(1+ j)(σ−1−α)
1−α (C.22)
These two conditions are equivalent if dt◦+ j = (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
σ−1−α
1−α − 1. So if intervention
started in period t◦ the subsidy rate in period t◦ + j equals
dt◦+ j = (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
σ−1−α
1−α (C.23)
and one can show that the subsidy rate in period t◦ is given by
dt◦ = (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
jσ−1−α1−α . (C.24)
Clearly, the number of periods j and so the size of the subsidy depends on the ”productivity-
gap“ Qz,t/Qm,t: The larger this gap, the greater is j. (ii) Dirty production given in (6.35)
equals
Yz,t = µ
2µ
1−µ (1 − γ)ε
(
Qm,tWˆ
1
σ−1
t
)2−σ
Qz,t. (C.25)
and emissions are given in (5.10):
Et = κYz,t. (C.26)
These two expressions together already imply that emissions Et do not grow for ε >
(2 − µ)/(1 − µ) ⇔ σ > 2, since during intervention and after redirecting R&D to sector
m, Qz,t is constant, while at the same time Qm,t grows with rate (1 + ηm,tλ¯m) and therefore
Yz,t and emissions grows with a rate (1 + ηm,tλ¯m)
2−σ.
Proof proposition 8.4
Proof. To prove the proposition in the text, first take the strength of intervention for period
t◦ intervention as given in equation (8.9):
dt◦ ≥ dˆt◦ ≡
[(
1 − γ
γ
)ε (
1 + ηz,t◦ λ¯z
)σ−1−α ( Qz,t◦
Qm,t◦
)σ−1−α] 11−α
− 1. (C.27)
This conditions for the subsidy holds for all t ≥ 0, so a delay in intervention of one period
to t◦ + 1 implies for the subsidy:
dt◦+1 ≥ dˆt◦+1 ≡
[(
1 − γ
γ
)ε (
1 + ηz,t◦+1λ¯z
)σ−1−α ( Qz,t◦+1
Qm,t◦+1
)σ−1−α] 11−α
− 1. (C.28)
We have to show that dˆt◦+1 > dˆt◦ which is straightforward. Insert (C.27), (C.28) and
simplify gives:
dˆt◦+1 > dˆt◦ ⇔(
1 + ηz,t◦+1λ¯z
)σ−1−α ( Qz,t◦+1
Qm,t◦+1
)σ−1−α
>
(
1 + ηz,t◦ λ¯z
)σ−1−α ( Qz,t◦
Qm,t◦
)σ−1−α
. (C.29)
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Now recall that with no intervention in period t◦, innovators continue to direct R&D
to sector z. Thus the average quality of sectoral capital goods in sector z changes by
Qz,t◦+1 = (1 + ηz,t◦ λ¯z)Qz,t◦ ,while the average quality of capital goods in the green sector
remains constant: Qm,t◦+1 = Qm,t◦ . Use this to rewrite the left hand side of the inequality
condition above gives
((
1 + ηz,t◦+1λ¯z
) (
1 + ηz,t◦ λ¯z
))σ−1−α( Qz,t◦
Qm,t◦
)σ−1−α
>
(
1 + ηz,t◦+1λ¯z
)σ−1−α ( Qz,t◦
Qm,t◦
)σ−1−α
⇔
ηz,t◦+1λ¯z > 0.
which is always fulfilled, since ηz,t◦+1 > 0, λ¯z > 0.
Computing the socially optimal allocation
I adopt a standard Langrangian-type approach to characterize the solution to (8.34). De-
fine the Lagrangian function
L
((
Ct,
(
Y j,t, X j,t, L j,t, ι j,t, (xϑ j,t, hϑ j,t, qϑ j,t)ϑ j∈[0,1]
)
j∈{m,z}
,Dt+1, A1,t, A2,t
)
t≥0
)
:=
∞∑
t=0
ωt
β
∑
ℓ∈{[w,e,i}
χℓu(Cℓ,t) + λ0,t
(
(1 − D(A1,t + A2,t))F(Ym,t, Yz,t) −Ct − Xm,t − Xz,t − Dt+1
)
+
∑
j∈{m,z}
λ
y
j,t
(
G(xϑ j,t, L j,t) − Y j,t
)
+
∑
j∈{m,z}
∫ 1
0
λ
q
ϑ j,t
(
(1 + ι j,tη j,tλ¯ j)Q j,t − Q j,t+1
)
+
∑
j∈{m,z}
∫ 1
0
λhϑ j,t
(
η j,t − h
α
ϑ j,t
zϑ j
)
+ λιt
(
ιm,t + ιz,t − 1
)
+ λLt
(
Lm,t + Lz,t − 1
)
+λA1,t
(
A1,t − A1,t−1 − φLκYz,t
)
+ λA2,t
(
A2,t − A2,t−1 − (1 − φL)φ0κYz,t
)
+λDt
(
Dt − Hm,t+1 − Hz,t+1
)
+
∑
j∈{m,z}
∫ 1
0
λxϑ j ,tdϑ j
(
X j,t −
∫ 1
0
xϑ j,tdϑ j)
) .
(C.30)
Then the first order conditions of the social planning problem are for all t ≥ 0:
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∂L
∂Ym,t
: λ0,t∂YmF(Ym,t, Yz,t) − λ
Y
m,t = 0.
∂L
∂Yz,t
: λ0,t∂YzF(Ym,t, Yz,t) − λ
Y
z,t − λ
A
1,tφLκ − (1 − φL)φ0κλ
A
2,t = 0.
∂L
∂L j,t
: λYj,t∂L jG(L j, xϑ j) − λ
L
t = 0, j ∈ {m, z}.
∂L
∂Cℓ,t
: βχℓu
′(Cℓ,t) − λ0,t = 0, ℓ ∈ {e,w, i}.
∂L
∂X j,t
: −λ0,t + λ
x
ϑ j,t
= 0, ϑ j ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {m, z}.
∂L
∂xϑ j ,t
: λYj,t∂xϑ jG(L j, xϑ j) − λ
x
ϑ j ,t
= 0, ϑ j ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {m, z}.
∂L
∂ι j,t
: −λιt + λ
q
ϑ j ,t
η j,tλ¯ jQ j,t = 0, ϑ j ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {m, z}.
∂L
∂Dt+1
: −λ0,t + ωλ
D
t+1 = 0.
∂L
∂qϑ j ,t
: λYj,t∂qϑ jG − λ
q
ϑ j,t
+ ω(1 + ι j,t+1η j,t+1λ¯ j)λ
q
ϑ j,t+1
= 0, ϑ j ∈ [0, 1], j ∈ {m, z}.
∂L
∂hϑ j ,t
: λ
q
ϑ j,t
αhα−1ϑ j ,t φϑ j ,tι j,tλ¯ jqϑ j,t + λ
h
ϑ j,t
αhα−1ϑ j,t φϑ j,t − ωλ
D
t+1 = 0.
∂L
∂A1,t
: −λA1,t + λ0,t
∂D(A1,t + A2,t)
∂A1
Yt
1 − D(A1,t + A2,t)
+ ωλA1,t+1 = 0.
∂L
∂A2,t
: −λA2,t + λ0,t
∂D(A1,t + A2,t)
∂A2
Yt
1 − D(A1,t + A2,t)
+ ω(1 − φ)λA2,t+1 = 0.
Note that λ0,t can be interpreted as a shadow price of time t consumption. Thus, the time
t shadow price of intermediate good produced in sector j ∈ {m, z} measured in time t
consumption goods can be defined as
λˆ j,t := λ
(y)
j,t
/λ0,t j ∈ {m, z}. (C.32)
We use this shadow price in the derivations in the main text.
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